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ABSTRACT 
From an economic point of view, decentralisation is expected to increase 
social welfare through better matching of service delivery to preferences. The 
latter have been a central piece of the economic rationales for decentralisation but 
only indirectly. Thus, at the theoretical level, the main question addressed in this 
dissertation is: might preferences in themselves influence the impact of 
decentralisation on allocative efficiency, in the context of health care resource 
allocation? 
Regardless of which model (public choice theory or principal-agent 
theory) is used to explain the positive outcome above mentioned, in any case, the 
benefits generated by decentralisation depend on the assumption of variation in 
preferences across jurisdictions. However, there is little empirical evidence 
regarding this matter. Consequently, at the empirical level, the main question 
addressed in the current work is: does geographic variation in preferences, in the 
context of health care resource allocation, exist? To answer this question we 
developed and administered the same questionnaire (eliciting preferences) to two 
independent samples drawn from two Portuguese municipalities. 
Within our fTamework, central and local decision-makers are seen as 
alternative agents acting on behalf of local populations. Given the different 
capabilities possessed by agents, decentralisation of resource allocation generates 
some trade-offs between objectives. Depending on the trade-offs that local 
populations are willing to make, they will be better-off with one or the other 
agent. Therefore, we conclude that the specific preferences held by individuals 
might also determine in themselves whether or not decentralisation is optimal, 
when compared to centralisation. 
Concerning the empirical work, the principal conclusion is that the results 
do not corroborate the hypothesis of geographic variation in preferences, meaning 
that the theoretical discussion about the impact of decentralisation on allocative 
efficiency might have to be revisited. The empirical results further suggest that the 
geographical dimension of (in)equality in treatment matters to people and that a 
maximum opportunity cost of equality, in ten-ns of health gain foregone, is likely 
to exist. 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction 
Decentralisation in the health care sector has received, since the early 1990s, 
an increasing attention from researchers and policy makers. The World Bank's 
World Development Report, in 1993, dedicated to health, has certainly contributed 
to strengthen discussions about decentralisation by classifying the latter as 
"potentially the most important force for improving efficiency and responding to 
local health conditions and demands" (cf, Reich, 2002, p. 1672). But the debate 
has not been restricted to less developed countries. Saltman and Bankauskaite 
(2004), for example, say that the concept of decentralisation has become a 
cornerstone of health policy in an increasing number of Western European 
countries. 
The phenomenon of decentralisation has been addressed by various 
disciplines and it is difficult to define but one might say that in broad terms it 
entails the transfer of powers from a central authority to more local institutions. 
Decentralisation is also associated with an array of different outcomes. Within 
economics, one of such (positive) outcomes is the increase in social welfare or 
allocative efficiency through better matching of service delivery to preferences. 
There have been two major lines of thought, within economics, that 
explain this better matching of service provision to preferences. One, linked to 
public choice theory, argues that locally elected governments compete with each 
other for constituents (who are also taxpayers), who will choose their preferred 
mix of services by 'voting with their feet' (the Tiebout effect) and moving to 
jurisdictions offering services more in line with their preferences. The other, 
related to the principal-agent theory, draws attention on information. In this case, 
the idea is that local authorities, by living closer to the people that they serve, 
have a better knowledge and understanding of the preferences held by these 
people, compared to the central authority. The concept of preferences has 
therefore played a relevant role in economic analyses of decentralisation but only 
indirectly. That is, what lead to the positive outcome above mentioned is 
information asymmetry (about preferences) or competition (among local decision 
makers) and not preferences themselves. 
The nature and content of preferences have not in fact been given attention 
II 
in the literature about decentralisation. In this literature, the concept of preferences 
has been implicitly interpreted as consumers' preferences. However, a much 
broader interpretation of this concept has been proposed in the health economics 
literature, recognising that preferences might be society regarding and not only 
centred on the self Therefore, at the theoretical level, the main question addressed 
in this dissertation is: are the nature and content of preferences relevant for the 
evaluation of the impact of decentralisation on social welfare? In other words, 
might preferences in themselves influence the impact of decentralisation on 
allocative efficiency, in the context of health care resource allocation? 
Regardless of which model (public choice theory or principal-agent 
theory) is used to explain a better matching between provision and preferences, in 
any case, the benefits generated by decentralisation depend on the extent to which 
there is variation in preferences across jurisdictions. Despite the relevance of the 
assumption of variation in preferences, there is little empirical evidence regarding 
this matter, for the context of health care. Consequently, at the empirical level, the 
main question addressed in the current work is: does geographic variation in 
preferences, in the context of health care resource allocation, exist? 
We start nonetheless with a systematic review of literature, whose main 
findings are reported in chapter two. The part of the review of literature 
corresponding to section 2.4 not only gives an account of the current state of the 
art regarding the theoretical and empirical literature about the impact of 
decentralisation on efficiency but it also serves as the basis to set up the 
framework underlying the theoretical discussion developed in chapter three. But 
because both concepts of decentralisation and efficiency beg for some 
clarification about their meaning, before reviewing the literature about the link 
between the two, we present in sections 2.2 and 2.3 the interpretations of these 
two concepts which have been mostly used in economics and health economics. 
A possible taxonomy classifies decentralisation by three categories of 
devolved responsibilities: political, administrative and fiscal. In the first case, the 
focus is on the transfer of powers from the centre to democratically elected 
representatives of local populations. Within the administrative approach, a well 
known typology classifies processes of decentralisation as deconcentration, 
delegation, devolution, and privatisation. Fiscal decentralisation focuses on the 
control at lower levels of govenu-nent over fund-raising and expenditures. Some 
12 
have argued that political and fiscal decentralisation have a limited applicability in 
the context of health care (due to the small weight that locally raised resources 
represent and due to the existence of administrative restrictions regarding the 
allocation of intergovernmental transfers). Two alternative frameworks have been 
proposed: the 'decision space' (Bossert, 1998), which draws on the principal- 
agent relationship and is interpreted as the range of effective choice that is 
allowed by the central government (the principal) to be utilised by local 
authorities (the agents); and the 'arrows framework' (Peckham et al., 2005) that is 
a two dimensional framework that distinguishes eight tiers of decision making 
(ranging from 'global' to 'individual') and three types of activities (inputs; 
process or decisions; and outcome). 
Concerning the concept of efficiency, three main interpretations have 
been used in health economics: X-efficiency or production efficiency; health 
maximisation; and allocative efficiency. Given a health production frontier, X- 
efficiency might be increased by moving the health distribution from any point 
inside the frontier to any point on the frontier. This movement, however, does not 
necessarily lead to the maximum total health. Thus, a popular interpretation of 
efficiency is health maximisation, which is met in that point on the health frontier 
where its slope equals -1. In this case, movements on the frontier towards this 
point are said to increase efficiency interpreted in this particular fashion. But 
health maximisation does not necessarily corresponds to the maximum welfare if 
the latter is affected namely by distributional considerations. Theoretical 
arguments supporting these varied distributional considerations are reviewed in 
section 2.3. In this section, we follow a classification that groups principles of 
justice into maximising principles, egalitarian principles, and need principles. 
Moreover, a further distinction is made between distributive and procedural 
justice. In the former case, outcomes are at the centre of discussions, while in the 
latter case, procedures are the core issue. Some of these considerations might 
conflict with each other; in particular, when there is a conflict between health 
maximisation and other principles, it is said that an equity- effi ci ency trade-off 
exists. It might even occur that a point inside the health frontier is preferred to a 
point on the frontier, on the grounds of e. g. procedural concerns. Thus, in this 
case, the equity- effi ci ency trade-off might involve not only health maximisation 
but also production efficiency. 
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Bearing in mind that efficiency and decentralisation might be interpreted 
in various ways, section 2.4 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature 
regarding the impact of decentralisation on efficiency, with a special focus on the 
context of health care resource allocation. There are arguments that point to a 
positive link between decentralisation and both production and allocative 
efficiency but there are also arguments that point to the opposite result. Examples 
of the fon-ner are greater knowledge at the local level regarding local 
circumstances affecting production costs, greater innovation at the local level, and 
a better match between service provision and preferences. Examples of the latter 
are the loss of economies of scale, lower technical knowledge at the local level, 
and the existence of externalities. On the whole, there is some ambiguity 
regarding the positive or negative impact of decentralisation on efficiency. This 
ambiguity of results is also a characteristic of empirical studies that have 
addressed this question. 
The literature about decentralisation has used the concept of preferences 
but this concept has not been expressly addressed within that stream of literature, 
in which preferences have been implicitly interpreted as consumers' preferences. 
However, once we look at the literature about health care resource allocation, we 
conclude that this interpretation is limited in the context of health care. In fact, in 
this dissertation the concept of preferences is used in a broad sense. Therefore, it 
is important to review the literature that supports this wider interpretation, which 
is done in section 2.5. Three main criteria that might be used to classify 
preferences are identified: 'whom respondents are asked to think about'; 'what 
respondents are asked to think about'; and 'individual versus collective 
preferences'. A major and perhaps the most important distinction is that between 
personal preferences and social preferences. In the fon-ner case, what matters is 
what individuals prefer for themselves on whatever basis, whereas in the latter 
case, what matters is what individuals prefer for the society as a whole. In general 
terrns, this distinction opposes a consumer perspective to a citizen perspective. 
Expanding the concept of preferences in economic analyses might lead 
some to question whether this is like opening Pandora's box. Consequently, in 
section 2.6, the empirical literature regarding preferences in the context of health 
care resource allocation is reviewed, showing that a link between theories that 
explain preferences and preferences held by the general public does in fact exist. 
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Many empirical studies have been conducted in England or UK, therefore, this 
part of the review of literature is also used to support the discussion In chapter 
five. In the final section of chapter two, we identify several topics that remain 
under-explored in the literature, some of which are addressed in subsequent 
chapters. 
Chapter three then addresses the central theoretical question of this 
dissertation: might preferences in themselves influence the impact of 
decentralisation on allocative efficiency? We begin by defining the framework on 
which the discussion is grounded. This framework stems from the literature 
reviewed in chapter two and more detailed information about it as well as about 
the theoretical or empirical literature supporting it is provided in section 3.2. The 
central assumptions are: there is variation in preferences across jurisdictions; there 
is imperfect infort-nation regarding preferences and local authorities are better 
infon-ned about these preferences (in their respective jurisdictions) compared to 
the central authority; the centre has superior technical information compared to 
local authorities; decision-makers, both at the central and local levels, are 
benevolent planners that seek to maximise the social welfare of local populations. 
This is a possible framework but we acknowledge that, based on the review of 
literature, information asymmetry for example can go either way. Moreover, the 
literature is ambiguous regarding the impact of decentralisation on allocative 
efficiency as well as on production efficiency. Our interest lies on the hypothesis 
of both impacts diverging but we recognise that given the current state of 
knowledge different assumptions would be acceptable as well. 
Globally, our framework might be viewed as an adaptation of the 
principal-agent approach. Traditionally, the principal-agent analysis applied to 
decentralisation is focused on the relationship between the central decision-maker 
(the principal) and local decision-makers (the agents). In our case, by assuming 
that decision-makers are benevolent planners, emphasis is given to the 
relationship between the central and local decision-makers, on the one hand, and 
local populations, on the other. Both types of decision-makers are thus seen as 
alternative agents and the idea is to compare, for each local population, the 
relative performance of the central and local authorities, in meeting the 
preferences of local people (see Figure 2). Centralisation is taken as the status quo 
(which fits the perspective adopted in most Western European countries as well as 
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less developed countries) against which decentralisation is evaluated. In our 
discussion, decentralisation is said to improve allocative efficiency if it leads to a 
better match, compared to centralisation, between what is achieved with resource 
allocation and what are the preferences regarding this same allocation. 
Sections 3.3 to 3.6 deal with different trade-offs between objectives of 
resource allocation that might emerge with decentralisation. These objectives 
range from production efficiency and health maximisation to equal provision of 
health care; participation or voice in decision making; and reduction in 
inequalities in health across jurisdictions. In this context, whether or not 
decentralisation improves welfare depends on how people trade-off the various 
arguments of welfare considered in each case. We thus conclude that preferences 
might determine the extent to which decentralisation is optimal compared to 
centralisation. In sections 3.3 to 3.6, preferences affect the distribution of local 
budgets within jurisdictions but not the distribution of the whole health care 
budget among jurisdictions. Therefore, in section 3.7, we consider the possibility 
of (heterogeneous) local preferences about health states being used to allocate a 
common pool of resources among jurisdictions and discuss its implications, 
compared to the case in which national preferences are used. We argue that 
distributing resources between jurisdictions based on local preferences raises 
some problems but, once local budgets have been set, it is optimal from the 
perspective of local welfare to allocate local budgets based on local preferences. 
The conclusions achieved in chapter three are obviously dependent on the 
assumptions presented in the beginning of the chapter; hence, in the final section 
(section 3.8) we point the limitations that might apply, discussing the 
consequences of relaxing some assumptions. 
One of the previous limitations has to do precisely with the assumption of 
variation in preferences across jurisdictions. Thus, in chapter four we report on a 
small-scale empirical study that sought to address this question; the main 
objective of this chapter is therefore to assess whether or not there are differences 
in preferences, in our case, between two independent samples drawn from two 
distinct Portuguese municipalities. 
To pursue this objective we developed and administered (method of 
delivery and collection) the same questionnaire to both samples. The selection of 
regions from which to draw the samples was partly by practical convenience and 
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partly judgemental, being the samples defined by quotas based on the composition 
of local populations (age, sex and level of education). The questionnaire 
comprises 6 questions (for the English version of the questionnaire see Appendix 
B; for the Portuguese version of the questionnaire see Appendix C) and adopting 
the terminology reviewed in chapter two, on might say that two types of 
preferences are elicited: personal preferences and social preferences. Regarding 
the latter, we have elicited preferences concerning the criteria of health 
maximisation and equality of treatment (across geographic regions) as well as the 
trade-off between them (using person trade-off questions). The selection of 
preferences to test for geographic diversity followed from the review of literature 
in which we concluded that the geographical dimension of (in)equality has not 
been addressed in empirical works; thus, this seemed to be an opportunity to 
contribute to current knowledge by looking at people's views about the trade-off 
between health maximisation and geographic equality in health care provision. 
This sort of trade-offs might actually acquire particular relevance in contexts of 
decentralisation given that the latter have been associated with geographic 
variations in provision. Additionally, that type of trade-off is addressed in chapter 
three; therefore, the empirical findings could be seen as a test regarding the 
pertinence, from a practical point of view, of the theoretical discussion. 
Descriptive statistics and graphical methods are used to explore the data, giving 
an account of respondents' preferences and an initial overview of differences 
between samples. Differences are afterwards analysed using inductive statistical 
methods. In all tests, the null hypothesis is that both samples have been drawn 
from the same population (or, from populations with the same mean, median or 
distribution, depending on the test), that is, to conclude that differences between 
samples are statistically significant one should be allowed to reject the null 
hypothesis. 
The main conclusions of the empirical study are: there are no differences 
in preferences across samples (given that the statistical tests showed that basically 
for all variables the null hypothesis could not be rejected); people are sensitive to 
geographic inequality in health care provision; and people are willing to mail- ke 
trade-offs between the principles of health maximisation and geographic equality 
of treatment (most people are willing to forego between 10 and 30 per cent of 
total health gain to keep geographic equality of treatment in return). These results 
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naturally apply for the case of the specific regions and for the particular topics 
approached in the study, which has its own limitations. These and other 
limitations (e. g. method of administration and size of samples) are identified in 
the final section of chapter four and directions to future research are suggested. 
Given the various forms that concepts such as decentralisation, efficiency 
and preferences might embody, there has been some lack of clarity in the use of 
these concepts in the literature. But this lack of clarity has also characterised the 
political discourse about decentralisation in health care. It is therefore important to 
point where ambiguities arise and further clarifications are needed. The objective 
of chapter five is precisely to draw attention on these ambiguities for the case of 
the debate about decentralisation in the English National Health Service (NHS). 
The focus on the English NHS is justified with the fact decentralisation in health 
care is one of the current policy themes in England, reflected in the political 
discourse of 'shifting the balance of power'. In fact, the English NHS has been the 
object of numerous analyses which is comprehensible given the successive 
reforms that it has been subjected to, in some cases representing worldwide 
pioneer initiatives. 
We first look at the use of the concept of preferences, in the context of the 
English NHS, noting that both consumer and citizen perspectives apply to this 
context but the distinction between the two has not always been explicit. Another 
ambiguity or confusion that seems to exist in the English NHS and that might 
affect the respective debate about decentralisation is that between variations in 
provision due to varying technical knowledge and variations in provision due to 
varying preferences. In chapter five, we use the framework proposed in section 
3.2 to distinguish between the two sources of variations. This question is even 
more pertinent in the case of the English NHS given the aversion to variations in 
provision that seems to exist in England. Finally, public involvement or 
participation in decision making is also a current theme in the English NHS and it 
is also a central issue associated with decentralisation. In England, there is at a 
rhetorical (and legal) level an association between participation and local NHS 
organisations. The question is that two approaches to participation have been 
identified (consequentialist approach and procedural approach) and some 
ambiguities might arise when, for example, the public and authorities have 
different views about participation or, when the approach adopted by authorities is 
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not accompanied in practice by mechanisms to implement it. In chapter five we 
suggest that this sort of ambiguities exists in the English NHS as well. 
To conclude the chapter, we suggest that the debate would benefit if the 
issues that we have addressed in regards to the NHS were made clearer, 
particularly, in terms of policy guidance flowing from the central government to 
local organisations and in terms of information directed at the general public. 
Although our discussion is focused on the English case, these ambiguities are 
likely to apply to other countries as well. 
Chapter six closes this dissertation with a summary of our main results and 
conclusions, pointing out their major limitations and the future research agenda 
that might succeed the current work. 
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CHAPTER 2. Review of literature: the core concepts of 
decentralisation, efficiency and preferences; theory and evidence about 
the impact of decentralisation on efficiency; and the evidence about 
preferences 
2.1. Introduction 
The phenomenon of decentralisation has been addressed by various 
disciplines and is associated with an array of different outcomes; in some cases, 
the same outcome results from different explanations depending on the discipline 
at stake. Given that the current dissertation focuses on the efficiency of health care 
resource allocation in the context of decentralisation, this chapter reviews the 
theoretical as well as the empirical literature regarding the impact of 
decentralisation on efficiency. Moreover, our interest lies on the perspective of 
economics and, in particular, of health economics. 
The main objectives are therefore to review the theoretical literature 
concerning the impact (positive or negative) of decentralisation on efficiency; the 
arguments used to explain that impact and how the concept of preferences relates 
to these arguments. We start with economic arguments in general and then focus 
on the particular case of health care resource allocation. In addition, the review of 
empirical evidence (in the context of health care) aims to reach a conclusion on 
whether or not the theoretical arguments are supported by the evidence. This part 
of the review (of theoretical and empirical literature), presented in section 2.4, not 
only gives an account of the current state of the art but it also serves as the basis to 
set up the framework (section 3.2) within which the discussion is developed in 
chapter three. 
Because social scientists often do not share common meanings even when 
they use common words (Culyer, 1989b), it is important to clarify the meanings of 
the concepts of decentralisation and efficiency, before reviewing the literature 
regarding the relationship between them. Consequently, sections 2.2 and 2.3 
present the interpretations of these concepts mostly used in economics and health 
economics. 
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The economic arguments, presented in section 2.4, that support a positive 
link between decentralisation and (allocative) efficiency make use of the concept 
of preferences, without explicitly addressing the concept in itself However. 
several distinctions have been made in the literature about health care resource 
allocation, namely between self-regarding and society-regarding preferences. 
Hence, section 2.5 reviews the main classifications of preferences found in the 
health economics literature. This part of the review is important to support the 
(wide) concept of preferences used in the theoretical discussion, in chapter three, 
as well as to classify preferences in the empirical work reported in chapter four. 
Together with section 2.3, section 2.5 also serves to show that the examples of 
preferences used throughout this dissertation are not arbitrary. To show in 
addition that they are not empirically unfounded, section 2.6 reviews the empirical 
evidence about what matters to people when it comes to allocate health care 
resources. 
In chapter five, we will also recall much of the content of sections 2.3,2.5 
and 2.6, namely to point out the lack of clarity of some concepts (like values or 
preferences) that have been used in the context of the English NHS and to support 
some parts of the discussion with available evidence for this context (e. g. 
preferences regarding participation in decision making). 
In the final section of this chapter (section 2.7), we summarise the main 
findings of the review of literature and identify some gaps and areas that remain 
under-explored in the literature, some of which are addressed in subsequent 
chapters. 
Methodology 
Data sources included electronic searches of various databases (EconLit, 
Medline, Wilson Social Sciences Abstracts and PsycINFO) as well as the follow- 
up of references in selected papers. The main search was carried out in the second 
semester of 2004 though more recent publications are also included, which have 
resulted from a few updates of the literature search (the last update took place in 
June 2007). 
The key tenns used (usually in the forin of combinations that included 
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health or decentralisation) were: health, decentralisation, efficiency, public (or 
social) preferences (or values), equity, justice, fairness and public participation (or 
involvement). 
Regarding the empirical literature about decentralisation in health care, 
much of the evidence has been produced for the case of developing countries. 
Although there might be differences in terms of key issues between developing 
and e. g. Western European countries, we did not exclude a priori the studies 
applied to the former context. In terms of the empirical studies about preferences 
in the context of health care resource allocation, we excluded empirical studies 
that elicited preferences from a specific perspective like the views of patients or 
health staff (we have nonetheless retained studies that used convenience samples 
such as students or academic staff provided that the stated aim was to elicit views 
from the perspective of the general public). Within this latter literature, there has 
been a discussion about the pros and cons of the various methods of preference 
elicitation. It is not however our objective to address this question, therefore, we 
also excluded studies specifically designed to approach methodological issues 
(there is an exception for the case of the person trade-off technique but this part of 
the literature is reviewed in chapter four, in the context of the empirical work 
reported there). 
2.2. The concept of decentralisation 
Decentralisation has been approached from diverse perspectives and by 
various disciplines, leading to different interpretations. As above stated, here our 
objective is to present the main interpretations referred to in the health economics 
literature, which in turn rely on the frameworks developed by economists. It 
should be said that it is unlikely that any single framework apply in all 
circumstances and it is also common to find overlaps between categories within 
the same framework. The main interdisciplinary consensus regarding the concept 
of decentralisation is perhaps the recognition that it represents a complex 
phenomenon. Levaggi and Smith (2005, p. 225) say that decentralisation in health 
care is indeed difficult to define. These authors still suggest that, in broad terms, 
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"it entails the transfer of powers from a central authority (typically the national 
government) to more local institutions". 
A possible taxonomy (used by e. g. Saltman and Bankauskaite, 2004, and 
Hutchinson and LaFond, 2004) classifies decentralisation by three categories of 
devolved responsibilities: political, administrative and fiscal. The distinction 
among these categories is not however clear cut. 
Regarding political decentralisation, it has been broadly defined as the 
shift in the public decision making power from a more-central to a more-local 
authority, in particular through democratic processes. It generally assumes that 
local decision makers are democratically elected representatives of local 
populations. 
Administrative decentralisation "is the transfer of responsibility for 
planning, financing, and managing certain public functions from the central 
government and its agencies to subordinate units or levels of government, semi- 
autonomous public authorities or corporations, or areawide, regional, or functional 
authorities" (Hutchinson and LaFond, 2004, p. 5, quoting Dennis Rondinelli). 
Saltman and Bankauskaite (2004, p. 8) say that the concept of administrative 
decentralisation emerged in opposition to the core tenets of Weberian 
bureaucracy. This form of decentralisation emphasises the greater or lower 
operational authority of lower level functionaries. 
Within the administrative approach, Rondinelli's (1983) four-fold 
typology (related to the institutions to which responsibilities are devolved) has 
been widely used to classify processes of decentralisation: deconcentration - 
spatial relocation of decision making, i. e. the shift of power from the central 
offices to peripheral offices of the same administrative structure (e. g. Ministry of 
Health and its district offices); delegation - shifts responsibility and authority to 
semi-autonomous agencies (e. g. a separate regulatory commission or an 
accreditation commission); devolution -shifts responsibility and authority from 
the central offices of the Ministry of Health to separate administrative structures 
still within the public administration (e. g. local governments of provinces, 
municipalities); and privatisation - transfers operational responsibilities and in 
some cases ownership to private providers. 
A distinction between vertical decentralisation and horizontal 
decentralisation might also be introduced here. In the former case, authority is 
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transferred to lower levels of decision making (this adjusts to forins of 
decentralisation such as delegation or devolution). In the case of horizontal 
decentralisation, at each level of decision making, authority might be spread out 
from a central point (this notion conforins to the concept of deconcentration). 
The third category of decentralisation, above introduced, is fiscal 
decentralisation. This sort of decentralisation refers to the control, at lower levels 
of government, over financial resources, either in terms of fund-raising and/or 
expenditure assignments. Saltman and Bankauskaite (2004) note that the seminal 
literature on fiscal decentralisation appeared under the label of 'fiscal federalism', 
given its original conceptualisation to fit the characteristics of a federal state (US). 
Each of these frameworks captures only some of the diverse dimensions of 
decision making. For this reason, each framework naturally presents weaknesses 
in some aspects, while performing better in other particular features. An 
advantage of the administrative approach, pointed by Saltman and Bankauskaite 
(2004), is that it acknowledges the distinction between policy and management, 
recognising that policy can remain partly central even as health system 
management is mostly decentralised. 
In the case of the four-part typology presented above, a central feature is 
the focus on the appropriate level for decentralising functions and responsibilities. 
However, although there is an implicit assumption that moving from 
deconcentration toward privatisation is likely to increase the range of choice 
allowed to local officials and managers, there is not a clear link between each 
form of decentralisation and what is being decentralised. 
Bossert (1998) argues that the main strength of the political and fiscal 
decentralisation approaches is their focus on choices made by local governments, 
developing "clear and parsimonious theoretical propositions to explain those 
choices" (p. 1515) but he claims that this framework has a limited applicability in 
the health care sector, namely in Western European countries and less developed 
countries. The author therefore proposes his own framework, based on the 
principal-agent theory, the latter being in fact presented by this author as an 
autonomous framework for the analysis of decentralisation. 
Initially developed to examine choices made by managers of private 
corporations, the principal-agent approach proposes a principal with specified 
objectives and agents who are needed to implement activities to achieve those 
24 
objectives. Agents may share some of the principal's objectives but they may also 
have additional interests and have some informational advantage over the 
principal. In order to overcome the informational asymmetry and self-interests of 
agents, the principal might use a scheme of incentives and sanctions. In the health 
sector, the Ministry of Health could be seen as a principal, with a range of 
objectives, and local authorities could be seen as agents who are given resources 
to implement general policies to achieve these objectives. Drawing on the 
principal-agent analysis, Bossert (1998) suggests the concept of 'decision space', 
which is interpreted as the range of effective choice that is allowed by the central 
government (the principal) to be utilised by local authorities (the agents). The 
author considers five categories of functions (finance, service organisation, human 
resources, access rules and governance rules). Within each category, Bossert 
(1998) defines the range of choice as 'narrow', 'moderate' and 'wide'. 
A framework more recently proposed by Peckham et al. (2005), 
conceptualised to fit the characteristics of the English NHS is ten-ned by the 
authors as the 'Arrows Framework'. This is a two dimensional framework that 
distinguishes eight tiers of decision making (Global; Europe; UK; 
England/ScotlandiWales and Northern Ireland; Organisation, like Primary Care 
Trust; Subunit, like practice; and individual) and three types of activities (inputs, 
including funding; process or decisions; and outcome, i. e. the definition of 
targets). The strength of this approach is making clear 'from where to where' 
decentralisation occurs, including the individual as the maximum exponent of 
decentralisation as well as the type of decisions over which decision making 
power is being transferred. It also accommodates opposite movements, in terms of 
decentralisation/centralisation, at the same time. This framework contributes to 
reducing the ambiguity in the definition of decentralisation but, as the authors 
note, it does not establish a link between centralising or decentralising movements 
and performance. 
2.3. The concept of efficiency 
In economics, one may distinguish among different kinds or levels of 
YORK 
i-110n 
inAlf 
25 
efficiency. Culyer (1989a), for instance, classifies them as: technical efficiency 
(when physical inputs are minimised for a given level of output, or, given the 
amount of physical inputs, the level of output is maximized - might be defined as 
'being on an isoquant'); cost-effectiveness, sometimes termed as X-efficiency or 
as production efficiency (not only are physical inputs minimised for a given level 
of output but also the total cost is minimised - might be defined as 'being where 
an isocost line is tangential to an isoquant); and ideal output or top-level 
efficiency (using Culyer's (1989a, p. 35) words, this level of efficiency is achieved 
when cost-effective outputs are produced at a rate that is 'socially' optimal and 
allocated to individual members of society in a 'socially' optimal fashion, that is, 
when the marginal rate of (product) transformation is equal to the marginal rate of 
substitution). 
Weffiarism versus extra-weffiarism 
The definitions above make use of to the concept of output, which has 
itself been the subject of debate. That is, there is a debate about what it is that 
should be maximised or distributed. In this respect, there are two broad 
approaches that became known as welfarism versus extra-welfarism, two terins 
introduced in the literature by Sen (1977) and Culyer (1989a), respectively. 
Others prefer to talk about non-welfarism instead of extra-welfarism (Tsuchiya 
and Williams, 2001). In the context of health care, two kinds of desideraturn are 
associated with the previous perspectives: utility and health. 
Utilitarian theory is welfarist and welfarism holds that the only 
information that is relevant to assessing social welfare is the level of personal 
utility, that is, the level of utility that is perceived by the individuals as the level of 
their own wellbeing (Tsuchiya and Miyamoto, 2007). According to Culyer 
(1989a), extra-welfarism transcends traditional welfare; it does not necessarily 
exclude individual welfares from the judgement about the social state but it does 
supplement them with other aspects of individuals. Sen (1980), for instance, 
suggests that further infori-nation beyond utility must enter the process of 
comparing social states, stressing the role of 'basic capabilities' and 
'functionings'. A capability is the ability to achieve a certain sort of functioning, 
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while the space of functionings is the various things a person may value doing or 
being (see also Sen and Foster, 1997). Culyer (1989b) adopts the notion of 
'characteristics of people'. These characteristics may represent deprivation or 
desired states. Thus, commodities and characteristics of commodities are needed 
to remove the deprivation or to move towards the desired state. 
While welfare economics literature conceptualises the social welfare 
function' (SWF) as a function of personal utility, the health economics literature 
has often defined the relevant social objective function as a function of individual 
health (Abasolo and Tsuchiya, 2004). Tsuchiya and Miyamoto (2006) note that 
"the desideratum in health economics has also been perceived to be health per se, 
not because it is valued by individuals as patients or consumers (although it may 
well be) but because it is valued by the public at large or the relevant decision 
makers". Tsuchiya and Miyamoto (2007) conclude "social welfare in the context of 
public policy decision making is not a function of the utility enjoyed by constituent 
individuals of society as judged by themselves, but a function of social desiderata, 
dictated by the relevant policy context". 
Health maximisation 
Within the predominant 'extra-welfarist' perspective adopted in the health 
economics literature, two main interpretations of efficiency can be identified: X- 
efficiency and health maxirnisation. We use Figure 1 to illustrate them. 
In Figure 1, hx and hy cardinally measure the health of two representative 
individuals or groups of individuals, X and Y. An example of a health measure is 
the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY). This measure entails two dimensions: 
length and quality of life. Each year of life is weighted by a quality-of-life score. 
This score depends on the health state associated with each year and varies 
typically from zero (death) to one (perfect health). In some situations, negative 
scores may be considered appropriate if there are health states seen as being worse 
than death. S is the health endowment, corresponding to the total amount of health 
The social welfare function is an economic device that provides a complete ordering of 
alternative social states. It is common to represent it in a two-dimension space by a set of 
indifference curves (on the conventional properti of social welfare functions, namely in the es 
context of health, see e. g. Abasolo and Tsuchiya, 2004). 
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enjoyed by X and Y, in the absence of health care. fyfx is the health possibility 
frontier and shows for a fixed level of Xs health (or Ts health) what is the 
maximum amount of health that Y (X) can obtain, given the available resources to 
allocate between X and Y and given the technology that transforins health care 
resources into health. X-efficiency can therefore be described as 'being on the 
health possibility frontier' and movements towards the frontier can be said to 
increase X-efficiency. 
hy 
hx 
Figure 1. Notions of efficiency and equity 
But efficiency in health is sometimes interpreted as 'health maximisation' 
(e. g. Wagstaff, 1991 and Williams, 1996,1997b), corresponding to a particular 
point on the health possibility frontier, fyfx. On this point, the total sum of rs 
and Y's units of health (with uniform weights attached to the health gain going for 
each individual) is maximised. Efficiency is met when it is not possible to further 
increase total health by substituting Xs health by Ts health and vice-versa (in 
Figure 1, health maximisation is achieved on point M, where the slope of the 
frontier is -1). Further note that X-efficiency is a necessary condition to achieve 
health maximisation. 
Allocative qf . 
Ticiency and sociaIjustice 
Allocative efficiency or top-level efficiency is about choosing the point 
that represents the preferred social state. In Figure 1, the preferred social state 
28 
might coincide with point M, or it might not. It has long been acknowledged 
(Wagstaff, 1991) that health maximisation, as represented by point M, might not 
reflect all the distributional concerns which potentially determine the preferred 
social state. These distributional concerns have been addressed mainly under the 
heading of equity (sometimes the question is put as a matter of principles of 
justice in health care priority setting) and it is now widely accepted that equity is 
an important policy objective in the health care field, particularly in publicly 
funded health care systems. 
Because accommodating other distributional concerns might imply a 
movement away from point M, in Figure 1, this means that a trade-off has to be 
made between what point M represents and what other aimed points represent. 
The most common approach in the health economics literature has identified this 
sort of trade-off as an equity-efficiency trade-off (e. g., Wagstaff, 1991; Williams 
1997b; Dolan, 1998; Dolan and Olsen, 200 1). Others (most notably Culyer (1995, 
2006)) have nonetheless defended that there is no such trade-off as the notion of 
efficiency should be purged of 'any embodied distributive equity assumptions' 
and should therefore be interpreted as 'being on the health possibility frontier' (in 
which case, movements away from M but still on the frontier do not represent a 
departure from efficiency). But, apart from these divergences in terms of the 
interpretation of the equity-efficiency trade-off, all agree that top-level efficiency, 
i. e. the preferred social state, might depend on a range of distributional concerns 
beyond that of health maximisation. 
There is an immense literature about social justice already applied to the 
context of health and health care. Although there might be diverse forms of 
grouping theories of justice, here we follow Cookson and Dolan (2000)2 . 
These 
authors distinguish between principles of substantive justice (which are about 
determining who should get what health care and when) and principles of 
procedural justice (which are about what decision making process should be 
followed). They focus on substantive justice, identifying three principles more 
relevant to the context of health care: maximising principles (in this case, health 
care should be distributed in order to achieve the maximum 'benefit'); egalitarian 
I 
-For a comprehensive classification of theories of equity in the distribution of health see Williams 
and Cookson (2000). 
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principles (health care should be distributed with the aim of reducing 
'inequality'); and need principles (the distribution of health care should be 
proportional to 'need'). Depending on how 'benefit', 'inequality' and 'need' are 
defined, these three principles have given rise to several variants. 
The most common variant of maximising principles, in the case of health 
and health care, interprets 'benefit' as the population's health (an alternative, 
much less popular among health economists, would be to interpret 'benefit' as 
utility or happiness, in line with classical utilitarianism - see above discussion 
about welfarism versus extra-welfarism). We have already seen that point M, in 
Figure 1, conforms to maximising principles. 
Egalitarian principles advocate equality but, in fact, it has been said that all 
theories of justice seeks equality of something and that "the real work begins with 
the specification of what is it that is to be equalised" (Sen, 2002, p. 660). A 
straightforward variant of egalitarian principles in the case of health care requires 
the distribution of health care resources so as to reduce inequalities in health. In 
Figure 1, equality of health (hx=hy) is verified along the 45' line through the 
origin. As it can be seen, point M (health maximisation) lies off this line and, from 
an egalitarian perspective, it is therefore inequitable. From the set of points that 
fon-n the health possibility frontier, in Figure 1, only point E meets equality of 
health. 
Cookson and Dolan (2000) note however that most authors that defend 
egalitarian principles would not in fact pursue equality as a sole objective, but 
would rather combine equality with other goals. A combination of equality of 
health and, for example, health maximisation would generate a point on the 
frontier, in Figure 1, between M and E (see e. g. the seminal paper on the equity- 
efficiency trade-off, Wagstaff (1991)). A strict egalitarian position would 
nonetheless pen-nit no concessions to health maximisation except as between 
alternatives that gave people equal levels of health. This situation is commonly 
represented by L-shaped indifference curves, in which there is a social 
improvement only if the health of the worse-off person is increased (also known 
as the 'maximin' principle). We should further note that L-shaped indifference 
curves have also been termed as Rawlsian indifference curves after Rawls' theory 
of justice (Rawls, 1971,1999) but, in this theory, social and economic inequalities 
are to be measured by an index of 'primary goods' (all purpose means that every 
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rational person needs to pursue their own ends - Williams and Cookson, 2000) in 
3 
which health is not included 
Further variants of equality of health might be identified, depending on 
how health is defined (see Dolan and Olsen, (2001)). One of such variants has 
gained considerable visibility and became known as the 'fair innings' argument 
(Williams, 1997a, 1997b), according to which everyone is entitled to a similarly 
long and healthy life. The implication for health care resource allocation is the 
prioritisation in favour of individuals in risk of failing to achieve their entitlement 
in terms of length and quality of life, compared to individuals that already got 
more than their entitlement. Generally, this principle favours the young over the 
4 old . In the case of Figure 1, point E could represent this principle (equalisation of 
lifetime health) provided that hx and hy were measured in terms of total health 
(including past health). 
Equality of health is not however the only kind of equality that might 
represent an equitable distribution. Cookson and Dolan (2000) identify a second 
variant of egalitarian principles which focuses on equalising people's opportunity 
for lifetime health, rather than achieved levels of health to account for individual 
freedom of choice and autonomy in making choices that influence health. This 
approach introduces a difference between health inequality and health inequity; 
the same is to say, there might be inequalities in health that are deemed fair if, for 
example, they result from a personal decision not to worry about health in 
particular. 
As Sen (2002) argues, health inequalities cannot be identified with health 
inequity. This author has firstly developed the capability approach (see above), 
precisely emphasising equality of opportunity. In the case of health, Sen (2002) 
distinguishes between health achievement and the capability to achieve good 
health (which may or may not be exercised). This author continues saying that 
"what is particularly serious as an injustice is the lack of opportunity that some 
may have to achieve health because of inadequate social arrangements" (Sen, 
3 In addition, the maximin principle following from Rawls' theory is not driven by altruism or 
concern for the least advantaged members of society; instead, it is the result of risk-averse 
individuals choosing behind a veil of ignorance (i. e. individuals choose to maximise the position 
of the worst off because they do not know in advance if they will belong to this group). 
4 This is not the only principle that favours the young over the old: at least two other forms of 
ageism, 'health maximization ageism' and 'productivity ageism, have been identified in the 
literature (Tsuchiya et al., 2003). 
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2002, p-660). He nonetheless acknowledges that health achievement tends to be a 
good guide to underlying capabilities. This might be due to the fact that ill health 
would rarely be entirely attributable to a person's own actions and even in the 
case of the so-called 'lifestyle-diseases', it is said that they are not just self- 
inflicted but rather caused by a mental or biological response to the environment 
in which the person lives (Olsen et al., 2003 )5. In the case of Figure 1, the 
egalitarian variant of equal opportunity implies that points on the frontier 
involving health inequality might well represent distributional concerns, which are 
equally defensible from an ethical point of view. 
Sen (2002) further distinguishes between achievement and capability, on 
the one side, and the facilities socially offered for that achievement. Health care 
can be seen as an example (though not the only one) of these latter facilities. In 
fact, social justice in health and health care has also been discussed in reference to 
health care itself and the notion that access to health care ought to be the same for 
everyone is a popular distributive principle (Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993) but the 
concept of access too can be interpreted in various way: (i) access as utilisation of 
health care; (ii) access as the money and time costs incurred in receiving health 
care; (iii) access as the maximum attainable consumption of health care; and (iv) 
access as the forgone utility cost of obtaining health care. 
Williams and Cookson (2000) say that the principle of equal access to 
health care places ethical constraints on the health possibility set, ruling out all 
attainable health outcomes that require unequal access to health care. Thus, in 
Figure 1, we might have points on the health frontier excluded from the health 
possibility set or we might have points inside the health possibility frontier that 
represent preferred social states, compared to points on the frontier, if the latter 
imply unequal access to health care. For example, point A in Figure I might be 
preferred over points on the frontier because in A some kind of equality of access 
is guaranteed. Further note that, in such cases, alternative social states might 
involve a trade-off where X-efficiency itself is at stake and not only health 
5 The discussion about individual responsibility has led some to claim that discrimination should 
occur in terms of health care financing but not in terms of health care delivery (e. g. Le Grand, 
199 1). Williams and Cookson (2000), for instance, accommodate Le Grand's suggestion by 
defining an autonomous 'theory', which they call 'equality of opportunity for health using 
financial means only'. Even at the finance level there might be some distinctions. Cappelen and 
Norheim (2006). for instance, argue that individuals should be held responsible for their choices 
and not for the consequences of their choices. This argument supports, they say, for example, 
levving taxes on tobacco instead of having cancer victims paying for their treatment. 
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maximisation. 
There is a third set of principles of justice identified by Cookson and 
Dolan (2000), related to the concept of need. These authors say that distributing 
health care resources according to need is one of the most popular principles, 
namely among clinicians (perhaps because it is seen as the opposite to distributing 
resources according to ability to pay). But, as with the previous principles, 'need' 
might be interpreted in different ways, originating several variants of this 
principle of justice. The most common interpretation of need defines it as the 
degree of ill-health. Following this principle, priority in terms of resource 
allocation should be given to the most severely ill, in the extreme, to those facing 
life threatening situations. In fact, this latter case has been specifically identified 
as the 'rule of rescue' (the imperative people feel to rescue identifiable individuals 
facing avoidable death - Mckie and Richardson, 2003). These interpretations have 
been criticised for ignoring the expected benefit of health care (for example, a 
ten-ninally ill person certainly needs health but it is hard to see how he or she 
needs health care if the situation is irreversible). To overcome this limitation, 
economists have proposed an alternative interpretation of need as capacity to 
benefit from health care. However, this still does not account for differences in 
treatment costs (for instance, if two individuals have the same capacity to benefit, 
according to the previous principle, both should receive the same amount of 
resources; however, if treatment costs vary between them, it might mean that one 
gets treated and the other does not). Hence, another interpretation of need that has 
been suggested (Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993) sees it as the expenditures required 
to exhaust capacity to benefit. Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) show how the 
allocation of resources based on the different interpretations of need can lead to 
different points on the health possibility frontier and how it can generate unequal 
distribution of health. Hence, need principles might also support the distinction 
between health inequality and health inequity. 
Besides the consequentialist approach to social justice, which evaluates 
alternative social states based on outcomes, there is an alternative view according 
to which it matters how the different states of the world are determined. We now 
focus on this latter, procedural, dimension of social justice. 
The works by Thibaut and Walker (1978) and Lind and Tyler (1988) are 
pointed as two seminal theories into procedural justice, in this case, more oriented 
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to the legal studies and social psychology. The former authors suggested that fair 
procedures influenced disputant's satisfaction with the legal system and their 
belief that justice has been done, regardless of the verdict, that is, regardless of 
whether the outcomes they received were fair or personally beneficial. In 
particular, these authors proposed that disputants will perceive that they have 
received fair treatment when they are permitted to communicate their views to 
those responsible for the final decision and they believe that their input facilitates 
their chance of obtaining desired and fair outcomes. Thibaut and Walker (1978) 
thus emphasised the instrumental value of having voice or control over decision 
making. 
Lind and Tyler's (1988) group value theory in turn explains why having a 
4voice' in the decision making process might also have non-instrumental value. 
Non-instrumentality means that even if disputants believe that communicating 
their views will not affect outcomes, having a 'voice' still affects their perceptions 
on whether they have been treated fairly. The group value model assumes that 
group identification is psychologically rewarding and that individuals are 
motivated to establish and maintain group bonds. A central claim of the theory is 
that being listened to is symbolically important as it reveals that group authorities 
value the individuals' standing in their social groups (Heuer, 2005). 
In addition to voice, five other broad procedural characteristics have been 
identified (Wailoo and Anand, 2005; Tsuchiya et al., 2005; Dolan et al., 2007): 
neutralitY6 (requires that the interests of similar people within a process are treated 
in the same way); consistency (the roles accorded to similar people must be the 
same or the same decision making criteria must be applied across time and 
comparable decision contextS)7 ; accuracy (assessment of the accuracy of different 
types of information); reversibility (right to appeal an unfavourable decision, for 
example, on the grounds that there were some process violations); and 
transparency (requirement about transparency about what procedures are in use 
and whether procedural rules were followed). 
Further note that in some literature, namely in the political economy and in 
the literature about decentralisation , in particular, the concept of participation (or 
' In some cases, this dimension is identified as 'impartiality' (Tsuchiya et al., 2005) or 'absence of 
vested interests' (Wailoo and Anand, 2005). 
7 A close relationship has been established between this dimension of procedural fairness and the 
notion of equality of opportunity (Leventhal, 1980, cf. Wailoo and Anand, 2005). 
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involvement) is usually used instead of voice. In any case, it has been 
acknowledged that voice or participation might take different forms. It might be 
interpreted in terms of infon-ning the public or it might mean consulting the 
public. The highest level of participation consists of sharing the responsibility for 
decisions or even delegating power (see e. g. Litva et al., 2002). Yet another 
distinction is that between a micro and a macro aspect of voice. In the former 
case, the individual is concerned that his or her own rights are honoured and it is 
about direct involvement, while in the latter case, because the expression of views 
by all is not feasible, the primary concern of the individual may just be that a 
hearing is given to some representative individuals (Anand, 2001). 
There has been a gradual movement beyond consequentalism, in 
economics. Anand (2001) says that Amartya Sen has been the most prominent and 
articulate advocate of the theoretical position that outcomes are not all that matter 
for economic welfare (Sen, 1997,2002). Bruno Frey and colleagues (e. g. Frey et 
al., 1996; Stutzer and Frey, 2006) have conducted much of the empirical work 
into procedural preferences in economic contexts, though in this chapter we are 
interested in the application of procedural justice to the context of health and 
health care; an application that only recently has started to assume more explicit 
forms (e. g. Wailoo and Anand, 2005; Dolan et al., 2007). In the specific context 
of health, Sen (2002) argues that in the face of the relevance of processes, 
inequalities in health care and not only in health achievement can also have 
relevance to social justice and to health equity. Therefore, in Figure 1, it is 
conceivable that points on the frontier other than point E are preferred based on 
procedural considerations and despite involving health inequality; it might even 
be the case that points inside the frontier are preferred over points on the frontier. 
We have said before that in these situations trade-offs between efficiency and 
other considerations of social justice occur not only when efficiency means health 
maximisation but also at the level of X-efficiency. 
2.4. The impact of decentralisation on efficiency 
In this section, our objective is to review the theoretical and empirical 
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literature about the impact of decentralisation on efficiency, in the case of health 
care resource allocation. Following the previous interpretations of the concept of 
efficiency, three forms of efficiency might be involved: X-efficiency (or 
production efficiency); health maximisation; and allocative efficiency. We should 
note nonetheless that in the literature the concept of efficiency appears in many 
cases with vague and ambiguous meanings. Moreover, it is acknowledged that 
assessing the effects of decentralisation is a challenging exercise, not only because 
it is difficult to distinguish between dependent and independent variables but also 
because the appropriate associations between them are not easily demonstrated 
(Bankauskaite and Saltman, 2006). Actual processes of decentralisation are most 
likely to be motivated by various factors and in some cases the different 
disciplines that have addressed the phenomenon of decentralisation offer different 
explanations for similar outcomes; here, our objective is to focus on arguments 
developed within the discipline of economics and applied to health economics. 
Review of theoretical arguments 
The classical theory of fiscal decentralisation is based on the core 
argument that public goodS8 that are consumed locally should also be produced 
locally. Decentralisation is believed to increase welfare by allowing local 
authorities to act in accordance with local cost structures and local preferences 
(Oates, 1972,1999). Improvement in welfare might thus be interpreted in terms of 
both production efficiency (adjustment to local costs) as well as allocative 
efficiency (adjustment to local preferences). This result is based on the 
assumption that local authorities are better informed than central government 
about (heterogeneous) preferences and costs. Further, by allowing for different 
mixes of public services across jurisdictions, decentralisation can achieve greater 
allocative efficiency in the allocation of resources by forcing local governments to 
compete for constituents (who are also tax payers) who will choose their preferred 
mix of services by 'voting with their feet' (known as the Tiebout effect) and 
8 Go 
" 
ods that are non-rival as well as non-excludable (this means that consumption of the good by 
one individual does not reduce the amount of the good available for consumption by others, and no 
one can be effectively excluded from using that good). Consequently, public goods have been 
pointed as an example of 'market failure', that is, competitive markets alone cannot fully provide 
public goods in line xvith society's wishes. 
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moving to jurisdictions offering services more in line with their preferences 
(Tiebout, 1956; Musgrave, 1959). These results are based on the assumption that 
local populations will be able to exercise choice and that they know their 
preferences and priorities better than regional or national authorities. 
Bossert (1998) groups these arguments in two models or frameworks: the 
principal-agent approach and the local fiscal choice. In the former case, the main 
rationale for decentralisation is grounded on information asymmetry between the 
central and local levels of government; in the latter case, the main rationale for 
decentralisation is based on competition among locally elected governments. 
Examples of the former models can be found in Gilbert and Picard (1996)9, 
Robalino et al. (2001) and Faguet (2004); examples of the latter models are 
provided by e. g. Chubb (1985) and Seabright (1996). Importantly, in both 
approaches, diversity in provision across jurisdictions increases allocative 
efficiency because it is assumed that preferences also vary among jurisdictions. 
In addition to the standard theory of fiscal decentralisation, another 
argument proposed by economists to justify a positive link between 
decentralisation and (production) efficiency is related to the issue of innovation, 
according to which autonomous local governments may be more willing to and 
able to experiment with new models of delivery (for a summary of economic 
arguments for and against decentralisation see Levaggi and Smith, 2005; for a 
summary of arguments generated by different disciplines see Peckham et al., 
2005). 
So far, we have identified arguments pro decentralisation but economists 
have also formulated a set of arguments that might lead to the conclusion that 
decentralisation decreases production efficiency. One of these arguments is that 
economies of scale are lost with decentralisation (e. g. larger entities may be able 
to secure more favourable contracts with service providers - Levaggi and Smith, 
2005). Additionally, inefficiencies are said to arise from the multiplication of 
small administrative units, that is, decentralisation increases transaction costs 
(Saltman and Bankauskaite, 2004; Levaggi and Smith, 2005). Also, the results 
9 Gilbert and Picard (1996) identify two effects potentially determining the precision of 
information on costs: on the one hand, the geographi IIIi that the smaller ical proximity effect implies 
die size of jurisdictions the more precise cost estimates will be; on the other, there is a learning 
effect that makes estimates on costs more precise in larger jurisdictions. Thus, the fon-ner effect 
pushes towards more decentralisation, while the latter pushes towards more centralisation. 
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suggested by the standard theory of fiscal decentralisation are valid assuming that 
well-qualified personnel are available at lower levels of government (Saltman and 
Bankauskaite, 2004). Thus, the local administrative capacity (or the lack of it) is 
identified as a strong determinant of the positive (or negative) effects of 
decentralisation (Lindaman and Thurmaier, 2002; Akin et al., 2005). This 
argument applies to production efficiency as well as to allocative efficiency. That 
is, even if information about costs and preferences is greater at the local level, this 
might not lead to increased efficiency under decentralisation if local authorities do 
not possess the necessary skills and expertise to use that information in decision 
making (Khaleghian, 2004). Within the principal-agent framework this can be 
thought in terms of a set of capabilities of the agent, which will influence the 
achievement or otherwise of expected outcomes (Bossert, 1998). Competition 
between local governments may also be harmful rather than beneficial if, for 
example, jurisdictions compete on tax rates (which might lead to widespread 
under-provision of public services - Levaggi and Smith, 2005). 
A final important economic argument against decentralisation concerns the 
existence of externalities or spillovers (when services provided in one jurisdiction 
affect citizens from another jurisdiction - Saltman and Bankauskaite, 2004; 
Levaggi and Smith, 2005). In this case, if these externalities are not properly 
accounted for by local authorities, there might be under-provision (or over- 
provision) of services compared to what is socially optimal, meaning that 
allocative efficiency is negatively affected by decentralisation. 
Review of theoretical arguments applied to the context of health care 
Theoretical analyses specifically developed for the case of decentralisation 
in health care resource allocation have mainly relied on informational issues, 
being therefore closer to the principal-agent approach than to the local public 
choice approach. This might be partly explained by the limitations of the 
application of the latter model to the context of health care. Saltman and 
Bankauskaite (2004), for instance, say that across most tax-funded health care 
systems in Western Europe not only there is a generalisation of centralised 
taxation but also central governments nearly always retain the authority to set 
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broad health strategy and often a variety of lesser health policy issues as well. 
Moreover, national governments nearly always maintain significant regulatory 
and monitoring roles. For the case of less developed countries, Bossert (1998) 
says that local resources are a small portion of local expenditures and 
intergovernmental transfers come with many administrative restrictions. 
Under these circumstances there is only a limited applicability of the local 
public choice framework. As Lindaman and Thurmaier (2002, p. 919) note, 
"without economic independence, either through an independent taxing authority 
capable of generating significant resources or no-strings block grants from the 
central govenunent's tax revenues, local autonomy will be undermined because 
local authorities will be accountable for budgetary decisions to the central 
authorities but not to their constituents". The local public choice approach fits 
better scenarios of devolution and the principal-agent approach fits better 
scenarios of delegation and the latter seems to better reflect decentralisation in 
health care decision making. 
Hurley et al. (1995) address precisely the issue of information, discussing 
how it affects the potential for decentralised structures in the health care sector to 
improve production and allocative efficiency compared to centralised structures. 
They start by distinguishing between information and knowledge. They consider 
that information includes e. g. facts and data, "all of which can exist, in a sense, 
outside human persons and which do not in and of themselves constitute usable 
knowledge". On the contrary, knowledge "involves human understanding; human 
beings convert information into usable knowledge" (p. 4). This distinction is 
important because information asymmetry does not necessarily mean that the 
access to data is asymmetric; what it might mean is that the capacity to 
incorporate this data into decisions is not the same across different organisations 
or across different levels of decision making. 
The authors further identify three relevant aspects of information: its 
distribution -are the sources of information widely distributed among individuals 
or are they concentrated among a small number of individuals or locations?; its 
communicability - can the information be easily summarised and inexpensively 
transmitted within the organisation without distortion or loss of meaning?; and its 
degree of technicality - are specialised skills required to interpret the information? 
Moreover, three types of information are presented as requisites for an efficient 
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allocation of health care resources: (i) expert, technical information regarding the 
effectiveness of alternative interventions; (ii) information about 'needs, values and 
preferences'; and (iii) information regarding circumstances affecting the delivery 
of care in each region (e. g. the geographic distribution of the population). 
Hurley et al. (1995) also distinguish between primarily normative 
decisions, which often require broad consultation, and primarily technical 
decisions, which require that the decision maker have the requisite of knowledge 
and skills to evaluate alternatives under consideration. According to the authors, 
in health care, the latter decisions favour centralised structures given the nature of 
information required (technical information). Although information regarding the 
effectiveness and technical efficiency could be accessible to decision makers in 
either decentralised or centralised systems, the concentration of scarce expertise 
might constitute, in the short run at least, a constraint for decentralisation. 
Concerning normative decisions, involving the assessment of health care needs, 
values and preferences among the population, they tend to favour decentralisation. 
Partly, because decentralised settings may make certain institutional mechanisms 
for eliciting values and preferences of the community more feasible (including 
regular public meetings), and partly because this type of knowledge is likely to 
grow out of experience and is elusive, making it hard both to collect and to 
communicate without loss of meaning. Finally, they argue that the cost- 
effectiveness of alternative interventions is heavily dependent on site-specific 
factors such as input prices. Consequently, infori-nation about local circumstances 
tends to favour decentralisation. 
Hurley et al. (1995) conclude that the gain in allocative efficiency 
associated with decentralisation is directly proportional with the degree of 
heterogeneity of preferences and values in the population, while the gain in 
production efficiency is directly proportional with the degree of variation in 
information about production-relevant local conditions. Hence, the impact of 
decentralisation on efficiency is ultimately an empirical matter. 
Bossert (1998, p. 1518), based on his 'decision space' approach (see 
section 2.2 above), says that decisions in each of the functional areas (finance, 
service organisation, human resources, access rules and governance rules) are 
likely to affect the system's perfon-nance in achieving the objectives of equity, 
efficiency, quality and financial soundness. He acknowledges that most areas are 
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likely to have an impact on all the stated objectives of health care but his 
statements are vague, both in terms of what these objectives mean and the 
expected direction of the impact in each area. The author also notes that with 
multiple objectives, some activities may support some objectives at the expense of 
others. This reflects the acknowledgment of the possibility of trade-offs but it is 
difficult to see how this problem would be tackled within his framework, 
involving sixteen functions and three degrees of range of choice and given the 
absence of clear links between functions and objectives. 
The strength of the 'decision space' approach is focusing on the issue of 
how much discretion, over what kinds of functions, is likely to lead local 
authorities to make choices that will achieve central government objectives but 
Bossert himself recognises the limitation of his approach regarding the impact of 
decentralisation namely on efficiency: "What decision space and what incentives 
work better in terms of efficiency, financial soundness, equity and quality and 
impact on health outcomes? Ideally the answers to these questions would fon-n the 
largest section of this article. ( ... ) Unfortunately, little comparative information is 
available concerning the relationship between decentralisation policies and 
performance" (Bossert and Beauvais, 2002, p. 26). 
Robalino et al. (2001) developed an empirical analysis that evaluates the 
impact of decentralisation on health outcomes. They say that decentralised 
decision making is expected to be more successful in allocating scarce resources 
to alternative interventions in order to maximise health and they suggest a 
theoretical framework within which this result might be achieved. 
These authors start with the problem of a benevolent decision-maker 
aiming to maximise the population's health (as measured by a given indicator like 
the infant mortality rate). They consider that within each region g in a country the 
outcome indicator, M, is a function of structural characteristics of the economy, 
represented by 0, and the allocation of public expenditures, xgi, among a set of 
interventions, I: Mg=fg(O, xgj,..., xgj). The authors assume that health is increasing 
in expenditures but the marginal effect decreases with the level of expenditure. 
The problem to be solved by decision makers is: 
Max : M=n g, 
A(I Xgi - Y) , where ng 
is the contribution Xgi gI 
fg (O, XgI, ---, X 
9g 
of region g to the national average and Y is the total budget to be allocated. 
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Optimality implies that expenditures are allocated such that the marginal impact 
of an additional monetary unit to an intervention i in region g (adjusted by its 
weight ng) is the same across all interventions and regions. The optimal spending 
in intervention i in region g is given by x*gi (similarly, the optimal share of 
expenditure in intervention 1* in region g is represented by s*gi). 
Robalino et al. (2001) note that given local budgets, x*giis also solution to 
the health maximising problem defined for region g. Nonetheless, they also stress 
that the allocation at the local level will generate a national optimum only if the 
allocation of Y among regions is optimal in the first place. Still, the authors argues 
that even if observed budgets are sub-optimal, their management by local 
governments can improve outcomes as long as local authorities have a better 
knowledge offg(. ) than the central authority. 
A general indicator of inefficiency, U, is defined as the deviation between 
actual amounts allocated to each intervention/region and the respective optimal 
amount. U is then presented as a function of the share, S, of the total budget that is 
managed (i. e. allocated) by local authorities. The partial derivative of U with 
respect to S will depend on the relative levels of efficiency of the local and central 
governments in the management of public expenditures. Hence the authors 
postulate: C9 
U= 
Qc - 1), where c and 1 are indicators of the level of efficiency in as 
managing public resources of the central and local government, respectively. (c- 
0<0 might be justified, as above noted, with a better knowledge of fg(. ) by local 
authorities. The case where (c-0>0 might be justified, according to the authors, 
with an institutional capacity at the local level low relative to the centre. 
In summary, according to the previous framework there is not an 
unequivocal impact of decentralisation on efficiency, here interpreted as health 
maximisation, which in turn requires production efficiency. The argument 
advanced by the authors to justify a positive impact of decentralisation on 
efficiency is information asymmetry (better knowledge at the local level about 
health production functions); the argument advanced to explain an opposite 
outcome is basically the absence of a usual assumption of the standard theory of 
fiscal decentralisation: the availability of well-qualified personnel at lower levels 
of government. 
Petretto (2000) analyses the 'desirability of the regionalisation of a 
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National Health Service'; by 'regionalisation' the author means increasing local 
health services provision financed by local taxes. In his analysis, the utility of 
individual i is given by Ui = U(xi , 
ii 
. 
h(si, qj)), where xi is private consumption, 1i 
is leisure, h(. ) is health, si is health status before care and qj is a composite health 
service. The latter is a publicly-supplied (free of charge) private good; it includes 
a part that is guaranteed uniformly by the central government and a residual part 
that is determined locally. There are also some spillover effects in the sense that 
inhabitants of one region may obtain the service elsewhere (though the author 
considers that services provided by different regions are not perfect substitutes). 
In this framework, an increase in regional autonomy with regard to health 
care expenditure and taxation is desirable for the community of region k if the 
marginal benefit of the public funds used for financing a supply increase in the 
composite health service is greater than the marginal cost of public funds. 
Marginal benefits and costs thus depend on consumers' preferences (an increase 
in local health care has a positive impact on individual utility but it also has a 
negative impact since local taxes increase too and private consumption decreases). 
This is basically a cost-benefit analysis and is no different from the scenario of 
centralised provision and taxation, with a utilitarian welfare function and 
assuming no externalities. 
Petretto (2000) further discusses another perspective to evaluate the effects 
of regionalisation: the perspective of overall social welfare point of view. This 
perspective now takes into account the spillover effects (actually, we previously 
saw that the existence of externalities is an argument that favours centralisation) 
but it also considers that spillover effects are corrected by considerations of 
redistributive aims (the author says that the social value of these effects is higher 
in regions 'more deserving from a social point of view'). The differences between 
the regional and social perspective is therefore not confined to the internalisation 
of spillovers; the latter perspective includes non-welfarist considerations. It is not 
however very clear the origin of the latter considerations; the author talks about 
'federal mandates' and 'constitutional objectives'. In fact, in Petretto's 
framework, only these restrictive mandates seem to offer a rationale for 
decentralisation (in the sense that a central authority is not allowed to provide 
varying supplementary health services across regions). Additionally, how this 
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framework might be used to evaluate the 'desirability of regionalisation I is 
somehow puzzling given that there are two non-comparable alternatives to 
measure such 'desirability'. 
Theoretical analyses in the context of decentralisation have considered that 
allocative efficiency is a matter of matching preferences without explicitly 
discussing what these preferences are; they seem to be consumers' preferences 
(below in section 2.5 we discuss this issue in detail), for different health care 
services, for example. However, in section 2.3 we said that allocative efficiency is 
about choosing the preferred social state and that a variety of considerations, 
namely distributional and procedural concerns, could determine the preferred 
social state. 
Therefore, we have identified two other outcomes attributed to 
decentralisation that might in fact impact upon allocative efficiency in health care 
resource allocation. One of these outcomes is the very diversity in the amount and 
type of services provided under decentralisation (Saltman and Bankauskaite, 
2004; Levaggi and Smith, 2005; Magnussen et al., 2007). If inequalities in health 
care provision, for instance, are considered a relevant factor to evaluate social 
alternative allocations, then, decentralisation, by generating variations in this 
regard, might negatively affect allocative efficiency. 
Another outcome of decentralisation that has been identified in the 
literature is an increase in participation in decision making (Inman and Rubinfeld, 
1997a, 1997b; Prud'Homme, 2003; Hutchinson and LaFond, 2004; Peckham et 
al., 2005)10 and we saw above in section 2.3 that procedural considerations like 
participation or voice might affect the ranking of social states. Consequently, 
decentralisation can also affect allocative efficiency via its impact on the 
procedural characteristic of voice. We said in the beginning of section 2.4 that our 
focus would be on outcomes derived within the discipline of economics but 
participation is an important outcome attributed to decentralisation within the 
democratic theory and participative democracy (Peckham et al., 2005). However, 
we also noted in section 2.3 that economics (and health economics) has not a long 
tradition in dealing with procedural considerations; it is therefore almost 
10 Inman and Rubinfeld (1997b) say that participatory actions (such as 'voting, debating, 
marching, picketing, contributing, and pass ve and armed resis I tance) are likely to be higher for 
each individual citizen when governments are smaller (because there are fewer participants). 
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inevitable to go beyond economics if we are to include this dimension of social 
justice in the evaluation of social welfare. 
Actually, participation might be valued in its own right, directly 
contributing to people's utility (procedural approach discussed in section 2.3) but 
it can also be linked to the more consequential i st approach of economics. That is, 
it might be seen as a means of matching outcomes to the preferences of the 
population (consequentialist approach - indirect contribution to utility). Stutzer 
and Frey (2006) say that the latter perspective, focusing on the utility produced by 
more favourable outcomes, has been at the centre of attention in both political 
science and public choice analysis, while the procedural utility has been sustained 
for a long time now by political philosophers and the proponents of participatory 
democracy. 
Review o empirical literature applied to the context of health care ýf 
The empirical evidence on the outcomes of decentralisation in health care 
is relatively small and much of it has been conducted using data from developing 
countries. In addition, probably due to the already mentioned difficulties in 
identifying and measuring independent and dependent variables, many studies are 
more qualitative rather than quantitative. Still, we give here a brief account of the 
main results that we have found in our literature search. We start with evidence 
regarding production-efficiency and the impact of decentralisation on health 
outcomes; then we focus on analyses that seem to be closer to allocative 
efficiency. 
According to Hutchinson and LaFond (2004, p. 14), "the Gestdo Plena do 
Sistema Municipal, in Brazil, which entitled municipalities to receive block 
transfers of funds directly from the federal government for all levels of care, 
provided incentives for municipalities to over-invest in hospitals, laboratories, and 
high-tech equipment, which were then under-utilized given the municipality 
population sizes". Collins et al. (2000, p. 122) too argue that "many of the 
municipalities in Brazil are really too small to consider them as having the 
capacity to develop workable municipal health systems". Among the factors 
contributing to this situation, are the lack of sufficient population size and 
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expertise. 
Needham et al. (2004), argue that decentralisation has been associated 
with negative consequences on a specialised programme like Zambia's 
tuberculosis programme. They note that, in an urban setting, decentralisatIon may 
be more successful than in a rural setting, since when population density is very 
low (in Zambia, <30/kM2), it is prohibitively costly to provide an acceptable level 
of services within reach of the sparse population. 
Koivusalo (1999) says that, in Finland, local governance is well 
established yet there is a significant concern on the extent to which the relevant 
skills should be and can be maintained by municipal, provincial, and hospital 
administrations. 
Bossert et al. (2003) (carefully) conclude, for the case of Zambia, that 
despite the decline in real per capita expenditure following decentralisation, there 
was little impact on the utilisation of outpatient services. They say that this may 
mean that the efficiency of the use of resources increased, though they stress their 
inability to evaluate the quality of services that may have been declining with the 
declining expenditures. 
The recent recentralisation in Norwegian health care system (2002 reform) 
has been in part justified by a decrease in productivity and the loss of economies 
of scale (Mosca, 2006). In the same line, Magnussen et al. (2007, p. 2135) 
conclude that efficiency 'certainly seems to have increased after the reform'. To 
reach this conclusion, the authors compare measures of technical and cost 
efficiency (calculated in Norway on an annual basis) for the period 1999-2000 
(before) with the same measures for the period 2002-2004 (after). 
Concerning the impact of decentralisation on health status, Robalino et al. 
(2001) conclude that higher fiscal decentralisation (measured by the 'ratio 
between expenditures managed by local governments and expenditures managed 
by central government') is consistently associated with lower infant mortality 
rates (the indicator of health outcomes used in the study) and that these benefits 
are particularly important for poor countries. They however note that they cannot 
distinguish between local governments with low and high institutional capacity 
and assess how decentralisation affects health outcomes in each case. Still, they 
argue that their results support the view that if local governments are strengthened 
then fiscal decentralisation is likely to improve health outcomes. 
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Smith, B. (1997, p. 40 1) also points the case of Papua New Guinea, where 
devolution is believed to have led to "substantial improvements in the health of 
the population, notably a lowering of infant, childhood and maternal mortalitN,, 
and increased life expectancy". 
Empirical evidence about the impact of decentralisation on allocative 
efficiency is almost inexistent. It is difficult to evaluate the match between 
delivery and preferences if the latter are not themselves assessed or even clearly 
defined to start with. Consequently, studies that claim to address allocative 
efficiency usually look at the allocation of resources between different social 
services and within health care the most common approach is to look at the 
allocation between primary and secondary care. 
Homedes and Ugalde (2004) report several situations which are presented 
as failures in meeting allocative efficiency: in Bolivia, mayors spent health and 
education funds on road development; in Colombia, health funds were directed to 
building hospitals in municipalities, which, according to the infrastructure plans, 
were not needed; in Mexico, some states have diverted federal health funds to 
other activities; in Nicaragua, the Ministry of Health donated sacks of cement to 
rural households to build latrines; instead many families sold them. 
Bossert and Beauvais (2002) mention the issue of distribution of resources 
between primary and secondary care saying that they found some evidence that 
local choices on expenditures in the Philippines and Uganda resulted in 
allocations to curative care rather than the national priority of primary care. In 
Zambia, the central government set percentage ceilings and floors on how much 
of district budgets could be spent on each level. It seems that in general the 
guidelines were respected (Bossert et al., 2003). 
Khaleghian (2004) examines the relationship between decentralisation and 
percentage of immunisation in 1-year old children for 140 countries and found 
that decentralisation is associated with higher immunisation coverage rates in low- 
income countries and lower coverage rates in middle-income countries. Indeed, 
immunisation is often used as an example of externalities in health. meaning that 
decentralisation could in theory decrease the level of provision. 
Regarding the question of variations in service provision, there has been a 
tendency for regarding them not as the result of local governments' responding to 
variations in local preferences; instead, these variations have increasingly been 
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viewed as an undesirable feature of decentralised systems (Magnussen et al., 
2007). Variations in provision have also been associated with variations in 
resources in the first place. In Finland, however, municipalities have tax powers 
and there has been an increasing cost sharing by users of health services but 
despite the concerns about growing divergences between areas, it seems that it has 
not led to major differentials between areas in terms of service provision 
(Koivusalo, 1999). 
Even in the absence of local taxes, if decentralisation creates the potential 
for local bids on global resources, then some inequalities might arise. Homedes 
and Ugalde (2004) argue, in respect to the Latin America in general, that: 
"decentralisation widened existing urban-rural and inter-regional inequities. 
Urban dwellers exert more political pressure than rural dwellers and, therefore, 
obtain a disproportional amount of health resources. ( ... ) Geographical inequities 
are aggravated by the well-establi shed fact that rural dwellers' health needs are 
larger than those of urban populations". 
Varatharajan et al. (2004, p. 49) mention, for the case of an Indian State - 
Kerala, the impact that active lobbying and technical expertise might have on 
"converting health care needs into fundable projects". In this sort of situation, 
decentralisation might not only lead to a reduction in local funds but also to 
variations among localities depending on their ability to attract resources towards 
them. 
Bossert et al. (2003) study the distribution of per capita health 
expenditures in Zambia, after decentralisation. Although there was a decline in 
expenditures, there was relatively little difference among districts when they were 
analysed according to degrees of urbanisation and income indicators. 
In what concerns the impact of decentralisation on participation in general, 
Smith, B. (1997) notes that decentralisation might not always be accompanied by 
the necessary conditions to guarantee an effective and meaningful community 
participation in decisions, particularly in poor countries, where community 
participation is widely recognised as a problem due to factors such as political 
inequality and dependency, illiteracy, poverty, among others. For the case of 
health care resource allocation, we found no empirical evidence about this topic. 
There are several discussions about participation and involvement but only in one 
reference (Allen, 2006) there is an explicit attempt to link participation to 
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decentralisation. Allen (2006) looks at the link between membership of local 
organisations and participation, in the context of the English National Health 
Service. He says that historical literature concerning local and mutual 
organisations demonstrates that it is hard to achieve high levels of participation in 
such organisations. Focusing then on recent analyses of Foundation Trusts (FTs), 
this author reports that small numbers of people volunteered to become members 
of FTs and that when they were given the opportunity to vote for the board of 
governors, the voting turnout varied from relatively high to below of 20%; in 
three quarters of the elections, under 60% of the eligible patient and public 
members actually voted. 
Peckham et al. (2005) carried out a review of empirical literature about the 
outcomes of decentralisation (including results from other disciplines besides 
economics). For all the outcomes included in their review, namely production and 
allocative efficiency, they found evidence of positive as well as negative 
relationships between decentralisation and these outcomes. In summing up their 
findings, the main message is that, apart from questions about the strength and 
quality of the evidence, the review demonstrates that the 'balance of evidence is 
often equivocal at best or does not provide any real conclusion' (p. 90). 
The impact of decentralisation on participation is not included in the 
'analysis of evidence' in Peckham et al. 's (2005) report, which might be in itself a 
reflection of the gap in the empirical literature in this regard. In fact, participation 
appears in their topic related to future research, where it is said that given the 
6strong assumption made about participation and democracy being improved 
through decentralisation' it is important that further research is undertaken to 
address this issue, namely in terms of determining what level of decentralisation is 
best for public involvement; how the public relates to local health agencies; and 
how does this relate to issues of responsiveness of local health services. 
2.5. The concept of preferences in the context of health care 
In section 2.4, in which we explored the literature regarding the impact of 
decentralisation on efficiency, we saw that the relationship between 
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decentralisation and allocative efficiency derives from a better match between the 
provision of public services and preferences. And this is true regardless of which 
model, the public choice analysis or the principal-agent model, is used to evaluate 
that impact. Preferences are therefore at the centre of a major economic argument 
in favour of decentralisation' 1. The nature and content of these preferences have 
not however given rise to particular debate, within the literature about 
decentralisation. In fact, Frey et al. (2004) say that economics has been 
deliberately vague about what human preferences are defined over but in 
principle, 'what individuals value could be anything' (p. 379). 
In the literature about health care resource allocation however preferences, 
or values as they are often interchangeably used, have received an increasing 
attention. The concept of values is said to constitute now a fundamental element 
of policy analysis, even 'comparable in importance to concepts such as 'health' or 
'evidence" (Giacomini et al., 2004, p. 22). Despite this enhanced role, it is said 
that research into the definition (as well as the operationalisation and application) 
of the concept of values or preferences remains under-developed (Giacomini et 
al., 2004; Bankauskaite and Saltman, 2006). In the current section, our objective 
is consequently to review the literature about health care resource allocation, 
summarising the main insights that have hitherto been proposed in order to clarify 
the meaning of preferences. We identified three main criteria that might be used to 
classify preferences ('whom respondents are asked to think about'; 'what 
respondents are asked to think about'; and 'individual versus collective 
preferences') but there are overlaps between them and there might also be some 
interdependence between them (for instance, the 'whom' might depend on the 
'what'). 
Classifying preferences according to whom respondents are asked to think 
about 
Dolan et al. (2003) identify three main perspectives that an individual 
could be asked to adopt in studies designed to elicit preferences for use in 
In the literature on decentralisation the term 'local preferences' is usually used instead of 'public 
preferences' but this stems from the above mentioned assumptio In of variation In public 
preferences across localities, thus, public preferences in a given locality are 'local' in the sense that 
they are different ftom other localities' preferences. 
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informing resource allocation decisions in health care. These are: (i) 'personal 
preferences' - when the question is concerned with the respondent herself, (ii) 
'social preferences' - when the question concerns people other than the 
5 respondent; and (iii) 'socially inclusive personal preferences - when the question 
concerns both the respondent and other people. 
The authors note that, under the first category, the individual is asked to 
consider only himself (self-regarding preferences). They further distinguish 
between ex ante and ex post preferences: in the fon-ner case, individuals should 
imagine that they face the possibility of being a patient; in the latter case, 
individuals are asked to imagine themselves as patients or preferences can be 
elicited from real patients. This latter dichotomy (hypothetical versus real 
patients) nonetheless usually arises in a specific context (health status 
measurement - see below). 
In the second category, 'social preferences', respondents are detached 
from any self interest given that the probability of becoming a patient is null. 
According to Dolan et al. (2003), what is at stake here are individuals' 
preferences about other people, which will reflect their concerns about the utility 
or welfare of other people as well as the distribution of utility or welfare among 
others. The distinction between ex ante and ex post preferences can be 
exemplified, the authors say, with the difference between statistical lives and 
identifiable lives (in the former case, there is some probability between 0 and I of 
others becoming ill; in the latter, illness is a certain outcome). 
Finally, 'socially inclusive personal preferences' present a combination of 
the other two categories and respondents are asked to think about their own 
interests as well as the interests of others. In the ex ante context, individuals are 
asked behind a veil of ignorance (they do not know whether themselves will 
require health care but this possibility exists); in the ex post context the individual 
being asked might require the same treatment as others or not. 
Dolan et al. (2003) note that under welfare economics, individuals are 
considered the best judges of their own welfare and this notion conforms to the 
perspective of 'personal preferences' above. Still, it might be that an individual's 
12 
utility is affected by the levels of utility enjoyed by others . In this case, 'socially 
12 In the presence of 'caring externalities', individuals may maximise their utility by giving. Culyer 
(1989a) terms this behaviour as 'welfanst altruism' (which, in some sense, can be thought as 
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inclusive personal preferences' might be more appropriate than 'personal 
preferences'. Tsuchiya and Miyamoto (2007) distinguish these two situations 
opposing the concept of 'personal utility' to the concept of 'individual utility': 
6preferences over possible outcomes for other people or preferences over 
distributions where one's own absolute and relative wellbeing are not affected can be 
part of individual utility but not personal utility. Dolan et al. (2003) say that 
although self-interest exists, it does not necessarily follow that it must be the basis 
for social welfare. They say that the perspective of 'social preferences' would 
seem entirely reasonable for example in the context of a tax-based health care 
system. The authors further note that when eliciting 'social preferences' the 
individual is typically placed directly in the shoes of a social decision maker. The 
perspective of 'social preferences' also seems in line with the shift that has 
occurred within the discipline of health economics from a positive study of how 
individuals make consumption decisions for themselves to a normative study of 
how society should make resource allocation decisions within the context of a 
publicly funded health care system (Tsuchiya and Miyamoto, 2007). 
A different though related classification of preferences, depending on the 
different perspectives that individuals might be asked to adopt in preference 
elicitation, can be found in Tsuchiya and Miyamoto (2006,2007). These authors 
give particular attention to the issue of health state valuation, more specifically, to 
health related quality of life. Recall from section 2.3 that measures of health like 
the QALY involve both dimensions of length and quality of life: each year of life 
is weighted by a quality-of-life score in which the latter can be represented by a 
utility function defined over health states (Tsuchiya and Miyamoto, 2007). A 
distinction must however be made between this utility function, used to measure 
health outcomes, and the utility that derives from the consumption of health care. 
Tsuchiya and Miyamoto (2006) define the 'informed consumer' precisely as the 
individual that is assumed to be rational, selfish and the best judge of how much 
utility health care will yield for him. 
Focusing then on the utility incorporated in health status measurement, 
Tsuchiya and Miyamoto (2006,2007) propose three ways of classifying 
individuals: the 'capable patient'; the 'informed non-patient'; and the 'infon-ned 
selfish: one gives away to the extent that this maximises one's own utility). 
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citizen'. The former two are assumed to be rational and selfish. The difference 
between them is that the 'capable patient' is an actual patient and therefore knows 
what if feels like to have a given health problem, while the 'inforined non-patient' 
is assumed to know about ill-health states but he himself is not Ill. It is in this 
context of health status measurement that the distinction made by Dolan et al. 
(2003) between ex ante and ex post personal preferences (or between hypothetical 
and actual patients) has become an issue of debate. In regards to the 'Informed 
citizen', the individual is assumed to know what it feels like to have different 
problems, to be rational but, contrarily to the previous cases, is assumed to be 
self-less "in the sense that she wiU not make judgements In order to forward her 
own case, or to advance the case of one particular health problem over another" 
(Tsuchiya and Miyamoto, 2007). 
Smith and Richardson (2005, p. 80) in turn distinguish between 'social 
utility' and 'individual utility'. They say that while the former "is an 
'intellectualised' preference, one thought through rationally, the latter is more 
directly related to personal feelings and hence much more subjective". In fact, it 
has been suggested that a qualification should be applied to social preferences in 
the sense of excluding unacceptable views. Tsuchiya and Miyamoto (2007), for 
example, talk about justifiable societal preferences as opposed to unacceptable 
views based on prejudices (like differential treatment by characteristics such as 
race, religion or sexual orientation); Dolan et al. (2003) talk about 'ethically 
defensible set of society-regarding preferences'; Olsen et al. (2003) argue that 
ethically unacceptable preferences, such as discrimination on the basis of race, can 
be distinguished from those that are defensible in terms of moral argument; 
Richardson and Mckie (2005) suggest that defensible principles for allocating 
health care should be derived in an iterative way, involving both an empirical 
study of population values and ethical analysis of the results. 
Classýoing preferences according to what respondents are asked to think 
about 
The concept of preferences has also been used in different circumstances 
in terms of what respondents are asked to think about. An alternative that we have 
already identified concerns preferences over health states, which might be 
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combined with the perspectives previously reviewed. Tsuchiya and Miyamoto 
(2007) say that so far not many actual valuation studies (regarding health related 
quality of life) have used the citizen perspective. There is an ongoing debate about 
which of the three perspectives (the 'capable patient'; the 'informed non-patient' 
or the 'informed citizen') should be used to derive quality-of-life scores (e. g. 
Dolan and Green, 1998; Ubel et al., 2000; Smith and Richardson, 2005). 
In Shiell et al. (1997), a distinction is made between preferences for 
market goods, which include health care, and 'underlying preferences', which are 
defined over fundamental aspects of life, such as health, prestige, benevolence or 
envy. This view draws on psychology and it is said that the basis for the 
distinction between preferences and 'underlying preferences' or 'values' is not the 
moral argument. The latter are stable and the distinction between the two types of 
preferences "relates to the ease with each individuals are able to formulate and 
express the values they hold for fundamental aspects of life" (Shiell et al., 1997). 
Even if one accepts that social preferences should be defensible in tenns of 
moral argument, there are several competing and sometimes conflicting 
arguments. Williams (2001) says that ethical discourse is typically inconclusive 
because the premises on which it is based are usually contestable, in the first 
place. So, preferences can also be defined over a set of ethical principles, both in 
terms of which principles matter and given conflicts between them in terms of the 
trade-offs between principles. Procedural characteristics might equally be the 
target of preferences. Examples of these principles have been discussed in section 
2.3 and several examples of empirical studies focusing on principles of justice are 
referred below. 
Preferences might further be defined over specific health care 
interventions or services (e. g. Bowling, 1996). These preferences might be elicited 
from a personal perspective or, following the tendency in health economics to 
focus on the societal level, in the context of a publicly funded health care system, 
they might be elicited from a social perspective. 
The concept of preferences can also be used to represent preferences for 
attributes of health care delivery, such as opening hours of facilities, doctor's 
gender, time for appointment versus time of consultation, etc. Mooney (1998) for 
example argues that the processes of care themselves can be utility bearing. These 
are clearly personal preferences that are closer to a consumer perspective. There 
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are some examples of empirical analyses for the case of out-of-hours care (e. g. 
Gerard et al., 2006). Preferences for attributes of health care delivery might be 
relevant even in a context of a tax-based health care system. In some cases, the 
success or otherwise of policies might depend on people voluntarily seeking 
health care services. Think for example about preventive care such as screening 
programmes, in which different attributes might constitute an incentive or, on the 
contrary, a barrier, to seek care. 
Individual versus collective preferences 
When discussing the meaning of values, Giacomini et al. (2005) say that, 
among other things, values can stem from collective beliefs, as expressed for 
example through social institutions, or, they can stem from individual convictions, 
as expressed by opinion polls. 
Mooney (2005) uses the concept of 'communitarian' preferences, arguing 
that this is different from Dolan et al. 's (2003) concept of 'socially inclusive 
personal preferences', given that in the latter case the individual is asked 'qua 
individual'; the 'community qua community' is not asked. Mooney (2005) says 
that community would most often be a geographical entity such as a province or 
region or state or even country for which there is already a health service and a 
health service budget. The author says that to elicit the preferences of the 
community qua community, individuals should be asked to reflect and discuss 
together what values or principles they would want adopted by the health service 
decision makers when these decision makers determine resource allocation. The 
views of the NICE Citizens Council 13 , in England and Wales, as expressed 
for 
instance in the Institute's report on social value judgements (NICE, 2005) can be 
thought as an example of collective preferences. 
In the majority of situations, the concept of preferences has been used to 
represent 'Individual' as opposed to 'collective' preferences. In empirical studies, 
even when discussion groups are used, after the exposition and discussion of the 
issues in question, respondents are asked to express their preferences individually. 
13 NICE stands for National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence and the Citizens Council 
is a form of citizens'Jury (see chapter five). 
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2.6. What matters to people when allocating health care resources? A review 
of empirical evidence 
So far we have seen that preferences might be defined over different 
things, including principles of distributive or procedural justice; we have reviewed 
the arguments used in the theoretical literature to explain why different principles 
or procedures might matter to people; and we have also seen that preferences 
might vary depending on whom individuals are asked to think about. As Frey et 
al. (2004) note individuals could value anything. This view may nonetheless pose 
some questions about its limits (is anything admissible? ). Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2002) say that there is a strong convention in mainstream economics of not 
explaining puzzling observations by changing assumptions on preferences. 
"Changing preferences is said to open Pandora's box because everything can be 
explained by assuming the 'right' preferences" (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, 
p. C30). Thus, it is important to show that the sorts of preferences used in this 
dissertation are not only based on the theoretical literature but they are also based 
on empirical evidence. 
The objective of this section is therefore to review the empirical evidence 
regarding people's views on different criteria and processes that might be adopted 
in health care resource allocation. The concept of preferences has been 
indistinctively used in this literature involving different contexts as identified in 
section 2.5. We review studies that elicit the views of the general public but, 
depending on the framing of questions, in some cases personal preferences might 
be at stake while in other cases social (citizens') preferences might have been 
elicited. Studies that elicit views from the perspective of particular groups such as 
14 
patients or health professionals are excluded. Below we present the main results . 
Prqferences related to distributive justice 
Starting with health maximisation, there is evidence that the expected 
outcome of treatment matters to people (Mossialos and King, 1999; Roberts et al., 
" Some references generated by our literature search are, or Include, themselves reviews of 
surveys of public preferences (Sassi et al., 2001; Schwappach, 2002; Dolan and Shaw, 20 0 3; and 
Dolan et al., 2005). 
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1999; Dolan and Shaw, 2003), in particular in the context of the allocation of 
donor organs where health gain has been ranked first (Ratcliffe; 2000; Dolan and 
Shaw, 2004) or second (Neuberger et al., 1998) among a set of factors used to 
prioritise potential recipients of organs. Roberts et al. (1999) concluded however 
that there is little support for health care programmes that provide a prognostic 
improvement but leave patients in relatively poor states of health and Dolan and 
Cookson (2000) found that although individuals are not totally unwilling to give 
priority to those who gain most from treatment, the end-point of health that the 
groups end up with after treatment seems to be relevant to people. 
Concerning health inequality, there is evidence that the general public 
embodies some inequality aversion and is therefore willing to trade-off health 
gain against the reduction in health inequalities. In some cases, studies have 
focused on health inequality per se (Dolan and Robinson, 200 1); in other cases, 
differences by social class (Lindholm and Rosen, 1998; Abasolo and Tsuchiya, 
2004; Williams et al., 2005, Tsuchiya and Dolan, 2007) or sex (Williams et al., 
2005) are considered. The latter authors, for example, report that the results 
suggest that there is a general willingness to sacrifice health benefits to target 
those with worst health prospects but there was considerable heterogeneity: in all 
questions there were responses implying no targeting at all as well as responses in 
which targeting would lead to lower health for all. Also, a result that emerged in 
this study is that preferences are sensitive to what inequalities exist and which 
groups are at stake. There were stronger preferences for reducing inequalities in 
life expectancy than in long-term illness and it also appears that inequalities by 
social class raise greater concerns than inequalities by sex. 
Individuals' preferences regarding the role of age in health care resource 
allocation has been explored in the empirical literature as well. There is evidence 
to suggest that health gains to the young are weighted more highly than those to 
the old (Williams, 1988; Bowling, 1996; Neuberger et al.; 1998; Cookson and 
Dolan, 1999; Mossialos and King, 1999; Ratcliffe, 2000; Wilmot and Ratcliffe, 
2002; Dolan and Shaw, 2004; Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2005). However, there are 
different forms of ageism (Tsuchiya et al., 2003) and, as Dolan and Shaw (2003) 
note it is if often difficult to tell how much of the preference for the young is due 
to the benefits to the young being greater (or being perceived to be greater) and 
how much is due to the young having lived less time. While the former argument 
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conforms to health maximisation, the latter is closer to the 'fair innings' argument. 
In one study, the authors nonetheless kept health gain constant across groups and 
still found that respondents were willing to give priority to the young: 40-year- 
olds always get a higher ranking than 60-year-olds (Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2005). 
Despite the support for the young over the old, Wilmot and Ratcliffe (2002) say 
that individuals were willing to discriminate between the ages of 5 and 80 but they 
did not discriminate between the ages of 40 and 60. Dolan and Shaw (2004) too 
report that respondents tended to focus on both ends of the age spectrum (20 and 
70 year old). Anand and Wailoo (2000) say that by far the largest group of 
respondents in their study is the one that looks like what they termed as 'equal 
righters', corresponding to those individuals who preferred to allocate funds 
equally between diseases affecting younger and older groups. 
In line with the distinction, introduced in section 2.3, between health 
achievement and opportunity to achieve good health, empirical studies have 
explored whether or not the public gives lower priority to supposedly self- 
inflicted diseases compared to 'natural' diseases. Empirical results show that the 
public is not totally neutral to the cause of illness, when it comes to allocate scarce 
resources (Bowie et al., 1995; Bowling, 1996; Neuberger et al., 1998; Mossialos 
and King, 1999; Anand and Wailoo, 2000; Ratcliffe, 2000; Williams et al., 2005; 
Dolan and Shaw, 2003). Dolan et al. (1999) nonetheless report that the majority of 
respondents (above 60%, both before and after discussion/deliberation) expressed 
no priority regarding smokers, heavy drinkers, people with unhealthy diets, those 
who rarely exercise and illegal drug users. Dolan and Shaw (2004) in turn note 
that the issue of health related behaviour in general terms gave rise to discussion 
and dissent, with some respondents being very in favour of discriminating against 
those with self-inflicted illness, and others very against such discrimination. 
Nonetheless, once the discussion was put in the context of donor transplantation, 
when having to make a choice between two individuals, respondents often chose 
that person whose kidney failure is not self-inflicted. 
Need principles, discussed in section 2.3, have also been addressed by 
empirical studies that have in this case explored the public supports for resource 
allocation based on ill health and on the rule of rescue. In this regard, there is 
evidence that people wish to give priority to the treatment of life threatening 
illnesses' (Bowling, 1996; Cookson and Dolan, 1999; Dolan and Shaw, 2003; 
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Dolan and Shaw, 2004). The severity of illness has also been studied in terms of 
trade-offs vis-a-vis other criteria. Available evidence indicates that people are 
willing to sacrifice health gain or quality of life in order to give priority to those 
with the worst no-treatment profile (Nord, 1993; Ubel et al., 1998; Cookson and 
Dolan, 1999). Dolan and Tsuchiya (2005) oppose preferences for worse future 
health prospects to preferences for the young over the old, and found that younger 
groups are always chosen over older ones, being future health and years without 
treatment non-significant in terms of explaining peoples' preferences. 
Preferences related to proceduraljustice 
There is less evidence about people's support for procedural characteristics 
compared to distributional concerns, in the context of health care resource 
allocation. Of the six procedural characteristics identified above (voice, 
neutrality, consistency, accuracy, reversibility, and transparency), voice is the 
dimension that has been studied more often. 
Available evidence suggests that people believe that voice or involvement 
is important (Anand and Wailoo, 2000; Litva et al., 2002; Wiseman et al., 2003; 
Wailoo and Anand, 2005; Dolan et al., 2007). However, there are some nuances 
depending on the level of involvement, on the type of decision at stake and on the 
level of government. For example, it seems that people wish to be consulted about 
their views but they are less willing to set priorities, which is seen more as a 
doctors' responsibility (Dolan et al., 1999; Coast, 2001; Litva et al., 2002). The 
evidence also indicates that the support for public involvement is greater at higher 
levels of decision making (Litva et al., 2002; Wailoo and Anand, 2005). 
Moreover, Dolan et al. (2007) report that voice was seen both as a right 
(associated with a notion of citizenship or democracy) as well as an instrumental 
mechanism 'to identify needs and to reflect public preferences'. 
Based on available evidence, all the other five characteristics of procedural 
justice are also important to people (Tsuchiya et al., 2005; Wailoo and Anand, 
2005; Dolan et al., 2007). In Dolan et al. (2007) consistency does in fact rank 
higher than voice. The authors say that the survey questions were set at a national 
level in the context of an institution that has the elimination of regional variation 
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as one of its primary aims. The authors further say that discussions about 
consistency tended to focus on regional rather than temporal issues. Wailoo and 
Anand (2005) however report that the proportion of respondents that felt that 
consistency was not important was in excess of 20% at the govenu-nent level 
compared to the other two levels despite that the problematic of variations in 
health care provision among regions (known in England as 'postcode lottery') is 
most relevant to the govenunental decision making level. Other results are also at 
odds with aversion to geographic variation in resource allocation decisions. For 
instance, Bowling (1996) says that when asked whether 'the government should 
issue guidelines to doctors about when not to use life-saving medical 
treatment/technology', 77% of respondents disagree or strongly disagree, despite 
that this sort of guidelines could ensure equal provision across the territory. 
Moreover, regarding who should set priorities, only 3% (61 out of 1997) of 
respondents said "politicians and the government at national level". 
Prqferences over attributes of health care delivery 
The type of preferences addressed here differs from the previous two 
groups in the sense that it explicitly looks simply at what individuals prefer for 
themselves, on whatever basis. In our search, we found studies only for the case 
of out-of-hours care. The available evidence suggests that people are sensitive to 
aspects of delivery such as the 'doctor's manner' (whether the doctor takes time to 
listen), time to making initial contact, time waiting for advice or treatment, type of 
contact (by telephone or in person; home visit or seeing an accident and 
emergency doctor, etc. ), profession of person providing initial advice (trained 
nurse or doctor), and information about expected waiting time (Morgan et al., 
2003; Scott et al., 2003; Gerard et al., 2006). The latter authors also estimated 
some trade-offs (for example, respondents are willing to wait 58 minutes longer 
for advice or treatment to be seen by a doctor than a nurse and 30 minutes longer 
to be seen in person rather than spoken to by telephone). 
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2.7. Main findings and gaps in the literature 
In this chapter, we have primarily focused on the impact of 
decentralisation on efficiency, from the perspective of economics and health 
economics. Regarding production efficiency, the theoretical literature has 
provided arguments both in favour and against decentralisation. Examples of the 
former are greater knowledge at the local level regarding local circumstances 
affecting production costs and greater innovation at the local level; examples of 
the latter are the loss of economies of scale and lower technical knowledge at the 
local level. Concerning the impact of decentralisation on allocative efficiency, an 
argument pro decentralisation is related to a better match between service 
provision and preferences; an argument against decentralisation is the existence of 
externalities. In conclusion, the theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the 
net effect of decentralisation on efficiency. Similarly, the empirical evidence does 
not offer us conclusive results. 
In the theoretical literature, a better matching between service provision 
and (local) preferences is achieved mainly via two models: the principal-agent 
approach and the public choice model. In the former model, the critical issue is 
the existence of information asymmetry between the central and local levels of 
government, in which it is assumed that local decision makers are better informed 
about local preferences than central decision makers; in the latter model, the 
critical point is the existence of competition among local decision makers for 
mobile taxpayers, in which a better match between service provision and 
preferences is seen as a way of attracting residents. The theoretical literature 
developed for the context of health care has relied not only but mainly on the 
issue of information asymmetry. 
In both the principal-agent approach and the public choice model, 
preferences play an important role in the positive link established between 
decentralisation and allocative efficiency but what leads to this positive result is 
information asymmetry or competition (among local decision makers) and not 
preferences themselves. Thus, a question that might be raised here is: are the 
nature and content of preferences relevant in this type of analysis? In other words, 
might preferences in themselves influence the impact of decentralisation on 
allocative efficiency? This is the central question addressed in the theoretical 
61 
discussion presented in the next chapter. 
In fact, the nature and content of preferences have not been explicitly 
discussed in the literature about decentralisation; however, if we cross this 
literature with the literature about health care resource allocation, new insights 
may emerge, helping to answer the previous question. Basically, the literature 
about decentralisation has viewed preferences under a traditional welfare 
economics perspective, according to which individuals are rational, selfish and are 
the best judges of their own welfare. However, once we look at the (theoretical 
and empirical) literature dealing with health care priority setting, we conclude that 
preferences might be many different things, depending on whom or what 
individuals are asked to think about, and that many other arguments besides self- 
regarding utility might affect the preferred social state and hence the optimal 
allocation of resources. 
In this latter literature, it has also been acknowledged that there might be 
trade-offs between different arguments affecting social welfare. Contrarily, in the 
literature on decentralisation, trade-offs between different objectives of health 
care resource allocation remain a topic under-explored. This seems to be an area 
in which one stream of literature has something to offer to the other stream of 
literature. Within health economics there are also some trade-offs that have so far 
received little attention, namely, trade-offs involving inequality (in health or in 
health care provision) across geographic areas. These trade-offs might acquire 
particular relevance in contexts of decentralisation given that the latter have been 
associated with geographic variations in provision. In chapter three we consider 
the possibility of decentralisation creating trade-offs involving inequality across 
regions both in terms of health and health care provision. In chapter four, we also 
explore at an empirical level the trade-off between health maximisation and 
equality of treatment across geographic areas. In chapter five, we further argue 
that this is a particularly pertinent issue (and lack in empirical research) in the 
case of the English NHS given the lively debate about variations in provision 
across areas that has taken place in England. 
Another sort of trade-offs less explored is that involving outcomes, on the 
one side, and procedures, on the other. Again this might be relevant in contexts of 
decentralisation given the link established in the theoretical literature between 
decentralisation and the procedural characteristic of voice or participation. In fact, 
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in the literature about decentralisation, participation has been presented as a 
positive outcome and it has been seen as a good in itself but the issue of people's 
preferences for participation has not been discussed; on the other hand, the 
literature about health care priority setting has to some extent addressed the theme 
of public participation or involvement and it has been acknowledged that 
preferences for involvement might be greater or lower and might depend on 
several factors but no association between participation and decentralisation has 
been made. Thus, there seems to be here an unexplored path between 
decentralisation and allocative efficiency in health care, via preferences. In 
chapter three (section 3.5) we also use this perspective to address the question 
posed above. 
Finally, another important finding/gap is that, regardless of which model is 
used, variation in public service provision (resulting from decentralisation) 
increases allocative efficiency because it is assumed that preferences vary across 
jurisdictions, which is ultimately an empirical matter. Despite the pertinence of 
this question, empirical evidence about variation in preferences across regions, in 
the context of health care resource allocation, is almost non-existent: in one case, 
Neuberger et al. (1998), the issue of geographical heterogeneity is marginally 
mentioned (in this study, there were no significant differences among the 
responses of the general public according to location in the United Kingdom); 
and, for the case of preferences over health states, while Sculpher and Gafni 
(2001) and Birch and Gafni (2002) argue that there is variation in preferences and 
even question the valuation of health gains, in England and Wales, based on the 
values of the general population, Robinson and Parkin (2002) argue that evidence 
indicates the existence of variability per se but not the existence of systematic 
variation. The main objective of the empirical work reported in chapter four is 
precisely to test the assumption of variation in preferences across (two) 
geographic areas. 
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CHAPTER 3. Might preferences in themselves influence the impact of 
decentralisation on allocative efficiency? A theoretical discussion 
3.1. Introduction 
In the final section of chapter two, we noted that the concept of 
preferences has played a relevant role in economic analyses of decentralisation but 
only indirectly. We further noted that this concept has been interpreted in these 
analyses as consumers' preferences. However, a much broader interpretation of 
the concept has been proposed in the health economics literature. Thus, the main 
objective of the current chapter is to discuss whether or not preferences, in this 
broader sense, might in themselves influence the impact of decentralisation on 
allocative efficiency, in terms of health care resource allocation. 
At the onset we define a framework, grounded on the previous review of 
literature. Within this framework, we identify the conditions under which 
decentralised resource allocation decisions improve local populations' welfare, or 
not, compared to centralised decisions (the status quo). The analyses in the 
various sections make use of the diagrammatic language to better illustrate our 
points. More formal approaches are not adopted since no particular functional 
forms are assumed for social welfare functions as well as for health production 
functions. 
In section 3.2, we thus present the framework within which the subsequent 
discussions are developed. The main assumptions are identified and supported 
with the findings of the previous chapter. In this section, we also suggest that our 
framework can be seen as an adaptation of the principal-agent approach. This 
adapted principal-agent relationship is later used in chapter five to distinguish 
between variation in provision derived from variation in preferences and variation 
in provision derived from variation in technical infori-nation. 
The discussion starts in section 3.3 with the impact of information 
asymmetry on the outcomes produced by decentralisation in terms of efficiency. 
stressing the trade-off between production efficiency and allocative efficiency 
(although the former type of efficiency is embodied in the latter, the term 
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allocative efficiency is used to account for the popular outcome of decentralisation 
concerning a better match between the provision of goods and services and 
preferences). 
In section 3.4, preferences for equal provision of health care across 
jurisdictions are considered, in which decentralisation might create a trade-off 
between this objective of resource allocation, on one hand, and production 
efficiency and other concerns embodied in the preferred health distribution, on the 
other hand. 
Section 3.5 focuses on preferences for participation (or preferences for 
having voice) in decision making. In this case, the trade-off potentially generated 
by decentralisation involves outcomes, on the one hand, and procedures, on the 
other. This happens because decentralisation increases participation or voice, 
which is a procedural characteristic that has inherent value to people regardless of 
outcomes but it comes at a cost in terms of health gain foregone, that is, given the 
assumptions identified below in section 3.2, decentralisation leads to production 
inefficiency. 
In section 3.6, the impact of decentralisation on local populations' welfare 
is discussed making use of the concept of externality effects, being the latter 
associated with distributional concerns at the interjurisdictional level. The trade- 
off that emerges with decentralisation is in this case between amounts of resources 
allocated to health care that better reflect local preferences, on the one hand, and a 
health distribution between jurisdictions that is farther from the preferred 
distribution, on the other. 
Preferences for health states are the topic of discussion in section 3.7. The 
main issue under consideration is in this case the use of local, rather than national, 
preferences to set the distribution of a common pool of resources among 
jurisdictions. 
Based on the discussion developed throughout the chapter, the main 
conclusion is that preferences might be seen as a basis to determine the optimality 
or otherwise of decentralised resource allocation decisions, compared to 
centralisation. However, this result is based on some assumptions; thus, the final 
section of the chapter (section 3.8) presents some limitations of the current 
analysis. Examples of these limitations are those stemming from the assumptions 
of: benevolent decision-makers, inforination asymmetry, variation in preferences, 
65 
absence of movements of people between areas, positive link between 
decentralisation and participation and exogenous preferences. The implications of 
relaxing these assumptions are discussed and several other issues that remain to 
future research are also identified. The assumption of variation in preferences is 
actually tested empirically in chapter four. 
3.2. The basic framework and assumptions 
In this section, we describe the overall framework that supports our 
discussion in the current chapter. The main assumptions adopted here are based 
on the review of literature presented in chapter two. 
In our framework, there is a central decision-maker (that might be viewed 
as the central government or the department of health) and there are two 
jurisdictions, A and B. In some cases it is sufficient to analyse the case of a single 
jurisdiction, which we represent by 'jurisdictionf. By jurisdiction we mean a sub- 
national group of people governed by a decision-making body that is a budget 
holder and that enjoys some autonomy in terms of health care resource allocation. 
In some of the sections below, a representative resident of each jurisdiction is 
considered; in others, we consider that there are two residents, X and Y, in each 
jurisdiction. 
The total amount of resources available to health care is fixed. Local 
budgets are wholly funded from central transfers (no funds are raised by local 
budget holders, whether through taxes or user fees). Thus, we discuss 
decentralisation applied to resource allocation decisions but not to revenue raising 
powers (this perspective fits the scenarios in most Western European countries, 
for instance, where there is a generalisation of centralised taxation). In two 
sections, we actually allow local budgets to vary according to preferences but the 
assumption that local budgets are formed by central transfers still holds. 
Resource allocation decisions might concern the distribution of resources 
among alternative health care interventions. Health care interventions may 
represent high technology curative interventions like heart and lung 
transplantation; or medicines (both for preventive or curative purposes); or 
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screening programmes (e. g. breast cancer screening). When we admit the 
existence of two residents in each jurisdiction, another decision comes into play, 
which is the allocation of resources between individuals X and Y, within each 
jurisdiction. 
We assume that: (i) health gain is null in the absence of health care; (11) 
health care causes no harm to individuals; (iii) health gain increases with health 
care; and, (iv) there is diminishing marginal health productivity (as more health 
care resources are allocated to j's resident, the additional health gain obtained by 
J .'s resident becomes smaller) 15 . For expository purposes, we assume that the 
maximum health gain, for a given amount of resources, is the same across 
jurisdictions. We also assume that there is no health externalities, meaning that the 
amount of health gain obtained in one jurisdiction is independent from the health 
gain obtained in the other jurisdiction. 
The constraints faced by decision-makers concern the limited amount of 
available resources and the available technology (that defines the opportunity set 
of alternative uses of resources). We further assume that central transfers received 
by each jurisdiction under decentralisation correspond to the amount of resources 
that the central decision-maker would devote to the respective local populations, 
under centralised decision-making (that is, the amount of funds does not change 
as a result of decentralisation). 
The concept of preferences should be interpreted in this chapter in a 
general sense, in line with the suggestions found in the health economics literature 
and reported in the previous chapter. That is, they might be personal preferences - 
when individuals are thinking about themselves, including (welfarist) altruistic 
sentiments; they might be social preferences - when individuals are thinking 
about the whole society (each individual might think only about others or he 
might think about the whole population including himself); preferences might 
focus on general principles of (distributive or procedural) justice, on groups of 
people, on specific health care interventions, or on attributes of health care 
delivery; they might even be the aggregate of individual views or some sort of 
collective preferences. 
15 These assumptions, leading to upward sloping and concave health production functions, are very 
common in the health economics literature (e. g., Wagstaff, 1991; Wagstaff and Culyer, 1993; 
Dolan and Olsen, 2001; Hauck et al., 2002). 
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We assume that preferences, relevant for resource allocation decisions, are 
heterogeneous across jurisdictions. In chapter two, we saw that diversity in 
preferences is a central assumption in classical theory of fiscal decentralisation 
(e. g. Oates, 1972,1999; Tiebout, 1956; Musgrave 1959). Other analyses that deal 
with preferences have relied on, or at least acknowledged the possibility of, 
heterogeneity in preferences (e. g. Hurley et al., 1995; Gilbert and Picard, 1996). 
Although recognising that the concept of preferences adopted in our discussion is 
potentially broader than the concept that has been adopted in the literature about 
decentralisation, at this stage we follow without questioning the traditional 
assumption that diversity exists. 
In our discussion, unless otherwise stated, we assume that there is 
imperfect infon-nation regarding preferences and that local authorities are better 
informed about these preferences (in their respective jurisdictions) compared to 
the central authority. This assumption goes along with other authors' positions 
(for instance, Oates, 1972,1999; Hurley et al., 1995; Gilbert and Picard, 1996; 
Faguet, 2004) 16 . In chapter two, we saw that this argument has been used to 
justify a positive impact of decentralisation on allocative efficiency. 
On the other hand, we assume that the centre has superior technical 
information compared to local authorities. This means that X-efficiency or 
production efficiency (as defined in chapter two - 'being on the health possibility 
frontier') is greater with centralised than with decentralised allocation of 
resources. Hurley et al. 's (1995) discussion supports this assumption and other 
authors have assumed (Faguet, 2004) or considered the possibility of (Robalino et 
al., 2001) a similar cost advantage of the central government compared to local 
authorities. In Norway, the lack of capacity of hospitals to manage and organise 
services efficiently has been put forward to partly justify the 2002 reforms of 
recentralisation (Mosca, 2006; Magnussen et al., 2007). In England, the lack of 
personnel with information handling and analytical skills to transform 'loads of 
data' into 'usable information', within Primary Care Trusts, has also been 
recognised (Bate et al., 2007). 
Another argument, discussed in the theoretical literature, that could be 
used to explain this negative association between decentralisation and production 
16 See chapter two. 
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efficiency is related to economies of scale 17 . Nonetheless, there are also arguments 
that point to the opposite result. For example, local authorities are said to know 
better than the central government about local circumstances affecting production 
costs (Oates, 1972,1999; Hurley et al., 1995; Gilbert and Picard, 1996). The latter 
authors use the term of 'geographical proximity effect' to define the cost 
advantage of local authorities. But these authors also say that there might be a 
'learning effect' about costs, which favours centralised allocations. 
Additionally, it could be argued that the centre is better 'equipped' to elicit 
and meet preferences. It is therefore admissible that infon-nation asymmetry can 
go either way. On the whole, taking into account both the theoretical literature and 
empirical evidence, we concluded in the previous chapter that the impact of 
decentralisation on allocative efficiency is ambiguous and that the same occurs in 
regards to the impact of decentralisation on production efficiency. Our interest lies 
on the hypothesis of both impacts diverging. Here, we assume that this divergence 
derives from information asymmetry as previously explained but we must 
acknowledge that, given the current state of knowledge, different assumptions 
would be acceptable as well. 
We make use of the theoretical assumption, mentioned in the previous 
chapter, that there is a positive relationship between decentralisation and 
participation. 
Centralisation is taken as the status quo against which decentralisation is 
evaluated, in terms of its impact on social welfare. This has been the preponderant 
perspective adopted in the literature about decentralisation and it seems to suit the 
contexts of most Western European countries (and less developed countries as 
well), in which decisions about health care resource allocation have remained a 
responsibility of central governments; therefore, in general, the debates have been 
mostly about the pros and cons of the changes brought by decentralisation always 
compared to the status quo of centralisation. 
Evaluating the impact of decentralisation on social welfare requires the 
definition of the desideratum and a rule of aggregation of the individuals' levels 
of the desideratum. In chapter two, we said that in terms of the former there is a 
main distinction between a welfarist perspective (that takes the individuals' utility 
17 In our discussion we focus only on the informational argument though. 
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as the desideratum) and a non-welfarist perspective according to which welfare 
might depend on other attributes beyond utility, like health. 
Regarding the aggregation rule, Tsuchiya and Miyamoto (2007) note that 
the simplest aggregation rule is to add up the changes 'in the desideratum across 
individuals without any weights (or equivalently, with uniform weights) so that the 
outcome with the largest total is recognised as the best outcome. This rule follows 
the Bentharnite tradition that everybody counts for one and nobody counts for 
more than one. 
But the aggregation rule might also incorporate concerns for the 
distribution of the desideratum. Tsuchiya and Miyamoto (2007) say that under 
non-welfarism, these concerns can be derived from the informed cit1*7-en" or poficy 
makers. Other forms of aggregation might involve some sort of bargaining or 
contract among individuals (Dolan et al., 2003). 
In health economics, the desideratum has been perceived to be health per 
se precisely because it is valued by the public at large or the relevant decision 
makers (Tsuchiya and Miyamoto, 2006). At the same time, the role of the public 
concerning the relevant aggregation rule has also been increasingly recognised 
within the non-welfarist approach, adopted in health economics. It is now 
accepted that the preferences of the general public have a role to play in terms of 
decisions about how to allocate resources in health care (Dolan and Tsuchiya, 
2007). It is in this context that we discuss the impact of decentralisation on social 
welfare by reference to preferences. That is, in our discussion, decentralisation is 
said to improve allocative efficiency if it leads to a better match, compared to 
centralisation, between what is achieved with resource allocation and what are the 
preferences (as defined above) regarding this same allocation. 
Importantly, we assume that decision-makers, both at the central and local 
levels, are benevolent planners. Thus, the objective of decision-makers is to 
maximise the social welfare of local populations. 
Figure 2 diagrammatically illustrates our approach, which might be 
interpreted as an adaptation of the principal-agent framework. In the upper half of 
diagram, we represent the traditional focus on the vertical relationship between 
the central and local authorities, where the latter are explicitly seen as agents of 
18 See chapter two for the definition of this concept. 
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the fon-ner. In this case, there is decentralisation of decision-making (arrows 
identified by the letter W) but it is the central authority that defines the targets 
for resource allocation and the intention is to have agents that seek to implement 
these objectives, hence, the emphasis on mechanisms of incentives and sanctions 
that are likely to generate this result (arrows identified by the letter 'B'). The 
dashed arrows "C" in the upper half of Figure 2 mean that the population's 
welfare might be implicit in the set of objectives defined by the central authority, 
i. e., it might be implicit that the central authority acts as an agent of the 
population (the ultimate principao. 
Local authorities as agents of the central authority: 
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Figure 2. An adaptation of the principal-agent approach 
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In the bottom half of Figure 2, the analysis shifts its focus, presenting the 
central and local authorities as explicit alternative agents deciding on behalf of the 
respective populations (note that each local authority acts as the agent of the 
respective local population, while the central authority acts as the agent of all 
local populations). We assume that decision-makers are benevolent and therefore 
seek to maximise the (respective) population's welfare. The idea is to compare, 
for each local population, the relative performance of the central and local 
authorities, in meeting its preferences. For local population 1, for example, if 
'Agent P is expected to produce greater welfare for this population than 'Agent 
0% then it is optimal to rely on the former. Because 'Agent 0' represents the 
central decision-maker and is taken as the status quo, then we say that it is optimal 
to decentralise decision making. A major difference between the two perspectives 
represented in Figure 2 is the assumption of benevolent decision-makers in the 
second case. 
In the adapted framework described in Figure 2, information asymmetry 
between the alternative agents might determine which of them performs better in 
meeting preferences but it might also be that, beyond infon-nation asymmetry, 
preferences themselves determine which agent achieves greater welfare for local 
populations. In other words, it might be that preferences themselves influence the 
impact of decentralisation on allocative efficiency. 
Finally, given the assumption of diversity in preferences across local 
populations and admitting the possibility of preferences affecting the impact of 
decentralisation on allocative efficiency, it might occur that the optimality or 
otherwise of decentralisation also varies across jurisdictions. To evaluate the 
overall impact of decentralisation on social welfare, an aggregation rule is needed 
at the interjurisdictional level. This rule might stem from preferences as for the 
case of the aggregation of the individuals' levels of the desideraturn 
(intrajurisdictional level), though in this case preferences regarding distributional 
issues among jurisdictions should stem from the whole population given that the 
whole population is affected by this rule of aggregation. In this dissertation, we do 
not however dwell on the issue of aggregation rules at this level (involving 
jurisdictions). 
in summary, the key assumptions for the following discussions are: 
decision-makers are benevolent and their objective is to maximise the welfare of 
72 
their respective populations; central authorities are better informed than local 
authorities in terms of technical issues while the opposite occurs for the case of 
public (local) preferences; participation increases with decentralisation; and there 
is diversity, across jurisdictions, in preferences. 
3.3. The trade-off between information regarding technical knowledge and 
information regarding preferences 
In this section, the discussion focuses only on the two types of infonnation 
asymmetry assumed above and analyses the impact of decentralisation on 
allocative efficiency under these circumstances. 
We start by considering a jurisdiction j, with two residents, X and Y, and 
whose health possibility frontier, fjyfjx , is shown in Figure 3 (note that the 
origin does not correspond to zero health; it represents instead the endowment 
point as defined in Figure I in chapter two). Resource allocation decisions involve 
the allocation of resources among alternative health care interventions and among 
X and Y. 
Let us consider for the moment imperfect infon-nation (and hence 
infori-nation asymmetry between levels of decision making) only for the case of 
preferences. This means that, given an allocation of resources between X and Y, 
the final distribution of health lies always on the frontier. Assume that preferences 
in jurisdictionj are such that the preferred distribution is that represented by point 
D 19 , 
in Figure 3. The convex indifference curves shown in this figure further 
indicate that we assume that the public is willing to accept deviations from the 
preferred distribution, D, if in return jurisdiction j's total health ( hjy + hj'Ir ) also 
increases but the shape of indifference curves is not a particularly relevant issue 
for the analysis. 
Suppose that point L, in Figure 3, gives the distribution reached by 
decentralised resource allocation, while point C represents the distribution 
achieved by centralised allocation. The distance between D and L is lower than 
19 The preferred distribution might result from a variety of factors discussed in the previous 
chapter. In chapter two we also saw that empirical evidence suggests that people are willing to 
trade-off different objectives, hence, the preferred distribution might itself derive from a 
combination of factors. 
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the distance between D and C due to our assumption about information 
asymmetry regarding preferences. 
hjy 
fi 
S hjx 
Figure 3. Gain in social welfare due to information asymmetry about local preferences 
The difference SWj2-SWjO is the loss of social welfare due to imperfect 
inforination under centralisation and the differenceSWj2-SWjI is the loss of social 
welfare due to imperfect infori-nation under decentralisation. Therefore, in this 
case, decentralisation increases allocative efficiency leading to an improvement in 
j's social welfare represented by the difference SWjl-SWjo. 
Let us now consider imperfect information regarding both preferences and 
technical issues. In this case, the foriner is likely to lead to deviations from point 
D (the preferred distribution) and given a distribution of resources between X and 
Y, imperfect inforination regarding technical matters is likely to lead to deviations 
from the frontier. 
Due to our assumption about infori-nation asymmetry in terrns of technical 
knowledge, deviations from the frontier are lower under centralised than 
decentralised allocations. Decentralisation will still have a positive impact on 
allocative efficiency if greater deviations from the frontier are outweighed by 
lower deviations from the preferred distribution. Decentralisation creates a trade- 
off between the two sources of welfare: on one hand it approximates the health 
distribution to the preferred distribution but on the other hand it implies grater 
losses in social welfare due to health gain foregone caused by greater production 
inefficiency. 
Admit that point L' in Figure 4 represents the health disti-ibution 
effectively achieved in junsdiction j, in a context of decentralised allocation. 
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SWji- SWjo is in this case the total loss of social welfare in jurisdictionj, under 
decentralisation, due to imperfect information. Whether or not decentralisation 
improvesj's social welfare depends on the status quo, that is, it depends on the 
health distribution achieved by centralised allocation. If the latter is represented 
by e. g. C' thenj's population is better-off if the central authority continues to act 
as its agent. Contrarily, if C" gives the health distribution obtained with 
centralised allocation, then decentralisation increases allocative efficiency. It 
would be indifferent to have centralised or decentralised allocations if the status 
quo corresponded to a health distribution on the indifference curve associated 
with the level of welfare SWjO. Diagrammatically, as the distance between C and 
D expands, the point of indifference between centralisation and decentralisation is 
compatible with an increasing distance between D and L' (larger welfare losses, 
under centralisation, due to imperfect information about preferences allow larger 
welfare losses, under decentralisation, due to production inefficiency). 
hjy 
ýfj 
S fix hjx 
Figure 4. Change in social welfare due to information asymmetry about preferences and 
technical knowledge 
If the status quo (centralised allocations) in jurisdiction A corresponds to a 
health distribution on the area filled with horizontal lines plus the area filled with 
crossed lines, then A's local population is better-off if the central decision-maker 
continues to act as its agent. On the contrary, if the status quo is defined by a 
health distribution off this area, then decentralisation is optimal in jurisdiction A. 
The same happens for the case of jurisdiction B and the area filled with vertical 
lines plus the area filled with crossed lines. 
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hjy 
fjy 
WBI 
S fix hjx 
Figure 5. Changes in social welfare given information asymmetry and variation in 
preferences 
Decentralisation is non-optimal simultaneously for jurisdictions A and B, if 
their health distributions associated with centralisation are anywhere on the filled 
sections of Figure 5. Decentralisation is welfare improving simultaneously for 
both jurisdictions only if their respective status quo correspond to health 
distributions on the white area , in Figure 5, defined by the axes, the health frontier 
and social indifference curves SWAO and SWBO. There is the possibility of 
decentralisation improving welfare in one jurisdiction but not in the other. For 
example, if the status quo in both jurisdictions corresponds to a health distribution 
on the area filled with vertical lines, then decentralisation increases social welfare 
in jurisdiction A but lowers social welfare in jurisdiction B. The opposite occurs 
for the case of the area filled with horizontal lines. In these latter situations, unless 
decentralisation is differently implemented across jurisdictions, depending on its 
effect on allocative efficiency within each jurisdiction, an aggregation rule is 
necessary to add up the changes in the jurisdictions' levels of welfare to reach a 
conclusion on the overall optimality of decentralisation compared to 
centralisation. 
In the contexts described in Figures 3 to 5, if, for any distribution of 
resources between X and Y, the only thing that mattered to people was total health 
(that is, if the only thing that mattered was production efficiency), central'sation 
would be preferred to decentralisation, given that the foriner involves a lower 
waste of resources due to imperfect technical infori-nation. In this sense, by 
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including or not distributional concerns, local preferences determine whether or 
not decentralisation is welfare improving, compared to centralisation. However. 
this is an indirect effect via the argument of infon-nation asymmetry about 
preferences; with perfect information, it would be possible for the central 
decision-maker to allocate resources in order to achieve different targets for 
different local populations. 
There might be an intermediate scenano, in which the central and local 
decision-makers do not act as alternative agents; instead, they share infonnation 
and decision-making. Infon-nation may flow from local to central authorities or 
the other way around. One of the relevant aspects of information identified by 
Hurley et al. 's (1995) is precisely its communicability. This characteristic might 
help to detennine from where to where information should flow. Following these 
authors, information about preferences is more difficult to transmit without loss of 
meaning than technical knowledge. Consequently, the intermediate scenario could 
be conceptualised as the central decision-maker deciding about technical matters, 
leaving to the local sphere of responsibility decisions about the allocation of 
resources among (independent)20 interventions or groups of individuals. 
A possible way of combining the information held at both levels of 
decision making is to incorporate (central) technical knowledge into local 
decisions through centrally defined clinical guidelines for the management of 
specific clinical conditions. Suppose, for example, that the bottom half of Figure 6 
shows the health production function for the case of individual X, living in A (mx 
is the amount of resources allocated to this representative individual). 
Clinical guidelines that help local authorities to move towards health 
production functions, given their current level of spending, always increase social 
welfare. For example, suppose that, in Figure 6, mo corresponds to the amount of 
resources underlying the health distribution D', obtained with decentralised 
allocations. Clinical guidelines that lead to an increase of the health gain obtained 
by X, given mo resources, can generate an increase of social welfare up to Sffý42- 
SW. 11 (as represented in the upper quadrant in Figure 6), compared to 
decentralised allocation in the absence of central guidelines. Nonetheless, results 
might be different if central clinical guidelines are cost-increasing compared to the 
20For each level of resources, deciding among mutually exclusive intervention is above all a 
technical issue. 
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solution that emerges with decentralised decision making. 
hjy 
fjy 
hj, k, 
MO 
MI 
MX 
Figure 6. 'Resource constrained' clinical guidelines as a mechanism to pass technical 
knowledge into local decisions 
Suppose that m 1, in Figure 6 is the amount of resources necessary to 
implement central guidelines for the management of the clinical condition 
represented by individual X. Compared to decentralised allocations without 
central guidelines, the movement towards the health production function, still 
represents an improvement in terins of X-efficiency. The question is that, if 
central guidelines themselves determine the amount of resources to be allocated to 
individual X, then, there is no decision resting on the local authority. This means 
that local knowledge about preferences is not incorporated into decisions. In 
Figure 6, being on Xs health production function, given the amount of resources 
m 1, actually entails lower social welfare in jurisdiction A, compared to what would 
be achieved by decentralised decisions. The difference Sffý41-SWAo, represents (by 
assumption) the loss in social welfare created by a cost-increasing clinical 
guideline. Note that if the clinical guideline sets a greater amount of resources to 
individual X, compared to mo, then, individual Y gets fewer resources compared to 
the amount that he or she receives in the absence of the guideline. 
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To conclude, if there is information asymmetry regarding technical 
knowledge as well as local preferences regarding health distribution, then, 
whether decentralisation increases social welfare or not, depends on the trade-off 
created by decentralisation: on the one hand, it leads to greater social welfare due 
to a better match between service provision and preferences; on the other, it leads 
to lower social welfare due to lower health gain obtained with each possible 
distribution of resources. 
There is nonetheless an intermediate solution that increases social welfare 
compared to total centralisation and compared to total decentralisation. This 
solution entails the decentralisation of decisions concerning the allocation of 
resources between independent interventions or groups of individuals (in our 
framework, represented by individuals X and Y), in which local knowledge about 
preferences can be incorporated into these decentralised decisions. At the same 
time, central technical knowledge can be incorporated into decisions via clinical 
guidelines, indicating how to manage each condition, given different levels of 
resources. The role of the centre here is to help local decision-makers to reach 
health production functions. 
Under the intermediate solution, the recommendation of a specific 
medicine, for instance, applicable to a particular condition, might be conditioned 
by the amount of resources made available for this condition. We could think of 
these as being 'resource-constrained' clinical guidelines. For instance, in Figure 6, 
moving from mo to m, might allow, say, providing a new drug to X. Moreover, 
given the level of resources ml, it is cost-effective to provide the new drug to 
individual X. But whether or not the new drug should be provided depends on 
whether or not it is optimal to allocate more resources to X at the expense of fewer 
resources allocated to Y. In this intermediate scenario, if local decision-makers 
decide within 'resource- constrained' central guidelines, there is the guarantee that 
variations in health care provision do not stem from differences in terrns of local 
availability of technical information and/or local capacity to transfonu it into 
usable technical knowledge; differences derive from different preferences for 
health distribution. And, from the perspective of maximising social welfare, these 
differences are optimal. 
In Figure 6, we represented the case of central guidelines affecting only 
individual X. When there are central guidelines that are cost-increasing for both 
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individuals, compared to the health distribution D', then, it is clearly not possible 
to meet both guidelines, within fixed budgets. If it is not possible to meet both 
guidelines, anyway, there might be room for decentralised decisions (in the sense 
of which guideline to left partly unmet). The situation represented in Figure 6, by 
the movement from mo to ml, is still valid when there are central guidelines for 
some conditions but not for others. Although this result is not intended, those 
conditions for which guidelines are available end up being given greater priority 
over other conditions. For example, in England, a distinction has already been 
made, in terms of priority for resource allocation, between 'NICE approved 
technologies' and 'non-NICE technology' (Davies and Littlejohns, 2002)21. 
3.4. Preferences for equality of health care provision between jurisdictions 
In this section, we focus on equality of health care provision across 
juns ictions, assuming that this issue is relevant to local populations' evaluation 
of alternative social states. Recall from chapter two that it has been acknowledged 
that inequalities in health care per se might have relevance to social justice and to 
health equity (Sen, 2002). Also, in England, NICE has been associated with equal 
provision of health care across jurisdictions as it was created partly to put an end 
22 on the phenomenon that became known as 'postcode lottery' 
Given our assumption that the health frontier is the same for jurisdictions 
A and B, an equal allocation of resources (to individuals X and Y) across 
jurisdictions also leads to an equal health distribution (between X and 1) across 
jurisdictions. Thus, in this section, the latter objective should be seen simply as a 
proxy for equal health care provision. 
In Figure 7, points D and E represent (as in Figure 5) the preferred health 
21 NICE produces guidance in three areas of health: health technologies (guidance on the use of 
new and existing medicines, treatments and procedures within the NHS); climcal practice 
(guidance on the appropriate treatment and care of people with specific diseases and conditions 
within the NHS), and the recently extended area of public health. The status of NICE guidance is 
defined as advice which should be ftilly taken into account by clinicians and NES organisations 
but in January 2002 the UK government announced a statutory obligation for the NES in England 
to provide funding for treatments and drugs recommended by NICE as a part of its technolo v 91 
appraisals work programme. 
22 Depending on the area of residence, people would get certain expenses reimbursed or not. 
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distributions, by A's and B's local populations, respectively. However, we assume 
that people (in both jurisdictions) are willing to give up, to some extent, of this 
preferred distribution in order to have equal health care provision across 
jurisdictions. Or, given the preferred health distribution, people are willing to give 
up of some health gain in order to obtain in return equality of provision between 
the two jurisdictions. Suppose then that the dashed indifference curves, in Figure 
7, represent the trade-off that people are willing to make between equality of 
health provision and other considerations affecting social welfare 23 . 
For the case of jurisdiction A, for instance, any distribution of health, 
involving equality of health care provision, located between the indifference 
curves corresponding to SWAI and SWAO is always preferred to any other health 
distribution. This implies that even when compared to point D, a distribution 
inside the frontier is preferred provided that it entails equal provision across 
jurisdictions. In the case of jurisdiction B, any distribution of health, involving 
equality of health care provision located between the indifference curves 
corresponding to SWBI and SWBO is always preferred to any other health 
distribution. In the shaded area, any distribution of health, involving equality of 
health care provision is preferred to any other health distribution simultaneously 
by both local populations. 
hjy 
. 
fjy 
SWBI 
S 
'fix 
hjx 
Figure 7. Preferencesfor equal health care provision 
Figure 8 is adapted from Figure 7. Suppose that points D' and E' represent 
23 In chapter four, we present a questionnaire in which questions 3 and 4 are examples of how a 
trade-off of this kind might be operationalised in practice. 
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the health distributions effectively achieved under decentralised allocation (note 
that deviations from D and E stem from Imperfect information about the 
populations' preferred distributions as well as from imperfect technical 
inforrnation that causes deviations from the frontier). 
Point C represents the preferred health distribution taking into account the 
whole population (from both jurisdictions); it therefore lies between D and E. 
Given our assumption that both local populations value equal treatment across 
jurisdictions, the central authority takes these preferences into account and 
therefore allocates health care resources (between X and Y) in the same way in 
both jurisdictions. The reference health distribution should consequently reflect 
the preferences of both local populations. Assume then that point C' shows the 
health distribution obtained with centralised decision making (hence it gives the 
status quo), in which point C' is based on estimates of point C (deviations 
between the two points are also explained by imperfect technical information). 
hjy 
, fj 
SWBI 
S fix hjx 
Figure 8. Convergent effects of decentralisation across jurisdictions 
In the face of this scenano, whether or not decentralisation of resource 
allocation is optimal for local populations depends on the welfare changes 
generated by the movements from C' to D' and from C' to E'. In this particular 
example, both local populations would be worse-off with decentrallsed 
allocations. Let us analyse first the case of jurisdiction A. We said above that, 
given preferences for equal health care provision, any distribution (involving 
equal provision) between the indifference curves corresponding to Sffý41 and SWAO 
is always preferred to any other health distribution entailing unequal provision, 
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thus, C' is preferred to D', meaning that decentralisation, i. e. the movement from 
C' to D', makes A's local population worse-off. However, if the social 
indifference curves (for jurisdiction A) passing through points D' and C' were 
depicted in Figure 8, it could be seen that D' belongs to a higher indifference 
curve than C'. Thus, what makes decentralisation non-optimal for jurisdiction A is 
preferences for equal provision themselves 24. In tenns of the framework described 
in Figure 2, one might say that A's local population is better-off if the central 
decision-maker continues to act as its agent not because he possesses greater 
information than local decision-makers but because changing the agent negatively 
affects the achievement of the goal of equal health care. Thus, it is the local 
population's objectives for resource allocation that determine which agent 
represents higher local welfare. 
In the case of jurisdiction B, preferences for equal health care also make 
point C' preferred to point E', meaning that as for the case of jurisdiction A, 
decentralisation makes B's local population worse-off. In the particular example 
shown in Figure 8, point C' is preferred to point E' anyway (from the perspective 
of jurisdiction B, point C' belongs to a higher indifference curve, not shown in the 
diagram, than point E'). 
Figure 9 shows a situation in which preferences in A are such that the 
movement from C' to D' (i. e. decentralisation) decreases social welfare in this 
jurisdiction, while preferences in B are such that decentralisation (movement from 
C' to E') increases social welfare in this jurisdiction. Here, there are winners and 
losers with decentralisation and an aggregation rule is needed to evaluate the 
overall impact of decentralisation on efficiency. 
Note that, in Figure 9 C' is off the shaded area hence the potential for 
conflict between jurisdictions regarding the impact of decentralisation on their 
levels of welfare. The trade-offs that people are willing to make between equal 
provision and other objectives across jurisdictions might also vary between 
jurisdictions. The shaded area will be larger or narrower depending on this trade- 
off. One can see the shaded area as a measure of the relative strength of 
preferences for equal health care provision: the greater the relative strength of 
24 It does not mean that under decentralisation equal provision is never achleved; it could be 
obtained with e. g. an agreement between local decision-makers, however, in t he current 
framework it is not optimal to change the status quo. 
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these preferences in both jurisdictions, compared to other preferences, the larger 
the shaded area. 
hjy 
fjy 
STVBI 
S fix hjx 
Figure 9. Divergent effects of decentralisation across jurisdictions 
As the dashed indifference curves approximate to the frontier, the role 
played by preferences for equal provision in the evaluation of welfare changes 
produced by decentralisation becomes smaller and the analysis shifts its focus to 
infori-nation asymmetry as discussed in section 3.3. Further note that, while in 
section 3.3, for any given health distribution, points on the frontier generate 
greater welfare than points inside the frontier, in the current section, points inside 
the frontier might be preferred to points on the frontier (for the same health 
distribution) if the foriner correspond to equality of provision across jurisdictions 
and the latter do not. 
3.5. Preferences for voice or participation in decision making 
This section focuses on preferences over procedures, in particular, on 
preferences for participation in decision making or voice. Both the theoretical and 
empirical literature, reviewed in chapter two, suggest that participation (or voice) 
is valued instrumentally as well as inherently. Here, the discussion revolves 
around the latter aspect of the procedural characteristic of voice. Also, recall from 
section 3.2 that, based on the review of literature, we assume that there is a 
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positive relationship between decentralisation and participation. 
To show that preferences for participation might affect the optimal level of 
decentralisation, we adapt Inman and Rubinfeld's (1997b) approach to our 
framework. 
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997b) extend the economic approach, focusing on 
economic welfare, to encompass political objectives as well. They say that the 
twin values of political participation and economic efficiency are rarely integrated 
within a common conceptual framework, proposing to this effect an approach 
different from the suggestion in Figure 10. These authors propose the 'federalism 
frontier' which is formed by combinations of an index of economic efficiency 
(vertical axis) and an index of political participation (horizontal axis). In their 
framework, the former is affected by decentralisation due to spillover effects, due 
to economies of scale and because decentralisation 'increases the likelihood that 
services provided and regulations promulgated will be consistent with the desires 
of each member of the population' (p. 1219). Regarding the index of political 
participation, it comprises a metric of political influence (measuring the effects of 
individual participation on political outcomes) and a metric of political effort 
(measuring the inherent value of participation, for example, by the hours given by 
the individual to a political activity). 
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997b) consider that as decentralisation increases: 
initially, economic efficiency and political participation rise; then, the frontier has 
a downward sloping segment with economic efficiency diminishing (due to e. g. 
spillover effects becoming more important) and participation increasing; finally, 
the frontier is fon-ned by a segment with a positive slope in which both economic 
efficiency and participation decrease. The two anchor points for the 'federalism 
frontier' are full centralisation (one national government) and full decentralisation 
(no govenu-nent at all). The relevant range of the frontier is that in which there is a 
trade-off between efficiency and participation. The authors say that the 
institutions should be chosen in order to get us to the relevant range of the 
frontier; once on this segment, institutional choices should adjust in order to 
reflect the society's preferred mix of efficiency and participation along the 
frontier. Although the focus of the authors is different from the focus adopted in 
the current chapter, one might see that in their analysis preferences can directly 
influence the optimal level of decentralisation (note that Inman and Rubinfeld, 
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1997b, assume that participation is a continuous variable as well as 
decentralisation). 
To adapt these authors' analysis to our framework, we define the variable 
cparticipation' (in jurisdiction j), pj , as a function of decentralisation in 
jurisdiction j, dj, being: pj = p(dj) and > 0. d increases as decision- adj 
making power regarding the allocation of resources among alternative health care 
interventions is successively transferred from the centre to the local level (central 
grants also vary in this case increasing in line with augmented responsibility for 
resource allocation). 
Further consider that preferences in jurisdiction j are such that social 
welfare increases with total local health (for simplicity, assume that uniforrn 
weights apply to all residents) as well as with participation in decision making 
regarding resource allocation in health care (we are still assuming that 
participation, or voice, is valued per se, regardless of the impact that it may have 
on outcomes). 
hj 
Figure 10. The impact ofpreferences for participation or voice on the optimal level of 
participation / decentralisation 
C In Figure 10, pj gives the level of participation that occurs with total 
D 
centralisation of resource allocation decisions and pj shows the level of 
participation that emerges with total decentralisation (i. e. all resource allocations 
are made by the local govemment). 
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Total health decreases with decentralisation due to information asymmetry 
concerning technical knowledge: more decentralisation means lower production 
efficiency, hence, higher levels of participation are associated with lower levels of 
total health. We thus have a health-participation possibility frontier with a 
negative slope (one might say that participation has an opportunity cost in terins 
of health gain foregone). 
The indifference curve shown in Figure 10 has a negative slope as well, 
indicating that both participation and health matter for social welfare in 
jurisdiction j. So, if there is a decrease in participation, social welfare is kept 
unchanged only if total health increases, to compensate for the fon-ner welfare 
loss, and vice-versa. The optimal level of participation, pj, occurs when an 
indifference curve is tangential to the health-participation possibility frontier. Le., 
when the slope of the latter is the same as the slope of the indifference curve: 
ahj 
_ _. 
aswj 
. 
aswj 
ap i ap j ahj 
In other words, the optimal level of participation is 
achieved when the marginal cost of participation, in terms of health foregone, is 
equal to the marginal rate of substitution (the rate at which society is willing to 
substitute health for participation). 
Given the optimal level of participation, pj', the optimal level of 
decentralisation of decisions, d,, is derived from the relationship pj = p(dj). 
The amount of resources and particular decisions that are transferred to the local 
decision-maker's sphere of responsibilities are those underlying the health- 
participation possibility frontier up to pj 
The convex shape of the indifference curve, in Figure 10, is not relevant to 
develop our point. It simply means that the more health society has, it requires 
greater additional amounts of health to give up of equal additional amounts of 
participation. But we could obtain the same p, with a linear indifference curve, 
provided that pj'. corresponded to the point of tangency between the indifference 
curve and the health-participation possibility frontier. A linear indifference curve, 
for instance, implies that the rate at which society is willing to trade-off 
participation against health effectiveness is the same for all values of pj and hj . 
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WB 
SW4 
Pi 
Figure 11. Different optimal levels ofparticipation / decentralisation as the result of 
different preferences 
In Figure 11, two indifference curves are represented, for jurisdictions A 
and B, with different slopes, their purpose being to show the effect of different 
preferences for participation versus health on the optimal level of decentralisation. 
The heal th-p articipation possibility frontier is assumed to be the same in both 
jurisdictions. The representative indifference curve of jurisdiction B (identified by 
the subscript B) is flatter than the representative indifference curve of jurisdiction 
A (identified by the subscript A). Thus, the same amount of participation is traded- 
off against a greater amount of health for the case of jurisdiction A than for the 
case of jurisdiction B. This implies that participation is more valuable, compared 
to health, to A's residents than to B's residents. So, with everything else the same, 
different preferences regarding participation versus health, lead to different 
optimal levels of participation, where p, 4 > p.. Consequently, the optimal 
level 
A 
of decentralisation also differs between these two cases: d4 > dB 
Figure 12 shows the loss in social welfare resulting from the 
implementation of a unique level of decentralisation in both jurisdictions, in the 
presence of differences in preferences. Suppose for instance that dj -d for 
j=A, B, such that the level of participation is p- = p(d) for both jurisdictions, 
P In this situation, the loss of social welfare in A is given, in where p. ' <P< p' 
Figure 13, by the difference SW. 41 -SW,, o and the loss of social welfare in B is 
given by SW, 61 -SWBO, compared to the case in which different levels of 
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decentralisation are implemented. 
hj 
c*-D 
Pi PB P PA Pj Pi 
Figure 12. Loss of social welfare created by a uniform level of decentralisation 
Finally, note that participation can impose significant opportunity (time) 
costs on people and significant resources might be required to promote and ensure 
participation. Time costs reduce the inherent benefit of participation for people 
though we might think about some monetary compensation and focus only on 
monetary costs. In this case, what might happen is that greater participation leads 
to lower health simply because resources are deviated from the production of 
health to sponsor participation (this effect reinforces the effect of information 
asymmetry concerning technical knowledge). Additionally, in the specific case of 
health care, it has been reported that denying care to others causes distress (Coast, 
2001); consequently, 'disutility of denial' might reduce the positive impact that 
participation has on welfare. 
3.6. Preferences affecting the size of local health care budgets: preferences 
for health versus non-health-related 'enjoyment' 
In the literature about clecentralisation, the term externalities has been 
applied in cases in which the provision of services or goods within a jurisdiction 
benefit (or impose costs on) residents of other jurisdictions. In contexts of 
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decentralisation, these costs and benefits might be under-estimated by local 
decision-makers, thus, externalities have been identified as an argument against 
decentralisation. In health, an often cited example of externalities is children 
immunisation. In our discussion we nonetheless assume that health care provision, 
within each jurisdiction, has an impact only on local residents' health. Despite this 
assumption, local health care provision in one jurisdiction might create spillover 
effects on the other jurisdiction's level of welfare via preferences for the 
distribution of health between jurisdictions. It is this kind of externalities that is 
addressed in the current section. 
In the previous sections, local health care budgets were given and 
preferences affected only their distribution within jurisdictions. In this section we 
focus on a case in which preferences affect the size of local budgets. However, 
while in the literature about decentralisation, varying local (health care) budgets 
have been associated mainly with variation in local taxes, here we continue to 
assume that local budgets are formed by central transfers only (this assumption 
guarantees that differences in the sizes of local health care budgets stem from 
different preferences across jurisdictions and not from differences in their levels 
of wealth; the latter might in fact lead to differences in local taxation even for 
constant preferences). Suppose then that the decision being considered for 
decentralisation is the allocation of untied resources that can be allocated to health 
care or to services other than health care. Here, we consider that resources are 
used to fund health care (generating health) or, alternatively, they are used to fund 
4entertaining events' like concerts (generating 'enjoyment' non-related to health). 
The example of 'entertaining events' is merely illustrative and it was 
deliberately chosen given that health has many determinants besides health care, 
thus, posing the question as one of distributing resources between health care and 
social polices such as education or housing would bring accrued difficulties to the 
analysis due to the impact that these policies are likely to have on health. 
Obviously, with a sufficiently flexible definition of health, in the limit everything 
affects health. So, people might feel better by attending a concert and this might 
be seen as a positive impact on their health (on the other hand, being healthier 
allows people to better enjoy the concert). However, we assume (without 
imposing too many restrictions, we think) that health care and 'entertaining 
events' have independent effects on social welfare. 
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We thus assume that, given preferences, social welfare within junsdictionj 
is affected by total health obtained by j's local population, by the local level of 
'enjoyment' non-related to health and by the distribution of health between 
jurisdictions A and B. Allocating more resources to health care increases welfare 
via increased health. On the other hand, allocating more resources to centertaining 
events' increases welfare via increased levels of 'enjoyment". Additionally, 
changes in health within jurisdictions affect the distribution of health between 
them and consequently affect their levels of welfare (the spill over effects 
previously mentioned). 
We continue to assume that there is variation in preferences (in this case 
for health versus 'enjoyment') as well as information asymmetry as described in 
section 3.2. In the current section, one agent (the central decision-maker) 
represents greater production efficiency plus the possibility of internalising the 
spillover effects (that is, the central decision-maker has the capacity of affecting 
health distribution between jurisdictions by determining the amounts of resources 
allocated to health care in both jurisdictions). The other agent (the local decision- 
maker) in turn represents a distribution of resources between health care and 
4entertainment' more in line with preferences (for health versus 'enjoyment'). 
Which agent produces higher social welfare depends on preferences in terms of 
the trade-off between all arguments affecting social welfare. Changing the agent 
(in the status quo the agent is the central government) might therefore have a 
positive or a negative impact on social welfare depending on preferences. That is, 
public preferences condition the impact that decentralisation has on allocative 
efficiency. 
Figure 13 illustrates the loss in (health-related) social welfare due to 
externalities effects associated with preferences. To simplify the exposition we 
limit the analysis to points on the frontier (thus the advantage of the centre in 
terms of production efficiency is not considered). Moreover, we admit that 
decentralisation does not affect the health frontier, implying that on the whole the 
amount of resources allocated to health care is the same under both scenarios; 
what changes is the distribution of this amount between jurisdictions A and B. The 
health fTontier for jurisdictions A and B, fjB, gives the maximum amount of 
health that one jurisdiction can get, given: the health of the other jurisdiction; the 
total amount of resources available to health care; and technology. The social 
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indifference curves shown give the level of health-related social welfare (Figure 
13 does not incorporate 'enjoyment'). 
hA 
f4 
S 
Figure 13. Loss of health-related welfare as a negative 'externality effect'of local 
decisions 
Suppose that point D in Figure 13 represents the preferred health 
distribution (between A and B) by both local populations (this is in fact another 
simplifying assumption 25). Point C represents the distribution achieved with 
centralised allocation and it is based on (central) estimates of point D. Under 
decentralised decision making, each local decision-maker is unable to manipulate 
the distribution of health between jurisdictions, hence, when deten-nining the size 
of local health care budgets only (local) preferences for health versus 'enjoyment' 
are considered. Suppose that preferences for health relative to 'enjoyment' are 
weaker in jurisdiction A than in B, leading to the distribution represented by L. 
Weaker preferences in A imply that in A fewer resources are devoted to health 
care compared to B (hence, A's health associated with point L is lower than A's 
health associated with point C and the opposite happens for B's health). 
The difference HRSWI-HRSWO shows the loss in health-related social 
welfare caused by decentralisation (movement from C to L) in each jurisdiction. 
This loss occurs because, by setting local health care budgets in accordance to 
local preferences for health versus 'enjoyment', local decision-makers moved the 
health distribution (between jurisdictions) farther away from the preferred 
25 But it could be easily relaxed by introducing two different preferred distributions on the frontier 
against which losses in welfare would be measured, using a different reference point for each 
jurisdiction. 
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distribution (point D). This movement can be seen as a negative externality effect 
of local decisions. 
Although there might be negative externality effects in terrns of health- 
related social welfare, to assess the overall impact of decentralisation on allocative 
efficiency, it is necessary to take into its impact on local social welfare due to a 
distribution of resources between health care and 'entertaining events', which 
better reflects local preferences for health versus 'enjoyment'. Therefore, 
decentralisation might be optimal or not, depending on how local populations 
trade-off these different arguments of welfare, involving health and other 
dimensions of welfare. 
The main conclusion here is that, even in a context of information 
asymmetry regarding preferences, decentralisation might not be optimal due to 
externality effects of local decisions. Given that these externality effects are 
associated with preferences, then, here too we conclude that preferences might 
themselves be seen as a basis to deten-nine the optimality or otherwise of 
decentralisation. 
3.7. Is it optimal to allocate resources between jurisdictions based on local 
preferences? 
We have hitherto considered that local budgets are given and that 
preferences affect only the distribution of resources within jurisdictions. Even in 
the prior section, in which local health care budgets are allowed to vary in 
response to preferences, the whole amount of resources available in each 
jurisdiction to allocate between health care and 'entertainrnent events' is fixed and 
independent of preferences. That is, up to this point of the discussion we 
considered that (different) local preferences affect resource allocation only after 
local budgets have been set by the central government. In this section, we thus 
discuss the impact of using different local preferences to set local health care 
budgets. 
The focus here is on a particular type of preferences: preferences over 
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health states, already presented In chapter two. Therefore, a distinction is made 
between quantity and quality effects of health care interventions. We assume that 
there is diversity across jurisdictions regarding preferences that affect health 
outcome measurement. There are then two alternatives to measure health gain, 
when setting local budgets: to use the preferences of the whole population 
(represented in this case by average preferences) or local preferences. 
The amount of health gain obtained by j's representative resident, when 
delivered mj, resources, e(mjt), might be decomposed into a quantity effect and a 
quality effect: e(mp )=L. Q(mj, ). Q is the number of time units (e. g. days, 
months, years) obtained by j's representative resident with mj, , and L is the 
change in the weight attached to the health state achieved with mj, compared to 
the health state that would be achieved without mj,. 
quality 
of life I 
QoL2 
QoL, 
0 length of life 
Figure 14. The impact of different preferences about health states on health gain 
measurement 
Figure 14 shows the impact of different preferences over health states on 
health gain measurement. The horizontal axis measures length of life and the 
vertical axis measures quality of life. Total health gain is therefore given, in 
Figure 14, by an area whose width corresponds to changes in the length of life and 
whose height corresponds to changes in quality of life. Suppose then that a given 
intervention affects both length and quality of life, being the quantity effect equal 
to Q*. If this quantity effect is weighted by the quality of life score QoLj, then the 
total health gain obtained with this intervention is given by the area A. 
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Differently, if the quantity effect is weighted by the quality of life score QoL--. 
then the total health gain obtained with this intervention is given by the area A+B 
(the health gain obtained with the intervention is thus greater for the case of QOL2 
than QoLj, that is, depending on preferences for health states, the health gain 
obtained with a given intervention will be greater or lower). The dashed line in 
Figure 14 indicates in the vertical axis the average value of QoL, given QoLi and 
QoL2 (using the average value, the total health gain is given by the area A+B 2 
Assume for the moment that there is only one health care intervention, t 
and that the objective of resource allocation is to maximise total health. The 
decision at stake here is the allocation of resources between jurisdictions A and B 
and the central decision-maker might use average or, instead, local quality of life 
scores, when distributing resource between jurisdictions. 
To simplify the exposition, assume that, for intervention t, the quantity 
effect is the same for both jurisdictions: Q(MA, ) = Q(MBt) I 
for MA, = M& Let us 
further assume that costs are also the same across jurisdictions: C(MA, 
) = C(MBI) I 
for MA, =M Bt . To analyse the case of heterogeneous preferences used to derive 
quality of life scores, assume that LA # LB , 
for MA, = MBI . Assume, for instance, 
that LA < LB . for MA, = MBt , meaning that A's residents attach lower value to 
what intervention t can do to their health status, compared to B's residents. L 
representing average preferences, lies between LA and 
LB 
* 
The central decision-maker has to allocate a fixed budget, M, between A 
and B. Welfare is maximised when health gain is maximised. Given the 
assumption of diminishing marginal health productivity (as mj, increases the 
additional quantity effect becomes smaller) plus the assumptions that 
Q(MAI) = Q(MB, ) and 
QMJ = C(MBi) , 
for MA, = MBt 9 if the central decision- 
maker uses average preferences to measure health gain, then 
e(m,,, L*Q(MAI) = e(MBt) =L '(? 
(MBt) 
. 
for MAt = MBI So, welfare is maximised 
when each jurisdiction receives one half of the total budget. Let us identify these 
amounts with the superscript L, to denote that they derive from average 
preferences: mE=ME=IM. At Bt 2 
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What happens if the central decision-maker uses L, 4 and 
LB to allocate M 
between A and B? In this case, because e(MAt = LA *Q(MA1 )< e(mBt 
)= LB 
'Q(MBt 
)I 
for MA, = MBt 
ý health maximisation would lead to a local budget lower in 
jurisdiction A than in B: MA<IM andMB >IM. This means that the amount 22 
of resources allocated to jurisdiction A, based on local preferences, m 
Local-L 
I 
is 
At 
lower than the amount of resources allocated to jurisdiction B, m 
Local-L 
in which Bt 
the latter is based on local preferences too. 
Compared to a resource allocation, between jurisdictions, based on 
average preferences, an allocation based on local preferences makes B's residents 
better-off but A's residents become worse-off. Although the quantity effect is the 
same in both jurisdictions, if the distribution of resources between jurisdictions is 
based on (different) local preferences, one jurisdiction gets more resources than 
the other. The use of local preferences to allocate a common pool of resources 
might therefore pose some problems. 
Let us now consider that there are two health care interventions, t--1,2. 
This means that there are two types of decisions: the allocation of resources 
between jurisdictions, involving different preferences for quality of life; and the 
allocation of resources between interventions, within each jurisdiction, involving 
common preferences for quality of life scores. The objective now is to discuss the 
implication of using average or local preferences, within jurisdictions and after 
local budgets have been set. 
Continue to assume that Q(MAt): -Q(MBt) and 
QMAt) :- QMBI) I 
for 
MAI -"::: MBt and t- 1 2. Let us further assume that quantity effects are also the same 
across interventions and that quality effects, based on average preferences, are 
also equal across interventions: LI = 
L2 for m, =M2. Differences apply to local 
preferences for intervention I versus intervention 2. Suppose that 
LAI < LBI 
. 
for 
MAI =M BI while LA2 > LB2 
for MA2 =M B2 . That is, the change in quality of life 
produced by intervention I is valued more in B than in A, while the opposite is 
verified for the case of intervention 2. 
Consider that local budgets have been determined based on average 
preferences LI and E., (for interventions I and 2, respectively). Given our 
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assumptions about quantity effects and costs, maximisation of social welfare (i. e. 
maximisation of health), implies that each jurisdiction gets half the total budget: 
MA =MB =IM. 
2 
Once local budgets have been set, if they are allocated between 
interventions I and 2 based on average preferences, L, and L2 , each 
intervention 
is allocated 
IM 
resources, in each jurisdiction (recall that we are assuming that 4 
quantity effects are also the same across interventions). Let us represent the 
amount of resources allocated to intervention t, in jurisdictionj, when it is based 
MLI on average preferences, by j, . 
Now, because residents in A value more the change in quality of life 
produced by intervention 2, compared to intervention 1, if the allocation of 
MA 
=IM is based on local preferences, 
LAI and LA2 more resources are 2 
allocated to intervention 2 than to intervention 1. Let us represent the allocation 
based on A's local preferences by M 
Local-L 
, for t- 1,2, where, m 
Local-L 
<IM and At Al 4 
M 
Local-L 
>IM. In turn, in jurisdiction B, if the allocationof MB M is based A2 
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on local preferences, it is intervention I that is allocated a greater amount of 
resources than intervention 2: M 
Local-L >IM and M 
Local-L <IM 
BI 
4 
B2 
4 
Given local budgets, moving from an allocation between interventions 
based on average preferences to an allocation based on local preferences, 
increases social welfare in both jurisdictions: L Q(MLoCal-L ) >YL 
4) 
AtAt. At'Q(MAI 
t=1,2 t=1,2 
and L Q(MLocal-L) > IL Bt Bt , Bt'Q(MBt 
t=1,2 t=1,2 
While distributing resources between jurisdictions based on local 
preferences raises some problems, once local budgets have been set, it is optimal 
from the perspective of local welfare to allocate local budgets based on local 
preferences (obviously, this result is valid assuming, as we are, that local welfare 
is maximised when local health is also maximised; if people value the use of equal 
scores across jurisdictions, the results might change as in section 3.4). 
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3.8. Discussion 
Preferences have played an important role in the literature about 
decentralisation concerning its impact on allocative efficiency but only indirectly. 
In this chapter we sought to show that preferences themselves might influence the 
impact of decentralisation on social welfare. Without being exhaustive, we 
focused on particular situations in which preferences contributed to the evaluation 
of the optimality of decentralised allocation of resources compared to the status 
quo of centralised allocations. So, the answer to the question posed in the 
beginning of the chapter is 'yes'. 
The traditional perspective of the literature about decentralisation has 
adopted a welfarist approach, interpreting the concept of preferences as 
consumers' preferences. Thus, to reach our main result (preferences themselves 
might affect the optimality or otherwise of decentralisation), it was crucial to 
bridge the literature on decentralisation with the literature about health care 
priority setting. Within the latter literature it has been acknowledged that the 
concept of preferences might be interpreted in different ways, including non- 
welfarist interpretations according to which preferences might reflect individuals' 
concerns for others. 
Many of the preferences discussed throughout this chapter can in fact be 
thought as society regarding preferences but in our assumptions (section 3.2) we 
have not imposed any constraint in this regard and some of the situations 
considered are actually closer to the concept of personal rather than social 
preferences (for example, preferences for non-health-related 'enjoyment' 
considered in section 3.6 and preferences for health states considered in section 
3.7). 
Some issues included in the current chapter have been addressed in the 
literature about decentralisation but no link has been established between them 
and preferences (which is understandable given the focus on consumers' 
preferences). For instance, the issue of equal provision of goods and services 
across jurisdictions (discussed in section 3.4) has been addressed in the literature 
about decentralisation but it has been presented as a political /constitutional 
constraint that prevent central governments from introducing local differentiation 
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in service provision (e. g. Oates, 1999). Also, the sort of externality effects, 
suggested and discussed in section 3.6, is actually recognised, though only 
implicitly, in Petretto (2000) 26 . This author argues that, in the case of the social 
evaluation of policies, spill over effects of public expenditure should be corrected 
by the considerations of redistributive aims. The concept of spill over effects is 
used by Petretto (2000) in the welfarist sense referring to the willingness to pay by 
non-residents benefiting from health services provided in jurisdictions other than 
that where they live. Regarding the impact of redistributive aims on the social 
value of spill over effects, the author does not associate it with preferences 
however, if he recognises that the public expenditure in one region might be 
socially valued because it affects other 'deserving' regions, then this is the 
recognition (thought the author himself does not follow this route) of the existence 
of spillover effects associated with distributional considerations. 
In the literature about decentralisation, equal provision across jurisdictions 
and increased allocative efficiency by better matching service provision to 
heterogeneous local preferences have been addressed within separate frameworks 
(the former aspect as been associated with a non-welfarist perspective, in which 
equal provision is seen as a constraint deriving from e. g. the Constitution; the 
latter has been addressed within a welfarist perspective, in which the levels of 
utility enjoyed by individuals are used to evaluate alternative social states). In this 
chapter, the adoption of a broad interpretation of preferences allowed us to 
reconcile these dichotomous objectives (equal provision versus variation in 
provision) within a single framework. In fact, both objectives might be linked to 
preferences and then the optimal allocation is dictated by the trade-offs between 
them that people are willing to make. 
Within our framework, decentralisation of resource allocation itself 
generates some trade-offs between objectives. Consequently, whether or not 
decentralisation is optimal, when compared to centralisation, depends on the 
capacity of local decision-makers to generate trade-offs closer to what the public 
prefers. The approach suggested in Figure 2 helps to understand the association 
between decentralisation and different objectives of resource allocation. There the 
focus is on the central and local decision-makers seen as alternative agents acting 
26 See review in chapter two. 
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on behalf of local populations. Depending on the goals of resource allocation 
envisaged by local populations and given the different capabilities possessed by 
agents, local populations will be better-off with one or the other agent. 
Decentralisation is said to improve social welfare, compared to centralisation, if 
local populations are better-off when local decision-makers assume the role of 
their agents. 
Naturally, our conclusions are valid under the assumptions described in 
section 3.2. A major assumption is that decision-makers are benevolent, which has 
allowed us to focus the discussion on the relative capacities of agents to reach 
resource allocation objectives, ignoring the possibility of the introduction of an 
additional tier of government bringing into the analysis additional self-regarding 
objectives of decision-makers (Smith et al., 1997). In Bossert's (1998) 'decision 
space' 27 , for instance, the objectives of resource allocation are set by the central 
government, the principal. His approach is therefore closer to the relationship 
described in the upper-half of the diagram presented in Figure 2. One must say 
nonetheless that, while his view takes into account that local authorities, the 
agents, may pursue self-regarding interests, it does not take into account that 
agents (local decision-makers) may possess superior knowledge about preferences 
than the (intermediate) principal (the central government). 
Another important assumption concerns the existence of infori-nation 
asymmetry between the central and local decision-makers regarding two types of 
information: technical information and information about preferences. The 
assumption that each decision-maker has an advantage over the other regarding 
one of the two types of infori-nation is fundamental to explain the trade-off created 
by decentralisation between production efficiency and the match between service 
provision and preferences. The direction of the information asymmetry, regarding 
each type of information, is not however deten-ninant to conclude that preferences 
might affect the impact of decentralisation on allocative efficiency. That is, we 
could reach the same conclusion assuming that the central decision-maker is 
better inforined about preferences than local authorities while assuming the 
opposite for the case of technical infori-nation. 
Variation in preferences across jurisdictions is an important assumption 
27 See chapter two. 
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too in the current chapter: even with wide variation in preferences, there will be 
no systematic way to address these differences in preferences by varying local 
health services provided if people are located randomly across jurisdictions (only 
in the case of preferences for participation in decision-making, the impact of 
preferences on the optimal level of decentralisation does not depend on the 
existence of variation across jurisdictions). Although variation in preferences is a 
common assumption in discussions about decentralisation, in chapter two it was 
said that there is a lack of empirical evidence supporting this assumption. Oates 
(1999, p. 1122) himself says, in respect to consumers' preferences, that the 'spatial 
pattern of consumption of certain goods and services like education and health is 
open to some debate'. The main objective of the empirical work reported in 
chapter four is precisely to test the assumption of geographic diversity in 
preferences. For the particular samples and preferences used in this work, the 
hypothesis of variation is actually not corroborated. 
The discussion in section 3.5 is valid under the assumption that 
participation increases as decentralisation increases but empirical evidence in this 
respect is scant too. Additionally, in Inman and Rubinfeld's (1997b) analysis (on 
which Figures 10 to 12 are based), decentralisation increases with the number of 
local governments, thus, the link between decentralisation and participation is 
clearer in their discussion than in ours because more local governments mean 
smaller groups of people governed by a single entity and hence greater possibility 
of participation. 
The discussion developed in section 3.6 is based on the assumption that 
the public is sensitive to inequality in health across jurisdictions nonetheless the 
empirical evidence about this issue is also scarce. Still, a priori it seems that the 
geographical dimension of inequality is relevant for policy making. In England, 
for example, in February 200 1, one of the two health inequality targets announced 
by the Secretary of State for Health at the time, Alan Milburn, was "starting with 
Health Authorities, by 2010 to reduce by at least 10% the gap between the quintile 
of areas with the lowest life expectancy at birth and the population as a whole 11 
(Department of Health, 2001a). The results of the empirical work presented in 
chapter four show that people do in fact value the geographical dimension of 
(in)equality in health and health care. The majority is however sensitive to 
opportunity costs of equality in terms of health gain foregone, meaning that they 
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are willing to give up of health gain to keep equality but only up to a certain level. 
In section 3.6, we did not however consider movements of people between 
jurisdictions but these movements might themselves alter health distribution 
between areas. In this case, if resource allocation between areas is not a feasible 
instrument to impact upon health distribution, then the advantage of centralised 
allocation in terms of internalising the spill over effects disappears and the 
discussion falls in the scenario adopted in section 3.3. 
Here, as in the mainstream economic theory, we have assumed that 
preferences are exogenous and stable. This assumption has nonetheless been 
challenged (e. g. Sunstein, 1993; Bowles, 1998; Palacios-Huerta and Santos, 
2004). Sunstein (1993, p. 221), for instance, says for the case of environmental 
law that 'policyrnakers cannot simply identify preferences and try to satisfy them, 
since preferences are influenced by law, and since there is no way to identify the 
preferences that would exist in the absence of law". 
In the current chapter, the consequence of endogenous preferences is that 
the optimal setting (centralised or decentralised decision making) cannot be 
identified based on preferences given that the latter are in turn affected by the 
chosen setting. So, for example, suppose that, given preferences for participation, 
we conclude that it is not optimal to decentralise resource allocation decisions. 
However, people might attach little value to participation because they have not 
been given the opportunity to participate. It has in fact been said that 'when 
people are induced to engage in an activity with little or no extrinsic reward, they 
come to value the activity more highly, that is, they come to believe that their 
actions were intrinsically motivated' (Bowles, 1998, pp. 90-91). Participation 
might even be viewed as a way of enhancing the credibility of, and getting 
support to, decisions that would otherwise be implemented (even more so as 
expectations and demand for health services have steadily increased). So, in this 
case participation might be deliberately used by decision-makers to lower 
expectations and possibly affect preferences regarding health care priority setting 
(Bagott (2005), for example, says that Patient and Public Involvement Forums in 
England - see chapter five - could be seen as a way of controlling the demand 
for 
services). Nonetheless, in a scale measuring the degree of participation in 
decision-making, this sort of participation is rated low and it has actually been 
ten-ned as 'manipulation' (Litva et al., 2002). Another example is the introduction 
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of guidelines, as in Figure 6, which might itself shape preferences regarding the 
allocation of resources to specific groups of people or to particular health care 
services. 
Sunstein (1993) says that it has been shown that people place a higher 
value on rights or goods that they currently hold than they place on the same 
goods in the hands of others. The author provides some explanations namely the 
existence of a status quo bias (losses are weighed more heavily than equivalent 
gains) and adaptive preferences (people adapt their conduct or even their desires 
to what has been available). Sunstein (1993) distinguishes however pnvate 
preferences from what he calls 'collective judgements', saying that the choices 
that people make as political participants are different from those they make as 
consumers. Moreover, he says that the collective character of politics might 
overcome the problem of adaptive preferences, further suggesting that private 
preferences are an inadequate basis for (environmental) policy. 
This suggestion raises some normative questions to future research on the 
nature of preferences used to inform policy making. Sunstein (1993) actually 
refers the possibility of shifting the analysis to normative issues, that is, he says 
that given the possibility of endogenous preferences, it may be important, when 
setting policy, to make some choice about the sorts of preferences that ought to be 
encouraged, rather than to act as if preferences can be kept constant. 
An important question that remains to future research concerns the rule of 
aggregation of the desideratum. at the suprajurisdictional level, that is, how to 
evaluate changes in overall social welfare given different preferences across 
jurisdictions (in Figure 5, for instance, decentralisation might represent an 
improvement relative to centralisation, or not, depending on which indifference 
curves, A's or B's curves, are used to evaluate welfare changes). This issue has 
been avoided either by not allowing the possibility of inconsistent objectives 
across jurisdictions (e. g. Gordon, 1983) or by assuming that there are two 
alternative, not necessarily convergent, perspectives (regional and national) to 
evaluate welfare changes (e. g. Petretto, 2000) but which alternative should be 
used to evaluate the impact of decentralisation on allocative efficiency is still an 
open question. 
In terms of empirical work, there are many topics that have remained 
under-explored. The question of variation in preferences and distributional 
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concerns involving geographic areas are addressed in the next chapter but other 
questions remain to future research, namely the operationalisation and elicitation 
of several trade-offs considered in the current dissertation (e. g trade-offs 
involving outcomes and procedures). 
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CHAPTER 4. Do preferences vary across regions? An empirical study 
applied to two Portuguese municipalities 
4.1. Introduction 
Following the review of literature in chapter two, we stressed that the 
assumption of variation in preferences across jurisdictions is crucial to the 
positive relationship established, in the theoretical literature of economics and 
health economics, between decentralisation and allocative efficiency. This same 
assumption is present (with few exceptions) throughout the theoretical analysis 
that we have developed in the previous chapter. However, despite the relevance of 
this assumption in economic analyses in contexts of decentralisation, in chapter 
two we also said that empirical evidence in this area is to the extent of our 
knowledge very scarce. This chapter reports on a small-scale empirical study that 
sought to approach this issue of geographic variation in preferences. Thus, the 
main objective of this chapter is to assess whether or not there are differences in 
preferences (some of which are addressed in the theoretical chapter), in this case, 
between two independent samples drawn from two distinct Portuguese 
municipalities. 
To pursue this objective we developed and administered the same 
questionnaire to both samples. The selection of regions from which to draw the 
samples was partly by practical convenience and partly judgemental (as explained 
in section 4.3.2). Given the framing of questions, and making use of the taxonomy 
proposed in the literature (reviewed in chapter two), one might say that two types 
of preferences are elicited: personal preferences that ask people about what they 
prefer for themselves, on whatever basis, and social preferences that ask people 
about what ought to be the distribution of resources affecting other people. 
Social preferences considered in the current study can be related to 
maximising as well as egalitarian principles of social justice (see chapter t'%N, o, 
section 2.3). Trade-offs between these two principles are elicited using person 
trade-off questions. Several trade-offs involving health maximisation and 
inequality of different kinds have been elicited, however, based on the results of 
105 
the literature search reported in chapter two, the trade-off between health 
maximisation and equality of treatment (equality of health gains) between regions, 
which is addressed in the current study, seems to have received little attention in 
the empirical (health economics) literature. Preferences regarding the 
geographical dimension of (in)equality are of particular importance in contexts of 
decentralisation given that the latter have been associated with variations in 
service provision. 
The chapter is organised as follows: in section 4.2, we introduce in brief 
the Portuguese context, in which the empirical study was carried out; section 4.3 
describes the methods, namely the design of the questionnaire, the selection of 
respondents and the statistical methods used to analyse the data; section 4.4 
presents the main results that emerged from the data; and section 4.5 closes this 
chapter with a discussion concerning the results and limitations of the current 
study. 
4.2. The Portuguese context 
In this section, we outline some aspects that characterise the health care 
sector in Portugal. We start by presenting some demographic and health 
indicators of the country (sub-section 4.2.1). The focus then shifts to the health 
care system (sub-section 4.2.2), covering a bit of history that explains to some 
extent the current state of affairs as well as organisational features, aspects related 
to finance and delivery, and, finally the issue of decentralisation. This section is 
mainly based on Bentes et al. (2004) and some OECD health data (2006) are also 
used. 
4.2.1. Some demographic and health indicators 
Portugal is part of the Iberian Peninsula in the southwest of Europe. Two 
archipelagos (Azores and Madeira) in the Atlantic Ocean are also part of Portugal. 
According to the 2001 census, the total resident population of Portugal was 
10.355.824, bemg 15,5% of the populatlon 65 years or older and about 65,6% of the 
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population resided in urban areas. The two main metropolitan areas are greater 
Lisbon and greater Porto. 
In 2000, GDP per capita was C1 1.288, a figure that rose from C-5.135 Just in 
1990. Despite the economic growth, Portugal has one of the highest levels of income 
inequality M Europe. Portugal has developed an increasingly service-based economy. 
The three main sectors of the labour force in 1999 were services (60%), industry 
(30%) and agriculture (10%). The main industries were textiles and footwear, wood 
pulp, paper and cork, metalworking, oil refining, chemicals, fish canning, wine, and 
tourism. 
Total health care expenditure in Portugal has risen steadily from 3% M 1970 
to 10,1% of GDP, In 2004 (OECD health data). In 2004 the average life expectancy 
at birth in Portugal was 77,4 years (80,5 years for women and 74,2 for men). The 
infant mortality rate decreased fivefold between 1970 and 1990. In 2005 this rate was 
4,0 per 1000, being now lower than the European Union average. 
Figures for 2004 show that diseases of the circulatory system accounted for 
39% of all deaths and cancers for 20% of all deaths. Cerebrovascular diseases 
account for almost half of the deaths associated with diseases of the circulatory 
system. Gastro-intestinal tumours are the most frequent type of cancer in both men 
and women. Approximately a quarter of premature mortality in men comes from 
traffic accidents, while among women the highest proportion of potential years of 
fife lost is caused by cancer (25.91/6). 
4.2.2. The health care system 
One might say that Portugal has a complex health care system, greatly 
explained by historical factors. Up until 1979 and the establishment of the National 
Health Service, the Portuguese state had traditionally left the responsibility for paying 
for health care to the individual patient and his or her family. Care of the poor was 
the responsibility of charity hospitals and out-of-hospital care remained the 
responsibility of the Department of Social Welfare. Civil servants were the exception 
as well as maternal and child health care, and some interventions in the control of 
infectious diseases and mental health. 
After the revolution of 1974, a process of health services "nationalisation" 
began which culminated into the establishment of the NHS M 1979. First, in 1974 
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district and central hospitals owned by the religious charities were taken over by the 
government. Local hospitals followed in 1975 and were integrated with existing 
health services. Finally in 1977, over 2000 medical units or health posts situated 
throughout the country were taken over by the government. 
The principle of the citizen's right to health was embodied in the Portuguese 
constitution of 1976 and was to be delivered through "a universal, comprehensive 
and free of charge National Health Service" but only in 1979 the law establishing the 
NHS was enacted. Despite the development of a unified publicly financed and 
provided health care system and the incorporation of most of the health facilities 
previously operated by the social welfare and religious charities, some aspects of the 
pre- 1970s system persisted. In particular, the health subsystems (Subsislelva-) 
continued to cover a variety of public and private employees. These schemes offered 
better services and greater choice of provider than would be available under the 
NHS. In addition to the coverage provided by the NHS, about 25% of the 
population is covered by the health subsystems. Along with the subsystems, a strong 
private sector remains an important part of the Portuguese health care system. In 
many cases, the medical professionals simultaneously work in the public and private 
sectors. This situation too has its roots in historical events, namely in the resistance 
offered by the medical profession to the implementation of a National Health 
Service. 
At the top of the hierarchy of the public health care sector is the Ministry 
of Health, with the Minister of Health himself embracing much of the core 
function of the Ministry (regulation, planning and management of the NHS). The 
Ministry of Health is made up of four directorates and seven institutes and there 
are also four vertical programmes run by national bodies attached to the Ministry of 
Health (there are however some reforms currently under way). 
The 1990 Law on the Fundamental Principles of Health (Law n47/90 - 
24 th August) introduced new principles for the organization and functioning of the 
health system, namely the decentralisation of management at the regional level. 
As a consequence, in 1993, five Regional Health Administrations were 
established: North; Centre; Lisbon and Tagus Valley; Alentejo; and Algarve (see 
Appendix A). In each region a health administration board, accountable to the 
Minister of Health, manages the NHS. 'Meir management responsibilities are a nux 
of strategic management of population health, supervision and control of hospitals 
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and centralized direct management responsibilities for p=ary care/NHS health 
centres. Each region is further divided into eighteen sub-regions (corresponding to 
the continental eighteen districts). Here too some organisational changes are to be 
introduced. 
Concerning public hospitals, legal and formal changes have occurred, with 
the introduction of an entrepreneurial management style, affecting the composition 
of boards and with most members appointed by the Minister of Health. Changes In 
management have also led to greater flexibility and accountabihty in resource use as 
well as the progressive change of the NHS personnel status from salaried civil 
servants to private employees working under negotiable contracts. We must note that 
there has been a series of experiences regarding the management of hospitals but 
fewer have been the lessons and consequences assumed, that is, experiences have 
neither been expanded nor abandoned. 
Primary health care centres are directly under the managerial control of the 
Regional Health Authorities through sub-regional coordinators. In their case too, 
there have been some experiences concerning their management and one of the 
most recent reforms has created the figure of executive director that for the first 
time does not have to be a doctor. The creation of Family Health Units is another 
aspect of the recent reforms (they are multidisciplinary teams involving doctors, 
nurses and administrative staff, being responsible for the provision of primary 
care and some specialised care to patients registered in their respective lists). 
Some of the health subsystems, for which membership is based on 
occupational category, are run by trade unions and managed by boards of elected 
members. The largest fund (ADSE- for civil servants) is controlled by the Ministry of 
Finance. It covers 15% of the population, corresponding to 60% of all subsystem 
members and includes amongst its members all employees of the NHS. 
The private sector has perfon-ned a supplementary role to the NHS and 
mainly includes private practitioners, Misericdrdias and private hospitals and clinics. 
Overall the private sector accounts for 32% of all medical consultations, being the 
majority specialist consultations (Bentes et al., 2004). 
The health care system benefits from both public and private sources of 
financing. The National Health Service is ftinded out of general taxation. though 
there are some flat rate charges namely for consultations (primary care and 
hospital outpatient visits), emergency visits, home visits and diagnostic tests. 
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Recently, flat rates were introduced for the case of in-patient care and elective 
surgery. Certain groups (e. g. pregnant women, children, low income patients) are 
exempted from these charges. Hospitals have other sources of revenue such as 
donations and payments from renting premises and equipment. In total, sources 
other than general taxation account for about 8% of the NHS revenue (Bentes et al., 
2004). 
The health subsystems are financed through employer and employee 
contributions, with the largest part paid by the employer. However, in the case of 
civil servants, the employer is the State, so this too should be considered public 
financing. 
An important source of financing of health care is out-of-pocket payments. 
This category of financing has consistently accounted for over 20% of total health 
expenditure over the last ten years, being among the highest in Europe. The majonty 
of payments are for drugs and therapeutic products. Voluntary health Misurance is 
marginal. 
Delivery of health care is also based on a mix of public and pnvate providers. 
Primary health care in the public sector is mostly delivered through publicly funded 
and managed health centres, by GPs/fan-ii1y doctors and primary care nurses. Some 
health centres also provide a limited range of specialized care (for example, 
paediatrics, gynaecology and obstetrics). Patients must register with a GP, and can 
choose among the available clinicians within a geographical area. In theory there is 
no direct access to secondary care and GPs are supposed to act as gatekeepers. 
However, people tend to by pass the referral process by going directly to emergency 
care services. Alternatively, they go to the private sector (particularly for the case of 
specialist visits M which there are longer delays M public hospitals). 
Portugal also has a large independent private sector which provides 
diagnostic and therapeutic services to NHS beneficiaries under contracts called 
convenf'jes. Patients can choose from any of the providers who appear on the 
contracts. 
There are very few NHS dentists; as a consequence of this shortage *in public 
supply, people use the private sector for oral care. In the case of members of health 
subsystems, they have easier access to this form of care, either by paying directly and 
being partially reimbursed afterwards or by paying a lower fee *in advance by visiting a 
dentist with a contract with the subsystems. 
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Secondary and tertiary care is mainly provided in hospitals. In 1999, Portugal 
had 205 hospitals, 110 public and 84 private. Most hospital services are directly 
provided by the NHS, though some non-clinical services have been outsourced. 
There are four categories of hospitals: central hospitals (provide highly specialized 
services with advanced technology and specialist human resources); specialized 
hospitals (provide a broad range of specialized services); district hospitals (located in 
the main administrative district and provide a range of specialist services); and district 
level-one hospitals (only provide internal medicine, surgery and one or two other 
basic specialties). 
Health resources are concentrated in the capital, Lisbon, and along the coast, 
between Lisbon and Porto. The regions of Algarve and Alentejo account only for 
about 10% of public hospitals, though they are also less populated areas. The 
number of NHS beds per 1000 people ranges from 1,87 in Algarve to 2,68 in the 
Centre. 
The NHS budget is set annually by the Ministry of Finance, based on 
historical spending and the plans put forward by the Ministry of Health. Capital and 
current expenditure are separated; being the former under the direct control of the 
Ministry of Health. Concerning current expenditure, the Ministry of Health allocates 
a budget to each Regional Health Administration for the provision of health care to a 
geographically defined population. Their autonomy has nonetheless been limited to 
primary care. Regional budgets for primary care are set according to historical 
expense and, since 1998, capitation, adjusted by age, sex and a disease burden index 
(computed according to the regional prevalence of selected health indicators). 
Despite that decentralisation is formally addressed within the Law of 
Fundamental Principles of Health (Law n047/90 - 24' August), where it is stated that 
the NHS is managed at the regional level, Bentes et al (2004) note that, in practice, 
responsibility for planning and resource allocation has remained highly centralised. 
Campos (2004) argues in the same line, saying that the public sector, including health 
services, remains highly centralised. In fact and as previously mentioned, Regional 
Health Administrations' autonomy has been limited to primary care, being hospital 
budgets still defined and allocated at the central level. 
In the case of hospitals, one might say that some degree of operational 
decentralisation has been achieved via the introduction of some of the principles of 
the New Public Management approach in the NHS. 
A further measure potentially leading to decentralisation and public 
involvement was adopted, in 1997, with the creation of regional contracting agencies 
(on in each of the five Regional Health Administrations). 'Mese agencies were 
expected to increase cost awareness and to provide incentives for efficiency. The 
impact of contracting agencies was however marginal and as a result of governmental 
changes, in 1999 and 2001, agencies were stroke by a lack of strategic guidelines and 
uncertainty about their role, coming to an effective end. The concept has been 
reintroduced in the political agenda but no practical changes have occurred so far. 
Another aim envisaged by the establishment of the contracting agencies was the 
promotion of public Involvement in health care decision making. However, at the 
moment, talking about an increase in public participation in decision making basically 
means that formal mechanisms for 'consumers' to make complaints have now been 
arranged in a generalised and systematic way. 
4.3. Methods 
In this section, we describe the methods used to collect and analyse the 
data, including: (i) the design and administration of the questionnaire as well as 
the designation and codification of the variables derived from the questionnaire 
(sub-section 4.3.1); (ii) the selection of samples (sub-section 4.3.2); and (iii) the 
identification of statistical methods used to analyse the data collected (sub-section 
4.3.3). 
4.3.1. The questionnaire 
Being the main objective of the empirical work to test for diversity in 
preferences, we had to select some preferences to start with. We decided to elicit 
people's preferences regarding the criteria of health maximisation and equality of 
treatment (across geographic regions) as well as the trade-off between them. The 
main reasons to choose in this way were two-fold: firstly, we saw in chapter two 
that the geographical dimension of (in)equality has not been addressed in 
empirical works that have elicited preferences in the context of health care 
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resource allocation, thus, this seemed to be an opportunity to contribute to current 
knowledge by looking at people's views about the issue, namely, whether or not 
(in)equality across regions matters and whether or not people are willing to make 
trade-offs; and, secondly, this sort of trade-offs is among the ones that were 
explored in the previous chapter (section 3.4), thus, one could use the empirical 
findings to test the pertinence of the theoretical discussion. 
In addition, we hypothesised that there could be different results 
concerning geographic diversity in preferences depending on the nature (personal 
or social) of preferences. A secondary objective of the questionnaire was therefore 
to elicit personal preferences, choosing for this effect preferences over attributes 
of health care delivery. In one case, the doctor's gender is the attribute at stake 
(which might be more relevant, for example, in conservative communities than in 
liberal communities). In the other case, as explained below, the aim is to identify 
thresholds below which people do not seek care (or, a particular forrn of care). We 
found this idea of thresholds in Rice and Smith (2001). These authors suggest that 
there may be important areawide cultural influences on the use of health services 
that might, for example, influence a threshold of ill health below which 
individuals choose not to seek medical intervention. 
In designing the questionnaire, we have followed common wisdom (Hill 
and Hill, 2002; Saunders et al., 2003). Examples of aspects that should be taken 
into account are the wording, lay out and length of questions, the size of letters, 
coding issues and the use of an odd or even number of points in rating scales. In 
some cases, one has to weigh advantages and disadvantages of each solution. For 
instance, in our questionnaire and particularly in questions 3 and 4, the reader has 
to go through the description of the hypothetical situations before answering the 
questions. Longer questions might disincentive the completion of questionnaires; 
however, we thought that it was important to make the respondent aware of what 
was at stake, trying in addition to control for some of the factors that could affect 
responses. The two stages and the graphic presentations of questions 3 and 4 were 
inspired by Williams et al. (2005). We also carried out a small pilot test (with a 
Portuguese version of the questionnaire), being some of the suggestions of 
participants included in the final version of the questionnaire. 
Considering that the questionnaire was aimed at Portuguese people, ýý'e 
have given extra attention to the Portuguese version (Appendix Q in terrns of the 
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specific words put into the questionnaire (namely, we have avoided the use of 
economic 'jargons' like health maximisation). As suggested by participants in the 
pilot study, we omitted the codes attributed to the different responses in order to 
avoid any confusion with numbers (these codes are shown only in the English 
version - Appendix B). 
The questionnaire comprises 6 questions, which can be classified in two 
groups. The first group (questions I to 4) is intended to elicit preferences from a 
societal perspective, in which individuals are asked about the allocation of 
resources affecting other people 28 . Moreover, the criteria in question, health 
maximisation and (geographic) equality of treatment, have echoes in social 
justice. Questions I and 2 simply ask respondents about their support for the two 
previous criteria; while questions 3 and 4 evaluate the extent to which people are 
willing to trade-off one principle against the other. Both questions 3 and 4 apply 
to hypothetical situations but in the latter the hypothetical situation involves actual 
Portuguese regions. 
The second group of questions (formed by questions 5 and 6) is intended 
to elicit personal preferences, asking individuals about what they prefer for 
themselves. ) on whatever 
basis. 
The last part of the questionnaire asks respondents about some personal 
data, for statistical purposes only (to assess the representativeness of samples). 
Given this overview of the questionnaire, we will now go through each question. 
Question I asks respondents about their support for the inclusion of 
expected outcome (health gain) in the set of criteria that might be used to guide 
resource allocation. A brief paragraph explains that not all health care 
interventions have the same impact on individuals' health and that, depending on 
the situation, what might be at stake is a health improvement or a lower 
deterioration in health. There is not an explicit reference to health maximisation as 
this seems to be a more complex concept. A Likert scale was used to measure the 
level of respondents' agreement or disagreement to the above criterion 29 . Answers 
28 Actually, questions I and 2 can be thought as an example of ex-ante 'socially inclusive personal 
preferences' (Dolan et al., 2003), though respondents are not given any information about the 
probability of them or others becoming ill (see chapter two). 
29 Rating or scale questions are often used to collect opinion data. The most common approach is 
the Likert-style rating scale in which respondents are asked how strongly they agree or disagree 
with a statement or series of statements, usually on a four-, five-, six- or seven-point rating scam 
(Saunders et al., 2003, p. 296). 
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could range from I (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), in which 3 represents 
a neutral position. 
It is important to note that we mention in the question that health gain is a 
potential criterion, among others. Consequently, respondents see themselves in a 
comfortable standpoint given that they are not forced to choose a single criterion 
over potential contenders nor are they asked to establish any ranking. This might 
result in high support to health maximisation. Nonetheless, presenting health 
maximisation as the only criterion would not serve our objectives (given that the 
aim was to ask respondents to make trade-offs between two potentially relevant 
criteria). Moreover, difficult decisions in real world situations are not so much 
about which principles matter as they are about how much weight should be given 
to each one; it is therefore reasonable to expect high levels of support to each 
principle, when considered in isolation. 
In question 2, we start by briefly explaining that resource allocation 
involves a geographical dimension as well and asks respondents whether (and to 
what extent) or not they agree that geographic distribution of resources should be 
taken into account in health care resource allocation. We use a Likert scale as in 
question 1. We do not explicitly mention geographic equality of treatment and 
again this is presented as one among other possible criteria. 
Despite the fact that the framing of questions I and 2 is likely to lead to 
very similar responses across respondents, we think that these two questions 
needed to be set prior to questions 3 and 4. Firstly, they serve to introduce and 
explain to respondents the issues of capacity to benefit from health care and 
geographic distribution of resources. And, secondly, when respondents are asked 
to make trade-offs between two principles, in question 3 and 4, they were already 
given the opportunity to think about the relevance of each one. 
Two variables, HMAX and HGEO, are defined to represent responses to 
questions I and 2, respectively (see Table I below). These variables directly 
follow from the questionnaire and can therefore take the values of 1 to 5. 
In question 3, respondents are faced with a hypothetical situation, in which 
there is a limited quantity of a given vaccine. This vaccine protects children 
against a disease that is not contagious but is lethal. Thus, each episode of illness 
avoided is a children's life saved. 
Respondents are asked to imagine themselves in a position in which they 
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must choose whom to immunise. The situation described involves a physical 
constraint that cannot be overcome by diverting more financial resources to health 
care. This means that respondents cannot consciously or unconsciously adopt a 
defensive attitude, claiming or thinking that rationing is not inevitable 30 . 
In order to deal with the issue of geographic distribution of resources, we 
hypothesise a country divided in two regions: Region I and Region 2 31 . 
Respondents must choose between two scenarios, A and B. In the former case, all 
doses of the vaccine are distributed among children living in Region 1; in the 
latter case, each region receives half of the doses. Because it is assumed that half 
of the children live in Region 1 and half of the children live in Region 2, Scenario 
A is not chosen over Scenario B on the grounds that Region I has more children 
than Region 2. 
In the first stage, both scenarios produce the same total health gain (100 
episodes of illness avoided) but, while in Scenario A, this gain is concentrated in 
Region 1, in Scenario B, the total health gain is equally divided between the two 
regions. From the perspective of health maximisation, respondents should be 
indifferent between the two scenarios. However, unless people disagree with the 
inclusion of geographic distribution of resources in the set of guiding criteria of 
resource allocation, we expect Scenario B to be chosen over Scenario A. 
Further note that Scenario B represents geographic equality of treatment in 
the sense that the relation between the total number of doses of the vaccine and 
the total number of children is the same in both regions. However, in our 
questionnaire, geographic equality of treatment also results in equal distribution of 
health gain between the two regions. This need not be the case (we could simply 
compare the total health gain obtained in both Scenarios and ignore how it is 
distributed between regions) but it greatly simplifies the questionnaire. It is 
nonetheless not possible to disentangle both effects of geographic equality of 
treatment and geographic equality of health gain. Still, the description of Scenario 
B emphasises precisely, and brings the attention of respondents to, the issue of 
equality of treatment. 
30 In a cross-country study in which respondents were given two choices for managing health 
services- 'unlimited funding' or 'limits should be set - some treatments given priority' - in almost 
all countries more than 50% of respondents chose the former option (Mossialos and King, 1999). 
When given the possibility, people tend to avoid hard decisions (Dolan and Cookson. 2000). 
31 We had initially used the designations 'North' and 'South', however, after the pilot study we 
changed it to Regions I and 2 to avoid any association with the North and South of Portugal. 
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If Scenario B is chosen in the first part of question 3, then the respondent 
should continue on the following page. In the second part of question 3, it is said 
that Scenario B actually produces a total health gain lower than previously stated. 
There are five hypotheses and while the health gain is kept constant under 
Scenario A, the total health gain associated with Scenario B is progressively 
reduced (being health gain always equally distributed between regions). It is 
expected that at some point respondents change their choice from Scenario B to 
Scenario A. The exact point where this change occurs depends on how people 
trade-off geographic equality of treatment against health maximisation. The more 
people insist in choosing Scenario B over Scenario A, the greater the relative 
value that they attach to geographic equality of treatment compared to health 
maximisation. Note that what is at stake is a greater or lower total health 
improvement. Therefore, when we talk about loss (or sacrifice), this is not an 
effective loss; what it means is giving up of a given health improvement. 
When the total health gain produced under Scenario B is lower than the 
total health gain produced under Scenario A, it means that meeting geographic 
equality of treatment has an opportunity cost in terms of total health gain. In our 
case, this cost can be measured in terms of number of persons (children). 
Actually, in the second part of question 3, choosing one Scenario over the other 
always involves some sacrifice. If Scenario B is chosen, the same number of 
children from both regions will avoid the disease but globally fewer children will 
avoid it. The sacrifice can be measured in terms of a given number of children 
living in Region 1. On the other hand, choosing Scenario A means that in total 
more children will avoid the disease but now no such gain is verified in Region 2. 
Here, the sacrifice can be measured in terms of a given number of children living 
in Region 2. 
This kind of approach is known as the person trade-off (PTO), in which 
subjects are asked to decide what sacrifices they are prepared to make in the lives 
of some people in order to provide health benefits to some other people (Nord, 
1995). The person trade-off technique has been proposed as a way of ascertaining 
the relative values that respondents attach to criteria relevant to social decisions. 
Unlike methods such as the standard gamble and the time trade-off in which 
individuals are asked to value health states for themselves, the person trade-off is 
proposed as a technique more appropriate to use in a resource allocation context 
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in which respondents are asked to distribute resources between groups of other 
people (Nord, 1995; Nord et al., 1999). 
Green (2001) presents the main pros and cons of the person trade-off 
technique and based on empirical evidence regarding its practicality, reliability 
and empirical validity, he makes an overall evaluation of the PTO. According to 
the author, the main advantages of the PTO are its clarity of meaning and 
directness of measurement. Moreover, given that allocating scarce resources in 
health care essentially means dealing with person trade-offs (Nord, 1995), it is 
said that PTO asks the right question (Prades, 1997). 
Regarding the limitations, Green (2001) concludes that available evidence 
on the acceptability and feasibility of the PTO technique is inconclusive and that 
empirical evidence on its reliability is virtually non-existent. Green (2001) says 
that it would seem that respondents often require greater explanation of the task 
than can be offered through a written survey instrument. Nord (1995) also notes 
that other factors such as the arguments used in the questions, the start-point, the 
numbers in pairwise comparisons and the decision context, may affect PTO 
responses. 
Green (2001) nonetheless concludes that the limitations of the person 
trade-off technique should not deter its further development, being PTO an 
appealing option for the elicitation of societal preferences and offering a means of 
bringing into the open the real trade-offs that decision-makers are frequently faced 
with (pp. 239-240). Moreover, the author argues that other alternative methods 
have their own weaknesses and that "at the present time all techniques for the 
measurement of societal values in health care are in their early stages of 
development" (p. 240). Some posterior works (e. g., Dolan and Tsuchlya, 2003; 
Mansley and Elbasha, 2003; Schwarzinger et al., 2004) have looked into 
methodological aspects of the PTO, underlining its limitations without 
nonetheless defending its abandonment. 
Based on question 3, the variable TOFF3 is defined as the number of times 
respondents select Scenario B over Scenario A in this question. TOFF3 can 
therefore assume values from 0 to 5, showing how far respondents are willing to 
go in terms of giving up of additional health improvements in order to keep 
geographic equality of treatment; the greater the value of TOFF3, the greater the 
willingness to forego health gain. Naturally, the hypotheses in which Scenario B 
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is chosen (before changing to Scenario A) should be consecutive; otherwise 
answers should be ignored and eliminated from the analysis. In the case of 
respondents rightfully skipping this part because Scenario A was chosen in page 3 
of the questionnaire, then TOFF3 is attributed the code '-1' (see Table 1). 
Contrarily, if respondents skip this part, despite having chosen Scenario B in the 
first part, then TOFF3 is registered as a missing value (999). 
If the respondent selects Scenario A right from the start (implying that 
TOFF3=0), this means that, although he or she is not indifferent to geographic 
equality of treatment (in the sense that Scenario B was chosen in the first part of 
the question though, one must acknowledge, we force the respondent to select one 
out of the two scenarios), he or she is not willing to forego any potential health 
gain in order to keep in return geographic equality of treatment. More specifically, 
the respondent is not prepared to give up of 10% of the total health gain. Still, we 
must note that Scenario B could eventually be chosen by the respondent for trade- 
offs smaller than that considered in the first hypothesis. 
In hypothesis 1, choosing Scenario B (90 children) implies the acceptance 
of a 10% loss in total health benefit, compared to Scenario A (100 children). In 
hypothesis 2, this loss raises to 30% (70 children vis-a-vis 100 children); in 
hypothesis 3, the loss is 50% (50 children vis-a-vis 100 children); in hypothesis 4, 
the loss is 80% (20 children vis-a-vis 100 children); finally, in hypothesis 5, the 
loss is 90% (10 children vis-a-vis 100 children). If a respondent chooses Scenario 
B up to, say, hypothesis 3 and then selects Scenario A in the hypotheses 4 and 5, 
then TOFF3=3, meaning that this respondent is prepared to forego 50% of the 
potential health gain in order to keep geographic equality of treatment. But it also 
means at the same time that, according to this respondent's preferences and given 
the set of options presented in the questionnaire, the maximum acceptable 
opportunity cost of geographic equality of treatment is 50% of the total potential 
health gain. 
Question 4 is very similar to question 3; its objective being to elicit trade- 
offs between geographic equality of treatment and health maximisation, using the 
person trade-off as well. It applies to a hypothetical situation but now actual 
Portuguese regions are involved and the introduction of the question uses real 
2006 data. Also, we use an example that is quite feasible given the strategy of the 
Ministry of Health in recent years. In a way, this question introduces a further 
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difficulty for respondents, in the sense that they are now led to think about actual 
regions, including that where they live. It is still a hypothetical situation but "'ve 
reduce a bit the level of abstraction. And this is not an irrelevant issue when it 
comes to preferences for guiding principles of resource allocation (think for 
example about the rule of rescue, reviewed in chapter two). Some authors have 
recommended the use of realistic examples in surveys to study on a less abstract 
level support for different criteria to be employed in resource allocation (Cuadras- 
MoratO et al., 2001; Stolk et al., 2005). Though it may also be argued that 
introducing too many details (instead of having questions described in a vague 
fashion) may lead respondents to focus on considerations of feasibility (Tsuchiya 
and Dolan, 2007). 
Respondents are asked to decide about the allocation of extra resources 
among three regions of Portugal. The objective is to reduce the number of people 
waiting for surgery beyond the clinically acceptable time. We inform respondents 
that the number of people in waiting lists for surgery and the average waiting time 
are the same in all three regions (the actual numbers are not exactly the same but 
they are very similar). Thus, from this perspective, all regions might be 
considered equally entitled to the extra resources in question. 
Respondents must choose between two alternatives, A and B. In the 
former case, the total amount of resources is concentrated on one region (Lisbon 
and Tagus Valley) and, in the latter case, resources are equally divided among the 
three regions (North, Centre and Lisbon and Tagus Valley). Nothing is said about 
the benefits of having a surgery. However, because there are no particular reasons 
to think that the characteristics of people waiting for a hip replacement or cataract 
surgery (the examples used in the questionnaire) significantly differ from one 
region to another, with some confidence we can say that responses were based on 
the assumption that the average benefit per surgery is constant across regions and 
therefore the relevant information to decide about the allocation of resources is the 
number of surgeries. For this reason, in what follows, we also consider that total 
health gain is proportional to the total number of surgeries. 
In the first part of question 4, respondents must choose between allocating 
all resources to Lisbon and Tagus Valley, benefiting 10.000 people (Alternative 
A) and allocating resources to all three regions, benefiting 3.300 people in each 
region (Alternative B). Here, right from the beginning there is a trade-off: 10-000 
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surgeries concentrated on one region compares to 9.900 surgeries equally divided 
among three regions (in this case, selecting Alternative B represents a loss of I% 
of the total potential health gain). Choosing the alternative that produces greater 
benefit implies a sacrifice born by people living in the North and Centre. Thus. 
respondents are faced with potential sacrifices affecting the regions where they 
32 reside 
For those respondents selecting Alternative B, in the first part of question 
4, the questionnaire continues on the following page, where the total benefit under 
Alternative A is kept constant and the total benefit under Alternative B is 
progressively reduced. Whether and when people change their choice from 
Alternative B to Alternative A, again depends on how people trade-off geographic 
equality of treatment against health maximisation. In proportional terms, the 
losses regarding the potential health improvements foregone, in the five 
hypotheses considered in question 4, are about the same as in question 3. 
The variable TOFF4 is defined as the number of times that Alternative B is 
chosen in the second part of question 4. The interpretation and codification of 
TOFF4 (see Table 1) are mutatis mutandis as those of TOFF3. 
Dolan et al. (2002) demonstrate how the sated preferences of a sample of 
the general public can be used to estimate the parameters of a social welfare 
function (SWF) in the domain of health benefits. Therefore, responses to 
questions 3 and 4 are also used to derive these parameters. 
Throughout the previous chapter we have not assumed any particular 
functional form for the social welfare function and there are in fact a number of 
functional fonns that it can take (see e. g., Wagsaff, 1991 and Dolan, 1998). Dolan 
et al. (2002) adopt an additive SWF with a constant elasticity of substitution: 
W= [aHa " +, 8Hb 
1' 
'5 Ha, Hb :" 05 a+, 8=1, rý! -I, r#O 
where W is the level of overall population health and H, and Hb are the 
levels of health of groups of equal size. In our case, W represents the overall 
population health gain (given that we do not provide infonnation about health 
endowments) and the two groups (a and b) are defined by residence. Dolan et al. 
(2002) assume that a and 0 (representing the relative value attached to health gain 
32 Braganýa is located in the North and Coimbra is located in the Centre, as shown in the Appendix 
A. 
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going to each group) are both equal to 0,5 (that is, both groups are considered 
equally deserving of any health gain). The parameter r measures the degree of 
aversion to inequality: if then social welfare is a function of total health and 
indifference curves will be straight lines with a gradient of -1; if r>-l there is 
aversion to inequality and indifference curves become convex to the origin; in the 
extreme, r approaches mand indifference curves become L-shaped. In our case, r 
should be thought as aversion to inequality in the distribution of health gain. 
To calculate the parameter r we need first to deten-nine the point of 
indifference between the two alternative programmes that respondents are faced 
with. 
H, 
A 
10( 
5C 
3C 
Figure 15. Deriving points of indifference from trade-off questions 
Figure 15 shows the case of question 3 (HI and H2 represent the health 
gain going to Region I and Region 2, respectively). There are two alternatives to 
allocate resources: in all hypotheses, Scenario A allows 100 children from 
Region] and none from Region 2 to avoid the disease (this corresponds in Figure 
15 to a movement in the vertical axis, from 0 to 100); in turn, Scenario B always 
produces equal benefit for both regions, thus, it corresponds in Figure 15 to 
movements along the 450 line through the origin. The aim is then to detennine 
what is the minimum benefit that Scenario B would have to provide to each region 
in order to be considered equally as valuable as Scenario A. Note that the latter 
represents maximisation of health gain, while the fon-ner represents geographic 
equality in the distribution of total health gain. 
In the first part of question 3, respondents are asked to choose between two 
alternatives represented in Figure 15 by points A and 1. Respondents were not 
actually given the opportunity to state that they were indifferent between the two 
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Scenarios but if points A and I were considered equally valuable, then we would 
have an indifference curve with a gradient of -1. 
As in Dolan et al. (2002), for those respondents that initially chose 
Scenario B and then switched at some point to Scenario A, we consider that their 
point of indifference is half-way between the last point at which they chose 
Scenario B and the first point at which they chose Scenario A. For instance, if a 
respondent chose Scenario B in hypotheses I and 2 and then switched to Scenario 
A in hypotheses 3,4 and 5 (TOFF3=2), he is willing to forego between 30 and 50 
children, the midpoint of which is 40. Thus, this respondent is indifferent between 
100 children concentrated in Region] and 60 children equally distributed between 
the two regions. In Figure 15 this means that the respondent is indifferent between 
points A and F (the indifference curve now becomes convex). 
Once indifference between alternatives has been established, the value of r 
can be calculated. According to Dolan et al. (2002): 
log((Ha(A) - Ha(B))I(Hb(B) - Hb(A))) 
log((Ha(A)+Ha(B))I(Hb(A)+Hb(B))) 
The authors further note that the precise trade-offs made by those who 
never switch between alternatives is indeterminate. 
For the example above (TOFF3=2): 
log((H, (A) - H, (I')) 
l(H2(, I)- H2(A))) 
I= 
log((l 00 - 30) /(30 - 0)) 
log((H, (A) + H, (F)) l(H2(A) + H2(, I))) log((l 00 +3 0) /(3 0+ 0)) 
Another parameter that can be derived from responses to questions 3 and 4 
is the implied trade-off between health equality and health maximisation. It is 
calculated as the difference between average health and the 'equally-distributed 
equivalent health' (the overall population health that, if distributed equally across 
the population, is as good as a given unequal distribution - Dolan et al., 2002, 
p. 17). So, for the case of TOFF3=2, the respondent is indifferent between the 
point where 100 children from Region I and none from Region 2 avoid the disease 
and the point where 30 children from both regions avoid the disease. This means 
that he would be willing to trade-off up to 20 children of the average number of 
children avoiding the disease of these two regions if the total number were 
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distributed equally between them. 
In question 5, we hypothesise a screening programme for colon cancer, in 
which tests are offered free of cost within the National Health Service. The 
success of screening programmes depends a great deal on people voluntarily 
coming forward to take tests, which in turn might be affected by some attributes 
of health care delivery. In this case, the attribute is the doctor's gender (the case of 
colon cancer was deliberately chosen given that it might be sensitive for both men 
and women). 
What we ask respondents is whether or not the possibility of choosing the 
gender of the professional performing the test has an impact on their decision to 
take the test. We might expect that in more conservative regions or regions where 
religion plays a greater role in people's lives, individuals will be more sensitive to 
this issue. It might also be that once individuals come forward to take the test, 
they do not feel very strong about their preferences up to the point of exercising 
their choice regarding the doctor's gender, hence the second part of question 5 
(see Appendix B). Two variables are defined to address the ('Yes' or 'No') 
responses to question 5: DOCGEND and CHOICE (see Table 1). 
The last question of the questionnaire seeks to identify preferences for 
different forrns of action, in the face of given health symptoms. As in the previous 
question, these are personal preferences (we ask individuals about what they 
prefer for themselves), which might affect the demand for health care. There are 
five situations, representing successively greater deterioration in the individual's 
health. For each situation, there are four alternative forms of action, representing 
preferences that require successively greater effort from the individual, in the 
process of using health care resources (see Appendix B). One might think about 
two main thresholds: one below which individuals prefer not to seek any form of 
care and another below which individuals prefer to seek forms of care (if any) 
other than visiting a doctor. The latter case might have a direct impact on the 
utilisation of public health care resources. 
We derive two variables from question 6, THRESH61 and THRESH62, 
representing the two thresholds above (see Table 1). The two thresholds might be 
different or not. That is, it might be that people start by doing, for example, self 
medication, or, it might be that people do nothing until they visit the doctor. Let 
us consider an example, in which an individual answers to question 6 as follows: 
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I- 'I do nothing'; 2- 'I do self-medication'; 3,4 and 5- 'I visit the doctor'. Here, 
we would have THRESH61=2 (given that the first situation involving some form 
of action is that described in hypothesis 2) and THRESH62=3 (given that the first 
time that the option 'I visit the doctor' is selected is in hypothesis 3). Further note 
that, because the five hypotheses represent successively greater deterioration in 
the individual's health, once respondents choose 'I visit the doctor', we should 
expect to see this same answer in the remainder situations. 
In the final part of the questionnaire respondents are asked to indicate their 
gender, age and level of education (corresponding to the last three variables in 
Table 1, which are only used to characterise and compare our samples with their 
respective local populations). The variable RESID, in Table 1, represents the 
region of residence, which is either Coimbra or Braganýa 33 . 
The questionnaire was self-completed by respondents and we adopted a delivery 
and collection method of administration. No covering letter accompanied the 
survey form, thus, the first page of the questionnaire provided some inforination 
about the aim, nature and relevance of the questionnaire. Contact details were also 
provided in the front page. Respondents were told in advance that any query could 
be addressed to us, using these contacts and that at the time of collection there 
would be a further opportunity to clarify any remaining queries. 
The method of delivery and collection offers the advantage of ensuring a 
high rate of response within a short period of time, still, not all questionnaires 
were returned and several follow-up personal contacts were necessary to reach our 
targets regarding the size of samples and to meet what we had defined as the 
deadline for collection. 
33 This information was inserted in the first page of the questionnaire, as completed questionnaires 
were collected (we used the small box on the top of the front page to insert a survey form 
identifier, composed by the letters C or B, indicating the region of residence, and a number). 
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Table 1. Variables designation and codification 
Question* Variable designation Codification 
=I if respondent resides in Coimbra; 
RESID 
=2 if respondent resides in Braganýa 
=1 if strongly disagree; =2 if disagree; =3 if neutral, 
HMAX 
=4 if agree; =5 if strongly agree 
2 HGEO 
=1 if strongly disagree; =2 if disagree; =3 if neutral, 
=4 if agree; =5 if strongly agree 
3 QUEST3 
=I if choose Scenario A in page 3; 
=2 if choose Scenario B in page 3 
If QUEST3= I then TOFF3=- 1; 
3 TOM Otherwise, TOM = number of times that Scenario 
B is selected in page 4 (0 to 5) 
4 QUEST4 
=I if choose Alternative A in page 5, 
=2 if choose Alternative B in page 5 
If QUEST4= I then TOFF4=- 1; 
4 TOFF4 Otherwise, TOFF4 = number of times that 
Alternative B is selected in page 6 (0 to 5) 
5 DOCGEND 
=1 if respondent answers 'YES' in the first part; 
=2 if respondent answers 'NO' in the first part 
=1 if respondent says that would exercise choice 
5 CHOICE 
=2 if respondent says that would be indifferent 
= number of first hypothesis involving some form 
6 THRESH61 
of action: ranges from I to 5 
6 THRESH62 
= number of first hypothesis involving a visit to the 
doctor: ranges from I to 5 
GENDER 
=1 if respondent is male; 
=2 if respondent is female 
=1 If 15 to 24 years; =2 if 25 to 44 years; 
AGE 
=3 if 45 to 64 years; =4 if ý! 65 years 
-I if no degree; =2 if I" cycle or 2"' cycle or 3" 
LEVELED cycle; =3 if secondary; =4 if medium or superior; 
=5 if attending (any degree) 
See Appendix B 
4.3.2. The respondents 
This study was carried out in two Portuguese municipalities, Coimbra and 
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Braganga, in March-April 2007. The selection of respondents (described below) 
ensures that the two samples are independent; being each one composed by 35 
members of the general public. 
Although Portugal is a small country, there are some differences across 
regions. People living in the north tend to be more conservative when compared to 
people living further in the south. There are also apparent differences between 
coastal and inland areas. These differences emerge when there are, for example, 
general elections. They also clearly emerged, in February 2007, when a 
referendum about the de-penalisation of voluntary abortion up to 10 weeks of 
pregnancy, was carried out in Portugal. The referendum question was of the type 
'Yes' (agree with de-penalisation) or 'No'. In regions such as Braga, in the north, 
59% of people voted 'No', while 41% voted 'Yes'; in Beja, in the south 
(Alentejo), 84% of people voted 'Yes', while only 16% of people voted 'No'. 
In this context, the choice of the two regions, from which to draw the 
samples, was partly oriented by practical convenience and partly judgemental. 
That is, we started by considering a series of regions that for several reasons are 
more accessible to us and then, from this set, we chose two that reflected most 
closely the division of the country in terms of north versus south and costal versus 
inland areaS34. 
We have consequently a sample drawn from a municipality (Coimbra) 
located in the most Populated coastal line in the centre of the country and another 
drawn from a municipality (Braganga) located in a northern and inland area of the 
country - see Appendix A. Out of curiosity, the results of the referendum (above 
mentioned) in Coimbra and Braganga, were as follows: in the fonner case, 63% of 
people voted 'Yes' and 37% voted 'No'; in the latter case, 59% of people voted 
'No' and 41 % voted 'Yes'. 
Considering that this study was conceived from the start as a small-scale 
study, we followed existing rules of thumb regarding the size of samples 
(Saunders et al., 2003), aiming for a minimum of 30 respondents in each sample. 
We used the method of quota sampling to define the composition of samples. The 
characteristics used to set the quotas were gender, age and level of education. We 
34 
Besides, taking into account that this is an exploratory study, the choice of regions did not seem 
to be of critical importance. 
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defined four age bands: 15-24; 25-44; 45-64: and 65 or older. Concerning 
education, we used 5 categories: no degree successfully completed; basic (which 
in turn includes first cycle - four years of schooling in total; second cycle - six 
years of schooling; and third cycle -9 years of schooling); secondary; superior; 
and currently attending (any degree). We considered using income instead of level 
of education; however, Portuguese people are usually not receptive to questions 
related to income. 
Based on the composition of local populations and given the projected size 
of samples, we defined quotas and selected respondents according to their gender, 
age and, whenever possible, according to their level of education. The groups 
harder to reach were older people and people with lower or no degree of education 
successfully completed. We distributed 40 survey forms in Braganga and 40 in 
Coimbra. Overall, it was not possible to collect five questionnaires; three were 
eliminated due to inconsistencies (reasons for exclusion are explained in sub- 
section 4.3.1); and two were deliberately not included to keep samples with equal 
sizes. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the characteristics of our respondents, in each sample, 
and how they compare with the respective local population (population data refers 
to the municipality level). It can be seen that in both cases the samples are 
definitely better educated and slightly younger than would have been the case had 
the samples been representative of the wider population. In particular, people with 
65 years or older are under-represented (with the age band 15-24 being over- 
represented) as well as people with no degree of education successfully completed 
and people that completed only the basic level (in this case, the group that ended 
up over-represented concerns individuals with superior education). 
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4.3.3. The analysis 
In this sub-section we describe the methods used to analyse the data. Two 
kinds of results are of interest: (i) the people's views regarding the issues 
addressed in the questionnaire; and above all (ii) the differences between samples 
in terms of people's views. Descriptive statistics and graphical methods are thus 
firstly used to explore the data, giving an account of respondents' preferences and 
an initial overview of differences between samples. Then these differences are 
analysed using inductive statistical methods. 
We begin by presenting some (comparative) descriptive statistics, showing 
frequency tables, for all variables, calculating afterwards some summary statistics 
to describe the empirical distribution of each variable. Regarding measures of 
central tendency, we calculate the mean for HMAX and HGEO. Siegel and 
Castellan (1988, p. 28) argue that in matters of opinion categories such as 'agree', 
'ambivalent' and 'disagree' may be thought to fall on a continuum reflecting 
strength of agreement/disagreement. Thus, the calculation of average values for 
the case of HMAX and HGEO is meaningful. We also calculate the mean for the 
implied parameter r and the implied trade-off as well as the median for TOFF3, 
TOFF4, THRESH61 and THRESH62. 
In addition to descriptive statistics, we conducted some statistical tests 
(STATA ver. 9.0) to evaluate statistical hypotheses formulated in order to assess 
the cross-sample variation in preferences (as reflected by the values of the 
variables defined in Table 1). In all tests, the null hypothesis is that both samples 
have been drawn from the same population (or, from populations with the same 
mean, median or distribution, depending on the test). In each case, the statistical 
hypothesis to be tested is: 
HO: There are no differences in preferences across samples 
H 1: There are differences in preferences across samples 
Consequently, to conclude that there are differences in preferences 
between samples, the null hypothesis should be rejected. Tests are all two-tailed 
given that we are interested in testing for differences, irrespective of the relation 
between values obtained in both samples. 
The choice of the specific test to apply in each situation was based mainly 
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on Siegel and Castellan (1988) and on Saunders et al. (2003). To test whether or 
not differences between the two (independent) samples, regarding the mean of 
HMAX, HGEO, implied parameter r and implied trade-off are statistically 
significant, we use the Student's Mest. Despite that the Mest assumes that the data 
is normally distributed, it is argued that this can be ignored without too many 
problems even with sample sizes of less than 30 (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 361). 
The same applies to the assumption that the data for the two groups have the same 
variance, provided that the two samples are of similar sizes. Regarding the 
variables TOFF3, TOFF4, THRESH61 and THRESH62, we test for differences 
between samples using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (in the case of obtaining 
different medians). 
In addition to the previous tests, we used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two- 
sample test, which is a non-parametric and distribution free statistical test, to 
check for differences, across samples, in the distributions of most variables. 
Concerning the variables DOCGEND and CHOICE, we use the Fisher 
Exact test for 2x2 tables to examine the significance of the association between 
each of these variables and the variable RESID. To conclude that there is a 
statistically significant association between DOCGEND and CHOICE, on one 
hand, and RESID, on the other hand (i. e., to conclude that residence matters when 
determining preferences), the null hypothesis should be rejected as in the other 
tests. 
The variables QUEST3 and QUEST4 are also eligible to apply the Fisher 
Exact test for 2x2 tables; however the results obtained in descriptive statistics 
decisively dispense further tests because there is basically a perfect match 
between responses in one sample and responses in the other sample. 
The final test used is the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test to test 
within-respondent differences; more specifically, it is used to check whether or 
not the distribution of responses given to question 3 (TOFF3) and question 4 
(TOFF4) are significantly different. The same statistical method is used to test for 
differences between THRESH61 and THRESH62. 
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4.4. Results 
The principle of health maximisation gathers the support of basically all 
respondents. This result is not surprising given (as previously explained) that this 
principle was presented as one among other possible alternatives. The average 
value of HMAX (see Table 4) is 4,5 for respondents from Coimbra and 4,2 for 
respondents from Braganýa, showing that opinions lie between agree and strongly 
agree. 
Agree ment/clisagree niv tit Ath critefion of health nuxinisation 
0,7k 
Figure 16. Bar chart of HMAX by region of residence 
Figure 16 further shows that the difference between means derives from 
the fact that respondents in Coimbra are equally distributed between the category 
'agree' and 'strongly agree' (18 and 17 respondents, respectively), while in 
Braganýa there is a greater concentration on the category 'agree' compared to 
4 strongly agree' (9 versus 24 respondents). 
Agreenvnt / disagreen-mt Wth criterion of geographic 
distribution 
i 
C, 
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0,5 
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O'l 
Figure 17. Bart chart of HGEO by region of residence 
Regarding the variable HGEO, again opinions lie between agree and 
strongly agree, with an average value of 4,3 (Table 4) for both regions. We now 
have an equal percentage of respondents in the categones 'agree' and 'strongly 
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agree' in Braganga, while in Coimbra there is a greater concentration on the 
category 'agree' (Figure 17). The means are still the same given that in Braganqa 
some respondents are neutral regarding the geographic distribution of resources, 
therefore lowering the average in this group. 
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Figure 18. HMAX and HGEO by region of residence, with three categories 
Figure 18 analyses the distribution of HMAX and HGEO considering only 
three categories: disagree, neutral and agree. The most noticeable result is the 
strong support to both criteria as potential guiding principles of health care 
resource allocation. Curiously, in both samples there was one respondent that 
manifested a negative opinion regarding any role played by geographic 
distribution of resources. Also, for the case of Braganýa, there is an equal 
percentage of respondents that are neutral regarding the two criteria (we note that 
the respondents are not the same). 
Table 4. HMAX and HGEO by region of residence: summary statistics and hypothesis 
test results 
Student's Kolmogorov- 
Var. Region Mean S. D. Max. Min. t-test 
Smimov test 
HO: equal means HO: equal 
distributions 
Coimbra 4,50 0,508 5 4 It-valuel =2,40 
HMAX Braganýa 4,20 0,531 5 3 p-value= 
P-value=0,281 0,0 19 
Coimbra 4,31 0,631 5 2 It-valuel= O, 176 
HGEO Braganp 4,34 0,725 5 2 p-value 
P-value=0,999 
=0,86 
The results reported in Table 4 suggest that overall the differences between 
the two samples are not statistically significant. The strongest result pointing to 
the existence of differences regards the Student's Mest for HMAX (different 
means) but the Kolmogorov-Smimov test suggests that the distnbutions of 
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HMAX in both samples are not statistically different. 
In terms of question 3 (variable QUEST3), as expected, when faced with 
two situations involving equal total health gain, all respondents choose the 
scenario ensuring geographic equality of treatment (Figure 19). Probably, those 
that are neutral towards the criterion of geographic distribution of resources are 
indifferent between the two scenarios, however, once forced to choose between 
them, they select the second option. 
I 
0,8 
0,6 o Coi 
OAX m Brag 
0,2 
0 
Scenailo A Scenano B 
Figure 19. Bar chart of QUEST3 by region of residence 
For the case of question 4 (variable QUEST4), a few respondents select 
Alternative A (see figure 20) given that geographic equality of treatment 
(Alternative B) is obtained here at the cost of 1% of total health gain foregone. 
Still, there is some inconsistency in responses. That is, following our previous 
argumentation, one would expect that those selecting Alternative A, in question 4, 
coincide with those manifesting a lower support to the criteria of geographic 
distribution of resources, in question 2. However, this does not happen. 
1 
Fa aýalbra 
Figure 20. Bar chart of QUEST4 by region of residence 
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Regarding the trade-off between health maximisation and geographic 
equality of treatment, for the case of question 3 (TOFF3), Table 5 shows the 
location of the median respondent. In both samples, the median corresponds to 
TOFF3=1 (which in turn corresponds to 10% of total health gain foregone - see 
sub-section 4.3.1). Half of the respondents is either not making any trade-off 
between total health gain and geographic equality of treatment or is willing to 
forego a maximum of 10% of the total health gain to keep equality of treatment. 
I o 0: )irrbra m Bragarra 
Figure 21. Bar chart of TOFF3 by region of residence 
In Figure 21, we can further see that the mode corresponds to TOFF3=1 
(10% of total health gain foregone) in both samples. There is also a greater 
percentage of respondents, in Coimbra, not making any trade-off, than in 
Braganýa. On the other hand, there is a greater percentage of respondents, in 
Braganýa, willing to forego 30% of total health gain compared to Coimbra. In 
both cases there are respondents (about 15%) willing to forego 50% of total health 
gain and in both samples two respondents always choose Scenanio B (we suspect 
that the question was misunderstood; that is, given that no one disagrees with 
health maximisation , it is surprising to obtain this 
latter result). 
Despite the differences suggested by Figure 21, the Kolmogorov-Smimov 
test does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions of the 
variable TOFF3 (Table 5). 
Concerning the variable TOFF4, because some respondents selected 
Alternative A, in question 4 (see bar chart of QUEST4, above), this means that 
TOFF4 ranges from -1 to 5. Consequently, TOFF4=-l represents no trade-off 
between criteria. If TOFF4=0, which applies to respondents that choose 
Alternative B in the first part of question 4 but then in the second part change to 
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Alternative A right in the first hypothesis, then respondents are willing to forego a 
maximum of I% of total health gain, to keep equality of treatment. In Table 5, one 
can see that the median respondent, in Coimbra, falls in the category TOFF4=1 
(10% of health gain foregone) and the median respondent in Braganýa falls in the 
category TOFF4=2 (25% of health gain foregone). Although seemingly different, 
the medians of both samples are not statistically different, as indicated by the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (Table 5). 
Table 5. TOFF3 and TOFF4 by region of residence: summary statistics and hjpothesis 
test results 
Wilcoxon-Mann- Kolmogorov- 
Var. Coimbra Braganp Whitney test Snurnov test 
HO: equal medians HO: equal 
distributions 
0(0%) 11 7 
1(10%) 13 12 
TOFF3 
2(30%) 5 11 P-value=0,967 
3(50%) 4 3 
4(80%) 0 0 
5(90%) 2 2 
-1(0%) 3 4 
0(1%) 4 2 
1(10%) 11 5 P-value= 0 322848 
TOFF4 2(25%) 9 , 11 (approximate value) 
P-value=0,640 
3(55%) 2 8 
4(76%) 1 0 
5(91%) 5 5 
Median respondent is in shaded cell; 
Percentages in brackets correspond to total health gain foregone 
Comparing the distribution of TOFF4 for both samples (Figure 22), the 
mode varies from one sample to the other (in Coimbra the highest frequency is 
registered for TOFF4=1 and in Braganýa the highest frequency occurs for 
TOFF4=2). There is in addition a greater percentage of respondents, in Braganqa, 
willing to sacrifice 55% of total health gain in order to keep equality of treatment 
than in Coimbra. As for the case of TOFF3, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
concludes that distributions of TOFF4 in both regions are not statistically 
different. 
In TOFF4 there are also some respondents that always choose Alternative 
B, meaning that they are prepared to forego 91% of total health gain to obtain in 
return equality of treatment. Previously, we said that this kind of result was 
inconsistent with answers to question 1. The puzzle here is that not only there are 
more respondents choosing in this way in TOFF4 than in TOFF3 but also they do 
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not coincide with those respondents that did the same in TOFF3. It looks as if 
respondents do understand in fact what they are doing. Still, we should consider 
the possibility of these 'outliers' being generated by a different process 
(misunderstanding of the questions or they might even be 'protest' votes who 
refuse to make any trade-off with geographical equality). Thus, we checked 
whether it would make a difference to the results if these outliers were excluded 
from the analysis. However, the medians are the same as in table 5 and the 
Kolmogorov-Smimov test still suggests that distributions in both regions are not 
statistically different (the K-S test generated a P-value equal to 0,957 and a P- 
value equal to 0,537, for TOFF3 and TOFF4, respectively). 
00/0 1% 109/0 25% 55% 769/o 91% 
%of total health gain traded-off 
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Figure 22. Bar chart of TOFF4 by region of residence 
Table 6 shows the value of the parameter r and the implied trade-off for 
both questions 3 and 4. This parameter is indeterminate for those who never 
switch between alternatives (corresponding to TOFF3=5 and TOFF4=5), which 
also implies that no trade-off is made, hence the empty cell in column 4. A 
possibility would be to assume, as Dolan et al. (2002), that these respondents are 
concerned only with equality and therefore to consider that r approaches infinity 
(but as the authors stress, one cannot be sure). 
In the case of TOFF4, we calculated r taking into account only two regions 
2 
(the total health gain under Alternative A was therefore adjusted to -x 10000 3 
Also, we assumed that the respondents that chose Alternative A in the first part of 
question 4 (TOFF4=-I) would have chosen Altemative B if the two altematives 
presented the same total health gain being this gain equally distributed between 
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regions in the case of Alternative B (as it happened in question 3). 
Table 6. ImDlied r and imulied trade-off for TOM and TOFF4 
Var. Implied r 
Implied 
trade-off 
0 -0,91 -2,5 
1 -0,67 -10 
TOFF3 
2 -0,42 -20 
3 -0,18 -32,5 
4 -0,05 -42,5 
5 Indet. 
-1 -0,99 -16,5 
0 -0,9 -183 
1 -0,71 -583 
TOFF4 2 -0,42 -1333 
3 -0,18 -2183 
4 -0,06 -2783 
5 Indet. 
In question 3, the median respondent in both samples is indifferent 
between a health gain of 100 children concentrated in Region I and a health gain 
of 80 children equally divided by the two regions. In question 4 and for case of 
sample I (Coimbra), the median respondent is indifferent between a total of 6666 
surgeries concentrated in LTV and 5500 surgeries equally divided by LTV and 
another region; in the case of sample 2 (Braganýa), the median respondent is 
indifferent between a total of 6666 surgeries concentrated in LTV and 4000 
surgeries equally divided by LTV and another region. 
In question 3, the implied trade-off for the median respondent in both 
samples is -10 children and in question 4 it is -583 surgeries for sample I and - 
1333 surgeries for sample 2. 
Regarding the parameter r, the results shown in Table 6 indicate that there 
is aversion to inequality in the distribution of total health gain between regions (as 
r>-I) though the values are relatively low. Note that the parameter r (see section 
4.3.1) depends not only on the trade-offs made (the numerator in the fon-nula 
presented in section 4.3.1) but also on the level of inequality (considered in the 
denominator). In our questionnaire, one of the alternatives produces zero health 
gain for one or some regions, which implies a high level of inequality under this 
alternative. Thus, the impact of large trade-offs is mitigated by large levels of 
inequality tolerated. 
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Table 7. Implied r and implied trade-off by region of residence: mean values and 
hypothesis test results 
Student's 
Region Mean t-test 
HO: equal means 
Coimbra -01653 It-valuel=0,907 TOFF3 Braganqa 
-01601 p-value=0,368 Implied r Coimbra -0,619 It-valuel= 1,29 TOFF4 Braganýa 
-01530 p-value=0,20 
TOFF3 
Coimbra 
-1117 It-valuel= 0,654 
linplied 
Bragarip 
-1313 p-value =0,52 
trade-off Coimbra -878 t-valuel =1,34 TOFF4 Braganp 
-1129 p-value =O, 19 
With the parameterisation of the trade-offs it was possible to calculate 
mean values for both samples and to use the Student's t-test. This test is inore 
sensitive than the Kolmogorov-Smimov test; nonetheless the results (shown in 
Table 7) suggest that differences between samples are still not significant. 
When it comes to the variable DOCGEND, Figure 23 shows that most 
respondents, in both samples, say that the possibility of choosing the doctor's 
gender does not affect their decision to take a screening test. Eventually, this 
might be a sign of a reasonable public awareness regarding the kind of disease in 
question (colon cancer); as pointed in sub-section 4.2.1, gastro-intestinal turnours 
are the most frequent type of cancer in both men and women , in 
Portugal. There is a 
slight difference in responses between samples, with more respondents in 
Coimbra saying 'yes' than in Braganýa but, as expected (based on Figure 23), the 
Fisher exact test rejects the existence of a significant association between answers 
to this question and region of residence (Table 8). 
Impact of doctoes gender on decision to take screening tets-, t 
I 
It 
o Goi n-bm 
m Bragarra 
Figure 23. Bar chart of DOCGEND by region of residence 
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Yes ND 
Table 8. Fisher exact test for DOCGEND and CHOICE 
Fisher exact test 
Variable HO: random assignment 
of cases 
DOCGEND p-value=0,218 
CHOICE p-valueý0,602 
Yes No 
Concerning the variable CHOICE, here too most respondents in both 
samples say that, once in the health centre, they would be indifferent regarding the 
gender of the doctor performing the test (Figure 24). Again, there is a slightly 
greater percentage of respondents in Coimbra saying that would exercise choice, 
compared to Braganýa but the Fisher exact test rejects any association between 
CHOICE and residence (Table 8). Comparing the distributions of DOCGEND and 
CHOICE, the percentage of respondents answering 'yes' is higher for the latter 
variable, in both samples, contrarily to what we have conjectured in sub-section 
4.3.1. 
Preferences for exercising choice regarding doctor's gender 
1 
16 
160- 
0,8 
0,7 
0,6 
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ýý 
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0,3 
0,2 
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0 
Figure 24. Bar chart of CHOICE by region of residence 
In terms of the variable THRESH61 the median respondent falls in 
category 1, in both samples (see Table 9). This category also represents the mode 
in both samples, as seen in Figure 25. What this means is that most respondents 
prefer to utilise some forrn of health care resources right in the first situation 
hypothesised in question 6 (see appendix B). The Kolmogorov-Smimov test, 
whose result is shown in Table 9, suggests that the distributions for the two 
regions, in Figure 25, are not statistically different. 
The variable THRESH62 corresponds to the situation in which a visit to 
the doctor is mentioned for the first time as the preferred forrn of action. In both 
regions, the second hypothetical situation is the threshold below which individuals 
do not seek personalised medical care for more respondents (in Figure 26, one can 
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easily verify that the mode corresponds to THRESH62==2). The medians (Table 9) 
are 2 and 3 for Braganga and Coimbra, respectively. There Is a noticeable 
difference between samples, regarding the category 1, which corresponds to the 
THRESH62 for about 20% of respondents in Braganýa, while in Coimbra this 
figure is about 8%. These results suggest that people in Braganga prefer to seek 
personalised medical care sooner (in terms of levels of severity of illness) than in 
Coimbra 35 . 
1 
1 
Threshold that detenrines some utilisation of health care 
resources 
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Figure 25. Bar chart of THRESHO by region of residence 
Statistical tests regarding THRESH62 (Table 9) suggest nonetheless that 
medians are not statistically different (at least at the 5% level) as well as the 
distributions. We should also note that we did not obtain any inconsistent 
response to this question, that is, after choosing once the option 'I visit the 
doctor', all respondents chose this option in the remainder situations. 
35 In Braganýa, the median respondent falls in the category 'feeling strong pain frequently', while 
in Coimbra the median respondent falls in the category 'feeling pain frequently and having 
sleeping difficulties'. So, the threshold corresponding to the median respondent is lower in Braganqa 
than in Coimbra. This result is somehow unexpected; up to a dozen years ago, Braganqa was relatively 
isolated and the primary sector still played (and plays) an important role in the region's economy. 
Thus, the donUnant idea was that people's lives were harsh under these conditions. One would expect 
that, given this background, individuals would be more prepared and wilfing to endure difficult 
situations, including illness. Naturally, although our interest lies on preferences, it is not possible to 
control for a variety of factors that could affect responses. For example, it seems reasonable to 
expect that a greater availability of doctors leads to higher demand and hence affect expressed 
preferences for this kind of health care. However, our results again do not confirm this 
expectation given that it is in Coimbra that there is a greater concentration of resources, compared 
to Braganýa (in 2003, the number of physicians per 1000 residents was 20,5 in the former compared 
to only 2,7 in the latter - cf. Portuguese National Statistics Office http: //"-w. ine. pt). 
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Threshold that deterryines a visit to the doctor 
I 
0 Ccxmbra 
m Bragarra 
Figure 26. Bar chart of THRESH62 by region of residence 
A final set of statistical tests compares the distributions of different 
variables within each sample; in other words, we test for within-respondent 
differences, in each sample. 
Table 9. THRESH61 and THRESH62 by region of residence: summary statistics and 
hypothesis test results 
Wilcoxon- Kolmogorov- 
Mann- Smirnov test 
Variable Coimbra Braganp Whitney test HO: equal 
HO: equal distributions 
medians 
1 24 21 
239 
THRESH61 382 P-value=0,999 
403 
500 
138 
2 12 13 P-value= THRESH62 3 10 9 0.089034 P-value=0,640 484 
521 
Median respondent is in shaded cell 
We use the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test to test firstly 
whether or not respondents make different trade-offs in questions 3 and 4, though 
we should say that questions are not framed in the same way. Thus, the 
interpretation of this test is for this reason limited. Still, the results (Table 10) 
suggest that answers are statistically different for the case of Braganýa while this 
does not happen for the case of Coimbra. 
Further note that there are movements in both directions (there are positive 
and negative differences), that is, there are respondents making lower trade-offs in 
question 4 compared to question 3 (positive difference) but there are also people 
making higher trade-offs in question 4 compared to question 3 (negative 
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difference). In the case of Braganýa, positive differences are given more weight 
than negative, while in Coimbra the opposite Is true (though they are not 
statistically different). 
People might make higher trade-offs in question 4 than in question 3 
(corresponding to a negative difference between TOFF3 and TOFF4) because 
now choosing the option that generates greater total health gain benefits residents 
in a region other than that where respondents live and implies a sacrifice born by 
residents in their own regions of residence. On the other hand, people might make 
lower trade-offs in question 4 than in question 3 (corresponding to a positive 
difference between TOFF3 and TOFF4) because they are more aware of 
opportunity costs (in terms of health gain foregone) of geographic equality of 
treatment. This latter suggestion is based on the idea that reducing the level of 
abstraction of questions makes people more conscious of the consequences 
associated to each decision. 
Table 10. Testsfor within-respondent differences in each sample 
Variables Region 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
signed-ranks test 
HO: equal medians and 
distributions 
Coimbra W+=82; W-194; N=23; 
TOM vs TOFF4 p-value: 
ý! D, 0914 
Braganýa W+--224; W- 13 3,5; N= 18; 
p-value: ý9,0342 
Coimbra W+=O; W-435; N=29; 
p-value: ý0,000 THRESH61 vs THRESH62 Braganýa W+=O; W- 17 1; N= 18; 
p-value: ý0,000 
Finally, we use the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test to test 
whether THRESH61 is statistically different from THRESH62 or not. Here there 
is no limitation in the interpretation of the test given that these two variables are 
derived from the same question of the questionnaire. In this case, positive 
differences are null by definition. That is, THRESH61 corresponds to the first 
situation involving some form of action. Because visiting the doctor (THRESH62) 
is already an alternative forrn of action, then, THRESH62 is in the minimum 
equal to THRESH61. When respondents prefer to start with a forrn of action other 
than visiting the doctor, then THRESH61 is lower than THRESH62 and the 
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difference between the two will be negative. 
The results in Table 10 suggest that THRESH62 is statistically different 
from THRESH61 in both samples. There are however some differences, which in 
fact have already been spotted to some extent in Figure 26. While in Braganqa 17 
out of 35 respondents prefer to start by visiting the doctor, in Coimbra, only 6 out 
of 35 respondents express this preference (in Table 10, N is the number of 
respondents that answer differently in the two questions). Also, the gap between 
taking some form of action and visiting the doctor is larger in Coimbra than in 
Braganýa. 
4.5. Discussion 
In the study reported here, two independent samples drawn from two 
distinct (Portuguese) municipalities were given the same questionnaire to allow us 
to test the hypothesis of variation in preferences across regions. 
We elicited preferences regarding the criteria of health maximisation and 
geographic equality of treatment. To measure the trade-off between these two 
principles, we asked respondents to choose between two hypothetical alternative 
programmes: one involving a fixed health gain concentrated in one region; and the 
other involving successively lower total health gain, equally distributed between 
two regions. Although the latter alternative is characterised by an equal 
distribution of health gain, when introducing questions, we have focused on equal 
treatment across regions. For simplicity and given that questionnaires were to be 
self-administered, we have considered that equal treatment would result in equal 
health gain. Trade-offs were elicited in two questions; one involving hypothetical 
regions; and the other making use of actual Portuguese regions. 
Respondents were also asked about personal preferences. In one case, 
respondents were asked if the possibility of choosing the gender of the doctor 
performing a screening test, for the case of colon cancer, would affect their 
decision to take the test. In the other case, we addressed the issue of preferences 
for different forms of health care, depending on the perceived severity of illness. 
Concerning the main objective of this study, the statistical tests showed 
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that basically for all variables the null hypothesis, that there are no differences in 
preferences across samples, cannot be rejected. This is true for the Student's t-test, 
Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, meaning that means, 
medians and distributions of variables in both samples are not statistically 
different. The Fisher exact test also shows that personal preferences for two 
attributes of health care delivery do not vary between samples. The strongest 
result concerns the variable HMAX, for which the Student Mest suggests the 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level. In this case, the support for the 
criterion of health maximisation is stronger in Coimbra than in Braganýa but mean 
values are actually closer to each other (4,5 and 4,2, respectively). Regarding the 
threshold indicating a visit to the doctor, our results produced different medians 
but the Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test suggests that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected only at the 10% level. 
The null hypothesis of absence of diversity could not be rejected in both 
cases of social and personal preferences. Thus, it seems that the nature of 
preferences is not decisive for the existence or not of diversity in preferences. 
Also, some changes in responses were registered when respondents were led to 
think about actual Portuguese regions instead of hypothetical regions (the example 
used - reducing waiting lists for hip replacement or cataract surgery - is very close 
to recent measures adopted by the Ministry of Health, in Portugal, as well); 
median values actually became different between samples but the Wilcoxon-Mann 
Whitney test suggests that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in the same. The 
difference between mean values of r is also greater for TOFF4 than for TOFF3 
but again the Student's t-test suggests that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
in both situations. 
Thus, the main conclusion is that differences between samples are not 
sharp and globally they are not statistically significant; our results do not 
consequently corroborate the hypothesis of variation in preferences across 
regions. Accepting these results means that the theoretical discussion about the 
impact of decentralisation on allocative efficiency should be revisited and greater 
attention should be paid to the role that the assumption of diversity in preferences 
has played. 
In tenns of the results obtained for preferences weighing health 
maximisation against geographic equality of treatment, respondents agree or 
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strongly agree that resource allocation should take into account both principles. 
Given a fixed total health gain, all respondents in both samples choose the 
alternative that equally distributes this health gain between two regions instead of 
choosing the alternative that concentrates this health gain in one of the two 
regions. 
Once respondents are asked to trade-off health maximisation and equality 
of treatment (equal distribution of health gain), between 70 and 80 per cent of 
them are prepared to make trade-offs between the two criteria. Of those making 
trade-offs, most people are willing to forego between 10 and 30 per cent of total 
health gain to keep geographic equality of treatment in return. For sample I 
(Coimbra), we obtained a median willingness to sacrifice health maximisation on 
behalf of geographic equality of treatment at 10% of total health gain in both 
questions 3 and 4. For the case of sample 2 (Braganga), we found a median 
willingness to sacrifice health maximisation on behalf of geographic equality of 
treatment at 10% of total health gain, in question 3 and at 25% of total health gain, 
in question 4. 
The results further show that, in question 3, the median respondent is 
willing to give up of 10 children of the average number of children avoiding the 
disease in the two regions if the total number were distributed equally between 
them, corresponding to an r equal to -0,67; in question 4, the median respondent 
in sample I is willing to give up of 583 people of the average number of people 
having a surgery in LTV and another region if the total number were equally 
distributed between them (corresponding to an r equal to -0,71), while in sample 2 
this figure raises to 1333 people (corresponding to an r equal to -0,42). 
Taking into account both samples and questions, the mean value of r 
ranges between -0,53 and -0,65 suggesting the existence of aversion to inequality 
in the geographic distribution of total health gain. 
Despite that the majority of respondents is willing to make trade-offs, there 
are some of them not willing to sacrifice one principle on behalf of the other. That 
is, some are not prepared to give up of any amount of health gain (not even I%) to 
keep equality of treatment, while there are other respondents not prepared to give 
up of equality of treatment even if this is obtained at a high cost in terms of health 
gain foregone. The foriner group ranges between 8 (TOFF4) and 30 (TOFF3) per 
cent of respondents, in Coimbra, while in Braganqa it ranges between II (TOFF4) 
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and 20 (TOFF3) per cent of respondents. The groups of respondents not willing to 
give up of equality of treatment are less expressive, ranging between 6 (TOFF 3) 
and 14 (TOFF4) per cent of respondents, in both samples. 
The results suggest that the geographical dimension of (in)equality in 
treatment matters to people and that a maximum opportunity cost of equality, in 
terms of health gain foregone, is likely to exist. Hence, the empirical findings 
reported here suggest that analyses of the sort developed in the previous chapter, 
in which equality of treatment is traded-off against other criteria are pertinent and 
might be operationalised. 
To conclude this chapter, one must say that the main conclusion of the 
current empirical work, i. e. that there is absence of diversity in preferences across 
geographic areas, applies for the case of the specific regions and for the particular 
topics approached in this study. Additionally, this study has its own limitations 
like the method of administration of the questionnaire: it has been acknowledge 
that, in the case of PTO questions, respondents often require greater explanation 
of the task than can be offered through a written survey instrument (Green, 200 1). 
Still, given the dimension and exploratory nature of our study, a delivery and 
collection method of administration seemed acceptable. Plus, when designing the 
questionnaire we have taken into consideration the method of administration, 
hence the introduction and explanation of themes in each question. Moreover, at 
the time of collection some respondents mentioned their difficulty in completing 
the questionnaire not because they felt difficulties in understanding the questions; 
instead they felt that questions were difficult in themselves but, as Green (2001) 
comments about the PTO, it may be that difficult choices are necessary to 
establish true preferences. In future works, however, the use of interviews or 
discussion groups should be considered. Plus, with these latter methods of 
administration, other principles and trade-offs could be introduced in the 
questionnaire without representing too many additional difficulties. Questions 
could also be refined in order to make more explicit the difference between 
geographic equality of health gain and geographic equality of treatment. 
The sizes of samples might also be considered a limitation of the study. 
therefore, in the future, samples should be larger (generating more powerful tests) 
and should include some fringes of the population that were excluded from our 
study. We must nonetheless acknowledge that this will be a challenge considering 
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that we are talking about people with no degree of education or at best people 
with 9 years of schooling in the maximum. In addition, these Individuals are on 
average older than others better educated. Thus, more inclusive studies should be 
designed taking into account the specific characteristics of the respondents. 
Beyond these limitations, several other issues remain to future research. For 
the particular context of Portugal, other regions should be included in analyses, 
namely southern regions. Also, it might be interesting, from the perspective of 
testing for differences between geographically defined samples, to group regions in 
terms of mainly rural and mainly urban areas. In addition, future research nuight look 
into the impact of the socio-demographic composition of samples on expressed 
preferences In order to test whether eventual differences between samples stem from 
their different compositions Polan and Tsuchiya (2007), for example, use binary 
logistic regressions to test whether age, gender, education and insurance status 
influence willingness to trade-off health gain against equality of health). 
Moreover, the trade-off between total health gain and geographic equality of 
treatment rnIght be defined in terms of total health gain at the local level veruis equal 
availability of services across regions. Another trade-off that seems to be worth 
exploring is that between the allocation of resources at the local level based on local 
preferences versus uniform provision throughout the country. Actually, in chapter two 
it is said that there has been a tendency to see variations in provision as an 
undesirable outcome of decentralisation but M our study, although respondents value 
equality between regions up to the point of being willing to give up of some health 
gain, the vast majority does not support this equality at all costs. 
Addressing methodological issues was not a particular objective of the 
current work; nonetheless, the results generated by the Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
signed-ranks test for TOM versus TOFF4 suggest that the level of abstraction of 
(PTO and other) questions might be a relevant aspect to consider in future 
research about methodologies. 
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CHAPTER 5. A discussion of ambiguities and confusions affecting the 
debate about decentralisation in the English NHS 
5.1. Introduction 
The literature and the debate about decentralisation have not been always 
clear and unequivocal about the meaning of concepts like preferences. In 
particular, we saw in chapter two that, in the context of health care resource 
allocation, the concept of preferences might reach beyond its narrowest definition 
of consumers' preferences. It is therefore important to point where these 
ambiguities arise and further clarifications are required. 
In chapters two and three, we have distinguished between infori-nation 
regarding preferences and information regarding technical matters. Because 
variations in both forms of infon-nation might lead to variations in health care 
provision, there might be some confusion between the two sources of variations in 
provision. It is consequently pertinent to clarify this issue, which can be done 
making use of the framework proposed in chapter three (section 3.2). 
It has already been noted in this dissertation that participation or voice 
might be inherently valued, directly contributing to social welfare (procedural 
approach) and that it might also be seen as a means of matching outcomes to the 
preferences of the population (consequentialist approach). In practice, references 
to both approaches have been used by authorities as well as by the public. Some 
ambiguities might however arise when, for instance, the promotion of 
participation as an instrument to bring public values into decision making is not 
accompanied by greater local discretion to accommodate such values. 
The objective of the current chapter is therefore to identify some 
ambiguities and confusions in the context of decentralisation in health care 
decision making in the English National Health Service (NHS). The English 
context was chosen as the reference for the current discussion because 
decentralisation in health care is one of the current policy themes in England, 
reflected in the political discourse of 'shifting the balance of power'. Among other 
features, this reforin contemplates a forrn of decentralisation of expenditures: 
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allocations were made directly to locally based Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). for 
the first time in 2003/04. Discussions about participation in decision making are 
also in line with recent changes in the English NHS, in which a 'patient and public 
involvement' movement was initiated and stimulated by the central govenu-nent 
itself 
In what follows, the discussion applies at some points to interpretations 
that might simply represent personal opinions of some authors. However, because 
our objective is to identify ambiguities and confusions in the debate, the message 
of those that might in fact act as opinion makers is important too. Moreover, the 
whole chapter is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive; suggestive 
rather than conclusive. 
We start by introducing, in section 5.2, the English NHS. This section is 
relevant to understand the geographical organisation of the NHS, including 
Primary Care Trusts, as well as the role of institutions like NICE and recent 
tendencies in health care policy. Because our discussion is centred on issues that 
might be related in one way or another with the debate about decentralisation, 
section 5.3 gives a summarised account of decentralisation in the NHS. Section 
5.4 then stresses the ambiguity that has characterised the use of the concept of 
preferences in the context of the English NHS. In section 5.5, the main argument 
is that variations in service provision in England have been dealt with mainly as 
variations in technical information, whereas they can derive not only but also 
from variations in health care priorities. In section 5.6, the discussion focuses on 
ambiguities associated with public participation in decision making. Finally, 
section 5.7 presents some suggestions and directions to future analyses. 
5.2. Brief characterisation of the NHS 
The objectives of the NHS, created in 1948, are characterised by the 
general principles of universality and equality of access The NFIS is funded out of 
general taxation and services are free at point of delivery (with some exceptions 
related to dental care, prescriptions and ophthalmology). The NHS expenditure, in 
England, is about 6 per cent of GDP (figure for 2003/04). 
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The NHS is one of the biggest employers in England. General practitioners 
are independent workers and have a contractual link with the NHS. They act as 
gatekeepers controlling therefore the access to secondary care. 
The NHS has been the target of successive reforms and is in continuous 
evolution. As Greener and Powell (2003, p. 43) put it "the health arena has 
undergone reforin after reforin through the 1980s and 1990s, from the 
introduction of general management, to resource management and clinical audit, 
to the introduction of internal markets ( ... ) to evidence-based medicine and the 
restructuring of the internal market by New Labour in 1997. Since then, the pace 
has, if anything, picked up further with the introduction of the perfon-nance 
assessment framework, the reforrn of regional health authorities, the introduction 
of the new bodies to 'modemize' health care ( ... )". 
There have been some changes in the NHS structure. The main feature of 
change has been giving locally based Primary Care Trusts the role of running the 
NHS in their areas. All existing health authorities were consequently abolished 
and new ones were created. 
NHS Trusts -4 ------------------ Primary care trusts 
---- Commissioning Statutory relationship 
Source: Department of Health (2003a) 
Figure 27. The NHS in England 
27 gives a general perspective of the organisation of the NHS. The 
Department of Health (DoH) is the government department responsible for 
delivering health and social care services to the English population. Its functions 
include, among others, securing management and accountability of the overall 
health and social care system and the overall regulation and inspection of the 
NHS. 
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Eight previous Regional Offices were abolished while four new Directors 
of Health and Social Care have been appointed. The latter work directly with the 
NHS and performance manage strategic health authorities (StHA). 
100 former health authorities were substituted by 28 strategic health 
authorities and then (on July 2006) these were in turn replaced by 10 strategic 
health authorities (the Statutory Instrument 2006 No. 1408 gives an account of the 
strategic health authorities abolished and sets out which areas are covered by each 
of the 10 new authorities). StHAs are presented by the Department of Health as a 
key link between the Department and the NHS. They are expected to ensure that 
national priorities are integrated into plans for the local health service. 
Primary Care Trusts are run by GPs, nurses, other health and social care 
professionals, and representatives of patients and the community. PCTs provide 
some services themselves and are responsible for commissioning other services (a 
role previously carried out by the former health authoritieS)36 . Commissioning 
might include services provided by hospitals, dentists, mental health care, Walk- 
In Centres, NHS Direct, patient transport (including accident and emergency), etc. 
Primary Care Trusts have been presented as the cornerstone of the NHS as well as 
a central piece to the Govenunent's strategy for decentralising and devolving 
power in the NHS to local communities. In 2003/04, for the first time allocations 
have been made directly to PCTs, controlling now about control 80 per cent of 
NHS resources. 
Resource allocation to PCTs is based on a weighted capitation fon-nula. 
The basic idea underlying the current allocation formula was proposed by the 
Resource Allocation Working Party (RAWP), in 1976, in which the weighted 
population, WP, of a local authority was given by: WP= POP*(I+a)*(I+n)*(I+c), 
where POP is the local population, a is the authority's age adjustment, n is its 
needs adjustment (over and above age) and c its relative cost adjustment. Several 
revisions occurred in the meantime, in particular in ten-ns of the needs adjustment 
factor, but the core idea remains the same. The current formula (see e. g. 
Department of Health, 2003b) is the result of a process coordinated by the 
Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation, set up in 1997. It has been firstly 
used for the 2003/04 to 2005/06 PCTs' allocations round. 
36 PCTs are expected to increasingly become commissioning-led organisations with their role in 
provision reduced to a minimum (Department of Health, 2005). 
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Special health authorities have been set up to provide a national service to 
the NHS or to the public. They are independent, but can be subject to ministerial 
direction like other NFIS bodies. Some examples of these special health 
authorities are: National Blood Service, Health Development Agency, National 
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) 37 , among others. 
NICE is a special health authority for England and Wales, launched on I st 
April 1999. An important reason behind the creation of NICE was the highly 
criticised (particularly by the press) geographic variations in service provision - 
38 the so-called 'postcode prescribing' or 'postcode lottery' . Precisely for its role in 
terms of equal provision of health care (see section 5.5), it seems opportune to 
provide a bit more of information about NICE. 
NICE produces guidance in three areas of health: health technologies 
(guidance on the use of new and existing medicines, treatments and procedures 
within the NHS); clinical practice (guidance on the appropriate treatment and care 
of people with specific diseases and conditions within the NHS); and the recently 
extended area of public health. The Commission for Health Improvement is 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of NICE recommendations. The 
Health Select Committee (NICE, 2003, paragraph n) also recommends that 
strategic health authorities include the implementation of NICE guidance as part 
of their regular monitoring of PCTs and acute Trusts. 
An important attribution of NICE is technology appraisals. These are 
recommendations on the use of new and existing technologies (e. g. medicines, 
medical devices, diagnostic techniques, surgical procedures and health promotion 
activities) within the NHS. Recommendations issued by NICE might be that the 
technology is a cost-effective use of NFIS resources in general, or for specific 
conditions or defined subgroups of patients. Recommendations might also be to 
reject the technology for the NFIS or demand additional research before a final 
decision is made. The status of NICE guidance is defined as advice which should 
be fully taken into account by clinicians and NHS organisations, though it does 
not override the individual responsibility of health professionals to make decisions 
appropriate to the circumstances of the individual patient. In January 2002 the 
37 On I st April 2005, NICE joined with the Health Development Agency to become the new 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (still known as NICE). 
38 The term 'postcode lottery' was used to represent situations in which, depending on where 
people lived, some drugs or treatments would be provided, or not, within the NHS- 
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Government announced a statutory obligation for the NHS in England to provide 
funding for treatments and drugs recommended by NICE as a part of its 
technology appraisals work programme. 
Hospital Trusts are found in most large towns and cities, and usually offer 
a general range of services. Some Trusts also act as regional or national centres of 
expertise for more specialised care, while some are attached to universities and 
help to train health professionals. Trusts can also provide services in the 
community, for example, through health centres, clinics or in people's homes. 
Except in the case of emergencies, hospital treatment is arranged through GPs (via 
the so-called referrals). Together, NHS Trusts employ the majority of the NHS 
workforce. 
Care Trusts are NHS bodies, which work in both health and social care. 
They can be established where NHS organisations and local authorities agree to 
work together and their actual functions are determined by this partnership. The 
role for the Care Trust is usually where it is felt that closer integration between 
health and social care is needed or would be beneficial at a local level. At the 
moment there are only a small number of Care Trusts in development. 
NHS Direct opened in March 1998 and offers free 24-hour advice about 
personal health care. NHS Direct nurses aim to provide callers with the advice and 
reassurance they need to care for themselves at home, or, if they need further help, 
to direct them quickly to the right service. 
Regarding some targets defined by the Government, cancer, heart disease 
and stroke, accidents and suicide constitute the four priority areas for intervention 
identified in Department of Health (1999). The targets set for 2010 are: (i) to 
reduce deaths from cancers at least a fifth in people under the age of 75 years; (11) 
to reduce the death rate from heart disease, stroke and related illnesses by at least 
two fifths in people under the age of 75 years; (iii) to reduce the death from 
accidents by at least a fifth and the rate of serious injury at least a tenth and (iv) to 
reduce deaths by suicide and undetermined injury by at least a fifth. 
In February 2001, the Secretary of State for Health at the time, Alan 
Milburn, announced two health inequality targets: (i) 44starting with children under 
one year, by 2010 to reduce by at least 10% the gap in mortality between manual 
groups and the population as a whole" and (11) "starting with Health Authorities, 
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by 2010 to reduce by at least 10% the gap between the quintile of areas with the 
lowest life expectancy at birth and the population as a whole" (Department of 
Health, 2001a). Regarding waiting times, by 2008 there should be maximum 
waiting times of three months for outpatients and inpatients (Budget Report 2003) 
5.3. A surnmarised account of decentralisation in the NHS: from 
Conservatives (1979-1997) to Labour 39 
The rhetoric of decentralisation does not always correspond to effective 
devolution of decision making power. Regarding the NHS, in particular, Peckham 
et al. (2005) argue that many British governments have claimed that they wish to 
decentralise the NHS; very few claimed to want to centralise the NHS. However, 
based on their review of literature, these authors note that the existing accounts of 
decentralisation in the NHS are unclear and that some of the conclusions are 
conflicting. 
According to Peckham et al. (2005), it appears that the NHS moved in two 
different directions at once, during the Conservative period of office. For 
example, they say that most commentators agree that the move from Regional 
Health Authorities to Regional Offices of the NHS Executive was centralist as 
regional staff became classified as national 'civil servants' rather than 'local' NHS 
personnel. Also, the system of performance reviews designed to monitor progress 
towards very specific targets was associated with a tighter system of control. 
Movements that have been classified as decentralist are, for example, devolution 
of actual purchasing budgets and of local pay. 
Although opposite movements towards more centralisation or more 
decentralisation have been associated with different initiatives or reforrns , it is 
common to find, in Peckham et al. 's (2005) report, divergences among authors 
regarding their interpretation of any single reforrn, in terms of decentralisation 
versits centralisation. 
The philosophy of the new public management (introduced into the NHS 
39 Section 5.3 is mainly based on Peckham et al. (2005). 
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in the 1980s and greatly motivated by the Griffiths Report) is seen as 
decentralising. General Managers are meant to be responsive to consumers and in 
principle should be allowed autonomy to achieve established objectives. Equally, 
the idea of the purchaser/provider split (suggested by the White Paper Working, for 
Patients, released in 1989 by the Department of Health), with decentralised 
institutions of self-governing NHS Trusts and General Practitioner Fund Holders, 
is identified as decentralist. However, centrally deten-nined targets and 
performance management have increased centralisation and created lines of 
command between the executive and the staff on the field. Exworthy (1994) 
argues that although decentralisation is associated with managerialism, local 
managers manage within closely defined central terms. Paton (1993,1998), for 
example, talks about decentralisation of pay bargaining and centralisation of 
objectives in the NHS. This author argues that in some cases responsibilities were 
devolved but not power and that despite the operational decentralisation, strategic 
control was kept at the central level. 
The opposite movements towards more centralisation, or, inversely, 
towards more decentralisation, have been reported for the period that began in 
1997 as well, when Labour came to power: "while the rhetoric of decentralization 
is frequently invoked, the practices in areas like health, education and social 
services are frequently centralizing" (Ross and Tomaney, 2001, p. 267); "while the 
centre is committed to the rhetoric of devolved implementation, it seems 
frequently unwilling to trust the front line with discretionary powers or has 
overlaid it with potentially contradictory initiatives of its own" (Gray and Jenkins, 
20015 p. 216). 
Peckham et al. (2005) conclude that, on the whole, the period between 
1997 and 2000 is attributed centralising tendencies, justified by the need to correct 
either organisational failures or health inequalities. There was strong central 
pressure to reduce waiting times (a Labour manifesto commitment) and the 
clinical governance strategy, seeking the improvement of quality of care and 
reduction of variations in services led to the creation of centralising organisations 
such as NICE and CHI (Commission for Health Improvement, seconded by the 
Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection, later renamed the Healthcare 
Commission - HQ- Centralising are also the National Service Frameworks 
(NSFs), launched in April 1998 within the spirit of clinical gov, crnance. with the 
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objectives of setting national standards and defining service models for a 
particular service or care group. 
Regarding the NHS Plan, in 2000, Ham (2004) classifies it as having 
centralising tendencies. Although allowing some potential for greater autonomy 
for high performing organisations (with performance assessment still depending 
on the centre), the NHS Plan represents, according to this author, a new delivery 
model for the NHS, putting in place arrangements for the inspection and 
performance measurement of health organisations that are 'strong centralising'. 
The policy document Shifting the Balance of Power, released in 2001 
(Department of Health, 2001b), represents a movement towards a more local 
approach to decision making. Primary Care Trusts are presented as the 
cornerstone of the NHS and it is announced the devolution of about 80% of the 
NHS budget to PCTs, from 2004 onwards. In the case of good performance, there 
exists the opportunity for an NHS Trust to become a Foundation Trust, earning 
more autonomy by, for instance, retaining revenues from land sales and 
determining their own investment plans. The spirit continues to be one of 
decentralising decisions over means of meeting health targets set by the centre. 
Oliver (2005, p. S79) says that in encouraging greater local autonomy 
through PCTs and Foundation Trusts, and yet introducing more extensive national 
regulation through NICE, the NSFs and the Healthcare Commission, the Labour 
Government has developed 'seemingly contradictory policy instruments though it 
is also possible that the Healthcare Commission will ultimately help to generalise 
transferable local innovation and good practice'. 
These policy reforms (PCTs, on one hand; NICE, NSFs and HC, on the 
other) need not to be seen necessarily as contradictory policy instruments; they 
might represent decentralisation of some decisions and centralisation of other 
decisions. Peckham et al. (2005) classify the former movements as input 
decentralisation and the latter as output centralisation (see 'arrows framework' in 
section 2.2 - chapter two). Though, we must say that NICE's recommendations, 
for example, can also be viewed as input centralisation (as they affect resource 
allocation to different health care interventions or groups of patients). 
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5.4. The ambiguous use of the concept of preferences in the context of the 
NHS 
In chapter two (section 2.5) we saw that preferences might be classified 
mainly taking into account 'whom respondents are asked to think about' as well 
as 'what respondents are asked to think about'. In broad terms, the former 
classification distinguishes above all between consumers' preferences and 
citizens' preferences. Consumers' preferences can further be elicited from actual 
patients or from non-patients. Concerning 'what respondents are asked to think 
about', different things might be at stake, namely health states, the criteria that 
ought to be used to guide resource allocation, priorities among health care 
services, and attributes of health care delivery. 
Both consumer and citizen perspectives might be associated with the NHS 
but the distinction between the two has not been always clear. Callaghan and 
Wistow (2006) say that the co-existence of those two approaches is a source of 
ambiguity about the status of those involved. The use of the concept of 
preferences in practice is actually closely related to the role accorded to public 
involvement in health care decision making 40 . 
Rowe and Shepherd (2002, p. 276) note that, prior to the 1990s, the pattern 
and delivery of health services were largely determined by the medical profession, 
"with the 'public interest' reduced to the sum of clinical judgements". With the 
New Public Management, the emphasis became on making services more 
responsive to the public, more precisely, to consumers' preferences. Milewa 
(2004) argues that the involvement agenda has clearly its origins in the work of 
Conservative administrations. Initiatives such as Working for Patients, Local 
Voices and Patient's Charter (Yvlhite Papers released in the late 1980s and early 
4 
1990s) led way to the institutionalisation of mechanisms to involve the publi cI. 
However, at this stage, although the importance of listening to local communities 
was advocated, in practice the focus was primarily on developing methods of 
40 While the literature about decentralisation uses mainly the ter-in 'participation' and the literature 
about procedural justice uses mainly the term 'voice' (as noted in chapter two), at the policy level, 
the term most commonly used to represent participation is 'involvement'. 
41 Prior to the New Public Management, Community Health Councils (which came to be abolished 
in 2003) were founded in 1974, being classified as bodies to represent the interests of the public. 
Baggott (2005) however says that although these bodies were able to contest major changes. they 
were not systematically consulted on matters of strategic planning, service design or delivery. 
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consultation about (consumer) satisfaction with existing services (Milewa, 2004). 
The initial philosophy of partnership and responsiveness thus focused 
above all on patients and their involvement on decisions affecting their own 
health. Nonetheless, acknowledging the diversity of roles that individuals may 
play, ranging from patients to carers or members of the public, and that these roles 
can produce divergent perspectives, namely between the perspectives of patients 
and non-patients, the Kennedy Inquiry into paediatric heart surgery in Bristol 
(Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry 2001) urged the inclusion of the wider public, 
besides patients, in the decision making process. This can be seen as an attempt to 
expand the concept of preferences though it is still not clear the distinction 
between consumers' (non-patients) and citizens' preferences. 
The Health and Social Care Act 2001 (section 11) brought some changes 
at a more formal level, by placing a statutory duty (commencing on I January 
2003) on NHS Trusts, Primary Care Trusts and strategic health authorities to 
make arrangements to involve and consult patients and the public in service 
planning and operation, and in the development of proposals for changes. To 
assist NHS organisations in meeting this legal duty, the Commission for Patient 
and Public Involvement in Health was established in 2003 as an independent, non- 
departmental public body. 
New advisory groups, Patient and Public Involvement Forums (PPI 
Forums), were established in 2003 to parallel the now over 570 NHS primary and 
secondary health care Trusts. Forums are independent of the bodies to which they 
relate and they will be funded, supported and performance managed by the 
Commission for Patient and Public Involvement in Health. PPI Forums comprise 
patients, carers and members of voluntary organisations that represent the 
interests of patients or carers (over 5000 people are currently members of existing 
Forums). According to the leaflet that publicised PPI Forums, their objectives 
include helping the public to feed its views about health services into the NHS and 
to make recommendations to NHS managers about changes to services. PPI 
Forums are also advertised as one way to influence and change local health 
services. It is nonetheless unclear if these views or recommendations are to reflect 
what individuals prefer for them or for others and it is not also clear what is meant 
by e. g. 'changes to services'. That is, are these changes mainly about attributes of 
health care delivery of the type reviewed in chapter two? Or, are these changes 
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nlý about more fundamental things such as the elimination of services and inclusion 
of new ones? 
In the literature about decentralisation, participation is associated with 
decision making at the local level. In England, PPI Forums are in fact associated 
with local organisations. But input might occur at a more central level, being the 
NICE Citizens Council, set up in 2001, an example of this situation. The Citizens 
Council is a form of citizens'jury, with its 30 members drawn from different age 
groups, social circumstances, ethnic backgrounds and abilities. The Council 
considers topics relating to social, ethical or moral questions which arise in the 
Institute's work and that are referred to it by the Institute's Board. When NICE 
Citizens Council was created, the Chief Executive of NICE expressed his 
expectations towards the Council, saying: "We expect this Council to provide 
NICE with advice that reflects the public's perspective on what are often 
challenging moral and ethical issues" (NICE, 2001). Here, the implicit concept of 
preferences seems closer to the definition of social preferences (compared to 
personal preferences). As we noted in chapter two, in some cases the 'whom' 
might depend on the 'what', that is, thinking about e. g. the role that age should 
play in resource allocation (NICE, 2005) forces people to think about others (the 
young; the elderly). Therefore, the concept of social preferences associated with 
the Citizens Council might itself derive from the topics under deliberation. In 
chapter two, we further noted that the views of the NICE Citizens Council can be 
thought as an example of collective preferences. Thus, another distinction that 
applies to the English NHS is that between individual versus collective 
preferences. 
Starting with a situation in which the medical profession was predominant, 
there has been an evolution that represented in a first phase the consideration of 
patients' (consumers') views regarding health services; later, the public in general, 
not necessarily patients, was also brought into the discourse at the policy level, 
though this emphasis in itself does not seem sufficient to clarify the status of the 
public in terms of consumers versus citizens. Nonetheless, as the views of the 
public are sought in regards to 'moral and ethical issues' (e. g. NICE, 2005), one 
might say that individuals are led to think more as citizens and less as consumers. 
On the contrary, the focus on patient choice fits better a consumer perspective. 
Baggott (2005), for instance, says that in the NHS it appears that 'choice rather 
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than voice is being prioritised as a mechanism of securing more responsive 
services'. 'Choice' here means that patients should be able to visit primary care 
centres and, where they need additional treatment, choose from a list of service 
providers and book care at the location and time of their choosing. These are 
essentially attributes of health care delivery; again the 'what' might influence the 
'whom'. But this continues to be an implicit rather than explicit issue in policy 
documents. 
Thus, in the future it would be useful if some guidance were provided in 
terms of the perspective that should be adopted when addressing public views. 
Additionally, we already referred that what respondents should be asked to think 
about has not always been clear as well. The role attributed to PCTs is another 
example of this ambiguity. In the Department of Health (http: //www. doh. gov. uk/), 
PCTs are presented as local organisations, being therefore best positioned to 
'understand the needs of their community'. In Department of Health (2005), we 
can find the expressions 4greater variety of service offerings and responsiveness to 
patient needs' and 'wider variety of local services and models of provision in 
response to patient needs'. There is here a strong parallelism with the literature 
about decentralisation (in which decentralisation is associated with diversity in 
provision according to heterogeneous local preferences). But what is meant by 
'needs of their community' is open to question. 
5.5. Variations in service provision: the confusion between variations in 
preferences and variations in technical information 
Variations in health care provision, across geographic areas, have been at 
the heart of discussions about decentralisation in health care because it has been 
pointed simultaneously as an advantage and a disadvantage of decentrallsation 
(e. g. Saltman and Bankauskaite, 2004; Levaggi and Smith, 2005 - see chapter two 
for more details). In England, geographic variation in health care provision has 
also been at the centre of attention and it has led, at least in part, to the creation of 
the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (see section 5.2 above). Variation in 
provision might be considered per se desirable or not but given that there seerns to 
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exist some confusion regarding its origin, it is important to clarify this matter and 
distinguish between the two sources of variation. That is, health care provision 
might vary across regions because local populations have different priorities in 
health care, or, it might vary because information about technical issues varies 
among local decision-makers. 
This distinction might be explained using the framework proposed in 
section 3.2 (Figure 2). When decision making is transferred from the central 
authority to local authorities, this might give rise to differences in health care 
provision between local populations because local authorities are better informed 
about local preferences and in the case of these preferences varying between 
populations, the provision of health care will accordingly vary. This corresponds 
to the perspective adopted in chapter three. We also considered that technical 
infon-nation possessed by authorities might vary between the centre, on one hand, 
and localities, on the other hand. But technical information might vary between 
local authorities as well. Consequently, when transferring decision making from 
the central authority to local authorities, this might give rise to differences in 
health care provision due to differences in technical knowledge possessed by local 
authorities. How variations are viewed might well depend on their origin. For 
instance, people might accept variations stemming from differences in 
preferences, while variations stemming from differences in technical knowledge 
are less tolerated. Or, they might simply care about variations irrespective of their 
sources. But it is pertinent to be clear about this issue and to point the confusion 
that there seems to exist regarding variations in the NHS. 
The principle of equal access has been given extreme importance in the 
context of the English NHS, which is reflected namely in the 1997 Labour 
manifesto ('access to NHS will be based on need and need alone'), cf Oliver 
(2005). This author argues that securing equal access for equal need remains the 
overriding objective of the system that ought not to be sacrificed in order to meet 
other 'secondary concerns' such as improving health outcomes and patient 
satisfaction, reducing waiting times and health inequalities. Sassi et al. (2001) , in 
turn, give two examples (cervical cancer screening and sickle cell disease 
screening) in which equal provision of opportunities to receive care have been 
pursued at a high price, in terms of small health gains. 
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Because health care is funded out of general taxation and is, with very few 
exceptions, free at the point of delivery, ability to pay is eliminated as a barrier to 
equal provision. There is also a geographic dimension to resource allocation in 
England, with more than 75% of NHS resources being allocated directly from the 
Department of Health to PCTs. At this level, equal access for equal need is to be 
achieved through the weighted capitation formula used in resource allocation to 
PCTs, so that PCTs in greater need get proportionately more funds (see section 
5.2). However, as noted by e. g. Smith (2003) and Oliver (2005), even assuming 
that the formula in question adequately captures variation in needs, it can only 
secure the opportunity for equal provision for equal need; it cannot by itself to 
secure equal provision for equal need. 
Additionally, and as noted above, NICE (see section 5.2) is associated with 
equal provision of health care across regions as it was created partly to put an end 
on the 'postcode lottery'. Rawlins and Culyer (2004) note that NICE 
recommendations are intended to apply across the whole England (and Wales), 
regardless of where people live or work. They further argue that local variations in 
cost ought not to result in variations in availability of health care. NSFs should 
also lead to more consistent standards of treatment. Thus, the role of NSFs and 
NICE might be seen as ensuring that the equal availability of resources for equal 
need is translated into equal availability of specific technologies and standards of 
treatment. Equal provision of health care across geographic areas should therefore 
result from the combination of the needs-based resource allocation system (which 
already includes a relative cost adjustment) with clinical governance. 
Although equal availability of technologies and standards of treatment 
should derive from NICE guidance, there is a difference between funding 
decisions and decisions about clinical and cost-effectiveness, as stressed by NICE 
(NICE, 2003, paragraph y). Rawlins and Culyer (2004) too reiterate that NICE 
does not take affordability when making judgments about cost effectiveness. They 
say that this is a matter for the government when deciding the annual budget for 
the NHS; the authors add that it is NICE's job to judge whether something ought 
to be purchased from within the resources made available to the NHS. The 
question is that, when the implementation of guidance requires additional 
resources, this in itself is already affecting health care priorities, which is not in 
essence a technical matter. In Figure 6 (chapter three), cost-increasing 
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recommendations are illustrated by the movement from mo to mi. 
In the case of the English NHS, NICE and NSF recommendations have 
been cost-increasing (Oliver, 2005) and NICE has said 'yes' more often than it 
has said 'no' (Devlin and Parkin, 2004). What might be happening here is that the 
elimination of variations in technical knowledge across localities is 
simultaneously eliminating variations due to different funding priorities. The 
Health Select Committee acknowledges this situation, stating that "in making the 
implementation of NICE Health Technology Appraisals mandatory in a healthcare 
system which operates within fixed budgets, there is the potential to give the 
provision of certain, NICE-approved treatments priority over other" (NICE, 2003, 
paragraph o). Others have drawn attention on this issue in the early years of NICE 
(e. g. Hutton and Maynard, 2000; Sculpher et al., 2001; Birch and Gafni, 
2002). These suspicions are confirmed to some extent by Davies and Littlejohns' 
(2002) research. These authors, based on a questionnaire returned by 92 Directors 
of Public Health about their views of NICE's technology appraisals, report that 
most respondents (76%) agreed that NICE was succeeding in making the NHS set 
aside resources locally to provide NICE approved technologies, however, nearly 
all (95%) agreed that this was causing difficulty locally for the implementation of 
'non-NICE' technology. 
Justifications for (and efforts to eliminate) variations in provision have 
focused primarily on technical decisions but, in a resource constrained 
environment, variations might well reflect different priorities in health care. 
Therefore, it would be important to distinguish the two sources of variation and 
make this issue clearer to the general public. There is some evidence that the 
latter's attention is also focused on technical matters. For example, in Dolan et al. 
(2007), it is said that geographic consistency is important to people and that 
respondents expressed a greater willingness to accept variations in outcomes if 
authorities used "the same way to come to the conclusion of which treatment to 
use". But because different treatments usually involve different costs, the question 
might not be 'which treatment to use' but instead 'which treatments should be 
funded'. 
The debate preceding and following NICE's guidance on infertility 
treatment is an example of this confusion between the different sources of 
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variations in provision 42 . When the 
(at the time) health secretary Alan Milburn 
announced that NICE was to provide national guidance on infertility treatment, 
some health authorities were spending up to f2m on this type of treatment 
whereas others were spending nothing at all (cf. Kmietowicz, 2000). Hence the 
'postcode lottery' associated with this kind of treatment. Clare Brown, executive 
director of the Charity Child and president of the National Infertility Awareness 
Campaign, said in respect to the government's instructions to NICE: "This clearly 
indicates that the government intends to make sure that infertility treatment should 
be funded by the NHS" (Kmietowicz, 2000). This statement illustrates how 
ending 'postcode lottery' might be in some cases almost automatically interpreted 
as providing in all authorities what is being provided in only some of them. 
Nonetheless, in theory, NICE's guidance could result in no funding of infertility 
treatment in the NHS. That is, the elimination of variations could in principle be 
achieved via no provision at all. 
NICE's guidance on this topic was issued in 2004 and a key 
recommendation is the provision of up to three free cycles of in vitro fertilisation 
(IVF) for couples in which the woman is aged between 23 and 39 years at the time 
of treatment and who have an identified cause for their fertility problems or who 
have been unable to conceive for three years (NICE, 2004). If the guidance was 
fully implemented, the demand for infertility treatment was estimated to increase 
by 80% at a projected additional cost to the NFIS of f85m in England and Wales 
(cf. White, 2004) and the Department of Health directed the health service to 
move gradually towards this target. The Department of Health guidelines say that 
the NHS in England must offer couples at least one cycle of IVF treatment and 
that those without children living at home should receive priority (Shannon, 
2005). 
Rawlins and Culyer (2004) say that if the government judges a particular 
intervention unaffordable for the NHS, even though NICE had judged it cost 
effective, it might respond in two ways: it might formally advise the NHS to 
ignore NICE's advice; or, alternatively, ministers might instruct NICE to take 
account of advice from ministers on available resources. According to Rawlins 
42 Although infertility treatment is not seen by the public as a high priority service (Bo-"Oing. 1996. 
Schickle, 1997). we use this example because it illustrates at once the -various points under 
discussion. 
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and Culyer (2004), neither of these responses had been proposed or threatened. In 
the case of infertility treatment, the Government chose a gradual implementation 
of NICE's advice but the health secretary at the time guidance was issued, John 
Reid, did not mention how long full implementation would take and he did not 
mention additional funding either (cf, White, 2004). 
When draft guidelines were issued for consultation, the largest part 
consisted, as Ashcroft (2003) notes, in a series of evidence based 
recommendations about particular techniques and protocols used in the 
management of infertility. However, most media attention was paid to the 
proposed recommendation about the level of service to be provided to couples 
experiencing difficulties in conceiving. But most importantly, Ashcroft (2003) 
notes that the clinical criteria from NICE for the provision of in vitro fertilisation 
are framed in tenns of the effectiveness and likely success of treatment for men 
and women of different age and diagnostic groups on the basis of the available 
data. He stresses nonetheless that what arguably explained most of the variation in 
service provision was social values. Ashcroft (2003) continues: "The debate about 
publicly funding assisted conception is in essence a debate about values and 
priorities rather than a debate about what works. Under a publicly funded NHS it 
is a political decision, not a clinical one, about how far we as a society want to 
provide fertility services and to whom. ( ... ) Local priority means setting 
local 
determinations of relative importance and local judgments of value. Differences 
should be allowed to flourish so that people can make personal and political 
choices. ( ... ) As long as people 
have reliable inforination (including reliable 
technical infori-nation such as that provided by NICE) and decision makers are 
accountable for the reasonableness of their decisions, why should there be national 
policy? ' . 
The testimony of Brambleby (2001), a consultant in public health, 
corroborates the view that variations in priorities did exist before guidance. He 
describes the situation in the Norfolk (former) health authority as follows: "In east 
Norfolk last year we lengthened screening intervals for cervical cancer from 36 
i-nonths to 54 months, at a small but tangible health loss. But we are now able to 
sustain our substantial in vitro fertilisation programme as well as allow 
sterilisations on the NHS ( ... ) this 
has been supported at public consultation. A 
neighbouring health authority claims that in vitro fertilisation and sterilisations are 
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unaffordable and continues its 36 month cervical screening cycle". 
The uneasiness, in England, to deal with unequal provision seems to apply 
to various public services and not only to health care. Bums (2000, p. 967) talks 
about a 'deep-seated' difficulty that has emerged with local democracy: even 
those councils with a strong ideological commitment have found it difficult to 
accept different levels and patterns of service in different neighbourhoods. "It is 
almost as if they had not realised that the very local responsiveness for which they 
argued, produces the diversity that they are uneasy about". 
Being the geographic variation in health care provision a very sensitive 
question in England, the debate would only benefit, we think, if the different 
sources of variation were clearly distinguished and the public's view towards 
geographic variation was open and directly addressed, namely in empirical terms. 
5.6. Ambiguities regarding the role attached to participation in the NHS 
We saw in chapter two that increased participation in decision making is 
an outcome attributed to decentralisation, in the respective literature. In England, 
at the policy level, there has been an association between participation in the NHS 
affairs and local organisations as well. For instance, the statutory duty to involve 
patients and the public is placed specifically on local organisations (Health and 
Social Care Act 2001 - section 11). Also, one of the criteria to evaluate proposals 
regarding the re-structuring of PCTs is their ability to 'improve public 
involvement' (Department of Health, 2005). As previously reported in chapter 
two, some authors have expressed doubts that a positive link between 
decentralisation in the NHS and participation exists and pointed the lack of 
empirical evidence in this respect (Peckham et al. 2005; Allen, 2006). 
Additionally, despite the focus of authorities on local organisations, there is some 
evidence that suggests that participation is seen by the public as more relevant at 
higher levels of decision making (Litva et al., 2002; Wailoo and Anand, 2005). 
Concerning the various roles attached to participation, we know from 
chapters two and three that in theory it can be seen both as an end (procedural 
view) and as a means (consequentialist view). In addition, there are tA, o, not 
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necessarily coincident, perspectives to consider in practice: the perspectives of the 
public and of the authorities. 
Regarding the general public's views towards participation, much of the 
empirical evidence produced refers to the UK or English context. Consequently, 
the main results presented in chapter two already give an indication about the 
English public's approach to participation. That is, participation is valued by the 
general public (e. g. Anand and Wailoo, 2000; Litva et al., 2002; Wailoo and 
Anand, 2005; Dolan et al., 2007), both as an end and as an instrumental 
mechanism to reach certain outcomes (Dolan et al., 2007). Nonetheless, in the 
eyes of the general public, doctors are in the vast majority of cases ranked first 
when it comes to deten-nine who should set priorities (e. g., Bowling, 1996; 
Mossialos and King, 1999; Dolan et al., 1999; Coast, 2001; Litva et al., 2002). 
Still, there seems to exist some ambiguities in this regard as well. For example, in 
Anand and Wailoo (2000), respondents say that a health authority should follow 
public opinion in a case where a treatment has a very low expected health gain 
and therefore is not supported by doctors, but which the public has said should be 
provided. It seems that people are willing to surpass doctors' view when it means 
providing health care that would not otherwise be provided. 
Furthermore, although surveys of public views suggest that people value 
participation, Milewa et al. (2002), for instance, reporting on a study of 167 
Primary Care Groups (PCGs), say that only 8.7% of PCGs give pressures from the 
public as a reason to involve it in decision making. Rowe and Shepherd (2002), 
based on their study of PCGs too, identify the existence of divergence between 
local and national decision-makers regarding the extent to which they considered 
there to be a demand for involvement from the public. The Department of Health 
(2004b, p. 3) claims however that the low public awareness of the opportunities for 
involvement in the NHS does not reflect a lack of willingness to become involved. 
The latter perspective might in fact reflect a view that preferences for participation 
are to some extent endogenous (see section 3.8, in chapter three, about 
endogenous preferences). 
English authorities have also attributed instrumental value to participation. 
One of the stated objectives of PPI Forums is precisely to help the public to feed 
its views about health services into the NHS. There are suggestions that the 
instrumental approach is also embedded in local organisations. For instance. 
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Rowe and Shepherd (2002), after surveying Primary Care Groups, conclude that 
the instrumental approach to public involvement is an area of consensus between 
national and local decision-makers. In addition, two other research projects 
(Department of Health, 2004b, p. 21) came to the conclusion that the instrumental 
approach to participation is embodied in PCTs' views regarding public 
involvement. 
But here too things seem to be non-linear. Milewa et al. (2002), for 
example, report that only 32% of the PCGs included in their study claimed that 
changes had taken place due to public and patient involvement. From these, only 
29.3% could cite examples in detail sufficient to be recorded. Similarly, Alborz et 
al. (2002) report that few chairs of their sample of PCG/Ts felt that consultation 
had much impact on decisions taken by their respective PCG/Ts (e. g., 77% said 
that consultation had little or no impact on decisions relating to clinical 
governance). 
There is some ambiguity in the central authorities' perspective. That is, on 
one hand, the instrumental value of participation is stressed; on the other hand, 
this participation is to occur at the local level but local organisations (e. g. PCTs) 
are greatly constrained by central regulations such as NICE guidance and NSFs- 
For example, Bate et al. (2007) say that national drivers were described by 
participants in their study (decision-makers from six PCTs) as 'the must-do's' and 
"it was suggested throughout the interviews that the PCTs tended to focus on 
reacting to and directing/allocating resources towards the national drivers first and 
foremost". Thus, the flexibility of local organisations to be responsive to 
preferences seems limited. 
In fact, this might partly explain why the pressure to involve the public has 
come mainly from the centre. That is, lower propensity at the local level to 
promote participation might be a sign of little decentralisation of effective 
decision making power. This is basically what Greener and Powell (2003) 
suggest. These authors, based on a questionnaire sent in 1999 to 121 health 
authorities in England and Wales, suggest that health authorities' attitude towards 
public consultation is itself conditioned by local discretion: in essence. 
if health 
authorities have few resources to use at the local level, consulting widely their 
local populations is seen as a waste of time; on the other hand, those authorities 
that consult widely with the public are either paying less attention to national 
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guidelines than other authorities or have already met these guidelines and are 
relatively resource-rich. Milewa (2004, p. 242) too refers that despite the role of 
local 'consumers', under the quasi-market, in advising health authorities on the 
type of health services that should be commissioned, "the limited upheaval in 
local health services and professional-managerial discretion in acting upon such 
input has limited the change that could be attributed to public and patient 
involvement". 
Another explanation for the limited impact of public views on policies 
might be of course that public involvement is seen as a way of giving pressure 
groups an opportunity to use preferences merely as advocacy. In this line, Rowe 
and Shepherd (2002, p. 279) say that user-group representatives have been 
labelled as 'activists' and that their views have been dismissed as not being 
typical of 'normal users'. Also, in Department of Health (2004b, p. 20), it is 
reported that some professional Primary Care Trust members are less certain 
about the value of public involvement, fearing that the people selected may not 
provide a representative viewpoint, or that they and their voluntary organisation 
representatives may push a self-interested agenda. Callaghan and Wistow (2006, 
p. 2291) too talk about (. 4manipulation by the better organised and more powerful, 
whether these be professionals, managers or, in some cases, user groups". 
Although different approaches to participation are acceptable and have 
been inclusively sustained at the theoretical level, it seems that there is some 
discrepancy between the objectives (particularly, instrumental objectives) of 
public involvement announced by the government and what local organisations 
like PCTs can effectively achieve. 
5.7. Concluding comments 
Some ambiguities and confusions seem to exist in the debate direct and 
indirectly related to decentralisation in the NFIS. In the future, more attention 
should be given to these issues in order to make the discourse and policy guidance 
clearer. Regarding the question of variations in health care provision, and 
although geographic inequalities in health have been considered in policy 
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objectives (Department of Health, 2001a), there is a lack of empirical evidence 
focusing on people's preferences about equality in provision across geographic 
areas. In fact, much of the empirical evidence about people's preferences, in the 
context of health care resource allocation, produced thus far has used samples 
from England or UK but studies of the sort reported in chapter four seem to be 
lacking in this scenario. 
There is also some ambiguity regarding the instrumental role attributed to 
public involvement given the centrally driven constraints that PCTs are faced 
with. Here we must however note that greater flexibility at the local level to meet 
local preferences has to be weighed against poorer accountability in the sense that, 
as noted by Saltman and Bankauskaite (2004), a basic principle of public finance 
is that spending and taxing authority should be located in the same agency to 
facilitate accountability. Given that tax decentralisation is unlikely in England, as 
in most Western European countries, any instrumental approach to public 
participation might have to be though in restrictive terms. 
Finally, participation is seen as being inherently good (the arguments 
supporting this perspective are reviewed in chapter two); Harrison and Mort 
(1998, p. 66) say that being in favour of better public consultation or more user 
involvement is "rather like being against sin: at a rhetorical level, it is hard to find 
disagreement". However, as we acknowledged in our discussion in chapter three, 
participation might have relevant opportunity costs; at some point, costs might 
even outweigh benefits. Thus, more complete analysis should take those into 
account and the debate at the policy level should be more open about benefits, 
costs and limits to participation. 
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CHAPTER 6. Conclusion 
The objective of this concluding chapter is to summarise and give an 
overview of the main results, limitations and directions to future research, that 
have already been identified throughout this dissertation. 
The main contributions of the current work are, at the theoretical level, the 
suggestion of a new role that might be attributed to preferences in the evaluation 
of decentralisation in terms of its impact on social welfare compared to 
centralisation; at the empirical level, we addressed two topics that have been 
given little attention, in the empirical literature: the hypothesis of geographic 
variation in preferences was tested and preferences regarding a trade-off involving 
a geographical dimension of inequality were elicited. 
Within our framework, central and local decision-makers are seen as 
alternative agents acting on behalf of local populations. Given the different 
capabilities possessed by agents, decentralisation of resource allocation generates 
some trade-offs between objectives. Depending on the goals of resource allocation 
envisaged by local populations, that is, depending on the trade-offs that they are 
willing to make, local populations will be better-off with one or the other agent. 
Therefore, we conclude that not only infon-nation asymmetry regarding 
preferences or competition among decision-makers (the usual economic 
approaches) matter but the specific preferences held by the public might also 
determine in themselves whether or not decentralisation is optimal, when 
compared to centralisation. 
Concerning the empirical work, the principal conclusion is that the results 
do not corroborate the hypothesis of geographic variation in preferences. 
Basically for all variables, the null hypothesis, that there are no differences in 
preferences across samples, cannot be rejected. This is true for the Student's Mest, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the Fisher exact test, and the Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney 
test. Only in the case of health maximisation the Student t-test suggests the 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level but mean values (representing the 
support to this principle on a scale ranging from I to 5) are similar in both 
samples (4,5 and 4,2). Moreover, the null hypothesis could not be rejected 
in both 
cases of social and personal preferences. Thus, it seems that the nature of 
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preferences is not decisive for the existence or not of diversity in preferences. 
Based on these results, the theoretical discussion about the impact of 
decentralisation on allocative efficiency should be revisited and greater attention 
should be paid to the role that the assumption of geographic diversity in 
preferences has played. 
Regarding the variables that measure the public support to the principles of 
health maximisation and geographic equality of treatment as well as the trade-off 
between them, respondents agree or strongly agree that resource allocation should 
take into account both principles. Once respondents are asked to trade-off both 
principles, between 70 and 80 per cent of them are prepared to make trade-offs 
between the two criteria. Of those making trade-offs, most people are willing to 
forego between 10 and 30 per cent of total health gain to keep geographic equality 
of treatment in return. The median willingness to sacrifice health maximisation on 
behalf of geographic equality of treatment ranges from 10% to 25% of total health 
gain, depending on samples and questions (two person trade-off questions were 
included in the questionnaire). Also, the median respondent is willing to trade-off 
10 children of the average number of children avoiding the disease in the two 
regions (in the case of question 3) and 583 (or 1333, depending on sample) people 
of the average number of people having a surgery in two regions (in the case of 
question 4). Taking into account both samples and questions, the mean value of r 
ranges between -0,53 and -0,65 suggesting the existence of aversion to inequality 
in the geographic distribution of total health gain. There are some respondents not 
willing to sacrifice one principle on behalf of the other but they form a minority. 
These results thus suggest that the geographical dimension of (in)equality 
in treatment matters to people and that a maximum opportunity cost of equality, in 
ten-ns of health gain foregone, is likely to exist. Hence, the empirical findings 
support the relevance of the discussion developed in chapter three in which this 
kind of trade-off is addressed. 
Overall, the results obtained in this dissertation imply that strategies of 
decentralisation might have to focus on outcomes other than a better matching 
between provision and preferences and, given the possibility of decentralisation 
causing vanations in provision, it should be taken into account that this is likely to 
have a negative impact on social welfare but it should also be noted that the 
results suggest that people are not willing to pursue equality in provision at all 
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costs in terins of health gain foregone. The conclusions are nonetheless valid 
under some assumptions that were made namely in the theoretical discussion and 
the empirical study also has some limitations. 
We have already mentioned the implications of relaxing the hypothesis of 
geographic variation in preferences. Another assumption is that central and local 
authorities are benevolent decision-makers however it has been acknowledged, 
e. g. within the usual principal-agent approach, that decision-makers might have 
self-regarding interests. Therefore, potential gains derived from superior 
infori-nation about local preferences might not be materialised because local 
decision-makers simply seek to achieve their own objectives. It might also be that 
greater public participation motivated by decentralisation gives pressure groups 
the opportunity to pursue their own agendas (as mentioned in chapter five, for the 
context of the English NHS). In any case, local populations are not necessarily 
better-off by having decisions made at the local level. 
Information asymmetry is an important assumption in our framework, in 
particu ar, the assumption that each decision-maker has an advantage over the 
other regarding one of the two types of information. Still, we could reach the 
conclusion that preferences might determine the impact of decentralisation on 
allocative efficiency, in the same, assuming that information asymmetry goes the 
other way around (i. e. assuming that the central decision-maker is better informed 
about preferences than local authorities while the opposite is true for technical 
information). 
Part of the theoretical discussion makes use of the assumption that there is 
a positive link between decentralisation and participation in decision-making. This 
assumption is in fact widely accepted in the literature about decentralisation. This 
link has nonetheless been questioned for the case of health care, namely for the 
case of the English NHS. Moreover, we have not considered the opportunity costs 
of participation that are likely to exist for participants themselves (e. g. time costs) 
and in terms of diverting resources of health care budgets from health production 
to sponsor participation activities. Determining health care priorities might even 
cause what has been ten-ned as 'disutility of denial'. These are factors that tend to 
lower the positive and direct impact of participation on welfare and which might 
be considered in future analyses. 
Throughout our discussion we have assumed, as it has been done in the 
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mainstream economic theory, that preferences are exogenous. Nevertheless, in the 
face of the criticisms that this assumption has stimulated, the assumption of 
exogenous preferences might represent a limitation of the current work. Relaxing 
this assumption has a relevant impact on our conclusions given that, in the case of 
endogenous preferences, the optimal setting (centralised or decentralised decision 
making) cannot be identified based on preferences given that the latter are in turn 
affected by the chosen setting. For example, if people attach little inherent value 
to participation because under centralised decision making they have not been 
given the opportunity to participate, then one cannot say that decentralisation is 
not optimal compared to centralisation because people do not value participation. 
When discussing externality effects associated with concerns for 
geographic inequality in health, we did not consider the possibility of movements 
of people between jurisdictions. Thus, if this happens, resource allocation between 
areas might not be a feasible instrument to impact upon health distribution and 
then the advantage of centralised allocation in terms of intemalising the spillover 
effects disappears and the discussion in section 3.6 falls in the scenario adopted in 
section 3.3 (that is, the argument to decentralise stops being the content of 
preferences and becomes the usual argument of information asymmetry about 
them). 
Regarding the empirical results, in addition to the limitations related to the 
specific regions from which samples were drawn and the specific topics included 
in the questionnaire, the method of administration might be viewed as a limitation 
because it has been acknowledge that, in the case of person trade-off questions, 
respondents often require greater explanation of the task than can be offered 
through a written survey instrument. The sizes of samples might also be 
considered a limitation for the generalisation of results. 
Several theoretical and empirical topics remain to future research. For 
instance, it has been suggested that, in the case of endogenous preferences, the 
nature of preferences (in terms of personal versus social preferences) might be a 
relevant issue to determine which preferences should be used to inform policy. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that the focus of discussion might even shift to 
the question of which preferences ought to be encouraged. Thus, in the future, 
normative questions of this kind might have to be addressed. 
An important question that remains to future research concerns the rule of 
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aggregation of the desideraturn at the suprajurisdictional level, that is, how to 
evaluate changes in overall social welfare given different preferences across 
jurisdictions? It is of course possible to evaluate changes in social welfare from a 
regional perspective and from a national perspective. But in the case of conflict 
between the two, how can we reach a conclusion on the overall impact of 
decentralisation? 
In terms of the empirical work, considering the Portuguese context in 
which this work was initiated, future studies should include other regions, namely 
southern regions as well as some fringes of the population that were excluded from 
our study. Methods of administration such as structured interviews or discussion 
groups might be considered, in particular for older people and people with no 
degree (or with a low degree) of education. It nught also be interesting, from the 
perspective of testing for differences between geographically defined samples, to 
group regions in terms of mainly rural and mainly urban areas. In addition, future 
research might look into the impact of the socio-demographic composition of 
samples on expressed preferences M order to test whether eventual differences 
between samples stem from their different compositions. 
Generally, and beyond the Portuguese context, questions could be refined in 
order to make more explicit the difference between geographic equality of health 
gain and geographic equality of treatment (studies might inclusively investigate 
whether or not this distinction has a significant impact on results). Also, a trade-off 
that seems to be worth exploting is that between the allocation of resources at the 
local level based on local preferences versus unifon-n provision throughout the 
country. The latter seems to be a particularly interesting issue to explore in the 
English context given the ambiguity that seems to exist there between the focus on 
'localism', on one hand, and the efforts to eliminate variations in provision, on the 
other hand. in fact, much of the empirical evidence about people's preferences, in 
the context of health care resource allocation, produced thus far has used samples 
from England or UK but studies of the sort reported in chapter four, in which the 
geographic dimension of (in)equality is explored, have not been implemented in 
England. Therefore, future analyses should take into account that there is this gap 
in the empirical literature. Yet another type of trade-offs that remains unexplored 
in the empirical literature is that involving outcomes, on the one side, and 
procedures, on the other. For instance, it would be interesting to see if, what; and 
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how much, are people willing to give up in order to increase their participation in 
decision making. 
Decentralisation is a current theme in the political agendas of different 
countries. Looking at the case of the English NHS, we suggest that there is a lack 
of clarity in the use of concepts like preferences and that other ambiguities and 
confusions have characterised the debate about (and related to) decentralisation. 
Although our discussion has focused on the English case, the same is likely to be 
happening in other countries as well. Thus, researchers might have a role to play 
here in terms of identifying these ambiguities and point the need for clearer policy 
guidance. 
178 
APPENDIX A -Maps of Portugal 
Regional Health Administrations: 
Legend: 
Ej North 
F-I Centre 
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 
Alentejo 
Algarve 
The Municipalities (Concelhos) of Braganýa and Coimbra: 
raganp 
oimbra 
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APPENDIX B- Questionnaire: English version 
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Questionnaire 
How ought health care resources to be distributed? 
)ý> This questionnaire is aimed at the general public. 
)ý- Thanks to scarcity, decisions about the distribution of health care resources 
are inescapable - It is important for decision makers to know what citizens 
would like from their National Health Service. 
)ý> There are no right or wrong answers; the researchers are only interested in 
your opinion. 
)ý> Answers are anonymous. 
)ý> There are 6 questions which will take about 10-15 minutes to complete 
Thank you very much for your co-operation. 
If you have any queries, please contact: 
Carlota Quintal 
Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra 
Av. Dias da Silva, 165,3004-512 Coimbra 
Tel: 239790580 
Email: qcarlota@fe. uc-pt 
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In the following two questions, we are asking you about your opinion 
regarding principles or criteria that might guide resource allocation. 
For each of the following two questions please circle 0 the number that matches 
your view most closely: 
Question I 
There are some health care interventions (for example, medicines and medical 
procedures) that have a greater impact on the individuals' health state than others. 
In some cases, this impact means improving the individuals' health; in other 
cases, it means narrowing the deterioration of the individuals' health. 
Do you agree that decisions about the distribution of resources available to health 
care ought to take into account, among other possible criteria, the impact that 
these resources have on the individuals' health state as well? 
12345 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly 
Disagree nor Disagree Agree 
(neutral) 
Question 2 
Resource allocation in health care involves the distribution of resources among 
different interventions but it also has a geographical dimension, involving the 
allocation of resources among different regions of the country. 
Do you agree that decisions about the distribution of resources available to health 
care ought to take into account, among other possible criteria, how these 
resources are distributed across different regions as well? 
12345 
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly 
Disagree nor Disagree Agree 
(neutral) 
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In the following two questions, we are asking you about your opinion 
regarding the relative importance of the two principles mentioned in 
questions I and 2. 
Question 3 
Imagine that following a scientific discovery, a new vaccine for children 
becomes available. This vaccine is capable of completely imi-nunising 
(protecting) children against a given disease, saving their lives. The disease is 
not contagious but is lethal. 
Without the vaccine, some children will become ill and consequently die; others, 
even without the vaccine might not become ill. 
There is however a limited quantity of this vaccine for each country, which is not 
enough to immunise all children. A decision must be made regarding which 
children to immunise. 
Imagine then that the country is divided in two regions, Region I and Region 2, 
where half of the children lives in Region I and the other half of the children 
lives in Region 2. 
Your must choose between distributing all doses of the vaccine among the health 
centres in Region I (Scenario A) or distributing half of the doses among health 
centres in Region I and half among health centres in Region 2 (Scenario B). Both 
scenarios involve the same total reduction in episodes of illness but differ in 
terms of the geographic distribution of the episodes of illness that are avoided. 
Please, indicate which scenario A or B you would choose, crossing X the 
corresponding box: 
Scenario A 
Number of children who will avoid the 
disease 
or 
Scenario B 
Number of children who will avoid the 
disease 
50 children 50 children 
Region I Region 2 Region I Region 2 
ATTENTION: If you chose Scenario A please turn to question 4 in page 5. 
If you chose Scenario B, please continue on the following page (p. 4) 
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Suppose now that targeting two regions (Scenario B) is less effective than 
concentrating on one region (Scenario A). 
For each of the five choices bellow, please cross X one box, indicating whether 
you would still choose Scenario B, or whether you would now choose Scenario 
A: 
Scenario A Scenario B 
Number of children who will avoid Number of children who will avoid 
the disease the disease 
1. 
or 
F-I 
45 children 45 children 
2. 
? gion I Region2 
100 children 
0 children 
3. 
, gion I Region 2 
'gion I Rcgion 2 
4. 
5. 
100 children 
0 children 
cgion I Rcgion 2 
100 children 
0 children 
? gioll I Region 2 
Rcgion I Region 2 
or 
F1 
35 children 35 children 
Region I Region 2 
or 25 children 25 children 
II F--] 
egion I Region 2 
F-I I 
or 
10 children 10 children 
II 
gi . 0111 Rcgion 2 
F-I I 
or 
5 children 5 children 
gi . On Region 2 
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Question 4 
Based on 2006 data, the average waiting time for a surgery, in Portugal, in the 
three regions where there are more people waiting (North, Centre and Lisbon and 
Tagus Valley) is about 7 months and the number of people registered in waiting 
lists is about 70000 in each of these regions. 
Suppose that the Department of Health decides to put extra money in the next 
year's health care budget to tackle waiting lists for a given surgery (for example, 
hip replacement or cataract surgery). The objective is to reduce the number of 
people waiting beyond the clinically acceptable time. 
Imagine that there are two alternative ways to distribute this amount of extra 
resources: 
-In Alternative A, resources are concentrated on Lisbon and Tagus Valley 
(LTV); 
-In Alternative B, resources are equally divided among the three regions (North, 
Centre and Lisbon and Tagus Valley) 
Because the number of specialized teams is greater in Lisbon and Tagus Valley 
than in the other two regions, Alternative A leads to a larger reduction in the total 
number of people waiting for surgery. 
Please, indicate which alternative, A or B, you would choose, crossing M the 
corresponding box: 
Alternative A 
Total number of people having a surgery 
10000 people 
00 
people people 
LTV Centre North 
or 
Alternative B 
Total number of people having a surgery 
3300 3300 3300 
people people people 
LTV Centre North 
ATENTTION: If you chose Alternative A, please turn to question 5 in page 7. 
If you chose Alternative B, please continue on the following page (p. 6) 
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Suppose now that the total number of people having a surgery under Alternative 
B is lower than previously stated. 
For each of the five choices bellow, please cross M one box, indicating whether 
you would still choose Alternative B, or whether you would now choose 
Alternative A: 
Alternative A Alternative B 
Total number of people having a surgery Total number of people having a surgery 
I. 
10000 people F-I 
00 people people 
or 
1-1 
3000 3000 3000 
people people people 
-TV Centre North LTV Centre North 
2. 
or 
10000 people 
00 
people people 
1-1 
2500 2500 2500 
people people people 
F-7 F-] I 
-TV Centre North LTV Centre North 
3. 
or 
10000 people 
0 
people people 
F-I 
1500 1500 1500 
people people people 
-TV Centre North 
LTV Centre North 
4. 10000 people 
00 
people people 
or 
F-I 
800 800 800 
people people people 
r---= r---= r----71 
-TV 
Centre North 
10000 people 
00 
people people 
TV Centre North 
or 
-TV 
Centre North 
300 300 300 
people people people 
JV Centre North 
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In the two following questions, we are asking you about your personal 
(private) preferences. 
Question 5 
There are many diseases, like cancer, that have a greater probability of cure if 
they are diagnosed at an early stage. To diagnose diseases at an early stage it is 
important to carry out screening programmes. 
In our country there are few systematic screening programmes. Still, even when 
screening tests are offered free of cost within the National Health Service, not all 
people come forward to take the test. 
Imagine that you received a letter from your Health Centre inviting you to take a 
screening test. Think for example about a test for colon cancer. 
It is mentioned in the letter that you may choose between being seen by a male 
doctor and a female doctor. 
For the following questions, please cross M the corresponding box: 
The possibility of choosing the gender (male or female) of the professional 
performing the test has an impact on your decision about whether or not to go to 
the Health Centre to take the test? 
YES .......................... 
1: 11 
NO .......................... 
1: 12 
Suppose now that you decide to go to the Health Centre for the screening test. 
You can still exercise your choice of a male doctor or a female doctor. Will you 
exercise your choice or are you indifferent to the doctor's gender? 
I choose according to my 
preferences ..................... 
I am indifferent ................ 
El 
2 
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Question 6 
Different people have different attitudes towards the same health problems. 
There are, for example, some vulgar symptoms like headache or back pain that, 
in most cases, do not lead people to seek personalised medical treatment. 
We would like to learn about your attitude / Preferences in the hypothetical 
situations described below. Think for instance about the cases of headache or 
back pain. 
For each of the five hypotheses, please cross X the box that in your view matches 
or would match your preferred fon-n of action most closely: 
I do I do self- I ask advice I visit the 
nothing medication to phannacist doctor 
1.1 feel strong pain occasionally 
El 1: 1 El 1: 1 
2.1 feel strong pain frequently but I carry out El 1: 1 El 
my normal life 
3.1 feel strong pain frequently and although I 
carry out my normal life during the day, I have 
sleeping difficulties overnight because of pain 
El 1: 1 El 
4.1 feel strong pain frequently, I do not sleep 
well and sometimes I have to interrupt my El 1: 1 El 
daily activities because of pain 
5.1 feel strong pain frequently, I do not sleep 
well and sometimes I am even forced to miss 
work / school because of pain 
El El El 
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Finally, we are asking you about some personal data (gender, age and level 
of education) for statistical purposes only. 
Please, fill or cross 0 the corresponding box: 
1. Gender: 
Male .................... 
1: 11 
Female ................. 
1: 12 
Age: year old. 
Education - please indicate the highest degree of education that you have 
successfully completed. If you are still a student (any degree) please select the 
box "Attending": 
None ................... F-I i 
Ist Cycle 
R2 
2nd Cycle 
............. 
1-12 
3rd Cycle ............. 
1-12 
Secondary F1 3 
Medium 
........... 4 
University 
.............. 4 
Attending 
................ 5 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. 
Your contribution is valuable to our research. 
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APPENDIX C- Questionnaire: Portuguese version 
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Questionario 
Como devem os recursos do Ministerio da Saude ser 
distribuldos? 
)ý> Este questionario destina-se aos cidadaos em geral. 
)ý> Devido a falta de recursos, as decisoes sobre como distribuir a parte 
F 
destinada aos cuidados de saude säo inevitaveis -E importante que os 
responsaveis politicos saibam o que e que os cidadäos desejam do seu 
Servigo Nacional de Saude. 
Nao ha respostas certas ou erradas; os investigadores estäo apenas 
interessados na sua opiniäo. 
> As respostas säo de caracter anonimo. 
> Este questionario e composto por seis questöes que deveräo levar cerca de 
10-15 minutos a preencher. 
Muito obrigada pela sua colaborapo. 
Se tiver alguma duvida sobre este questionario, por favor, contacte: 
Carlota Quintal 
Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra 
Av. Dias da Silva, 165,3004-512 Coimbra 
Tel: 239790580 
Email: qcarlota@fe. uc-pt 
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Nas duas questOes seguintes de-nos a sua opini iAo sobre dois criterios que 
considere poderem vir a orientar a distribuiýäo de recursos. 
Para cada urna das quest6es seguintes, fap um circulo 0 em redor do numero 
que melhor reflecte a sua opinido: 
Ha cuidados de saude que tem maior impacto sobre o estado de saude das pessoas 
do que outros. Ein alguns casos, este impacto significa melhorar o estado de 
saude das pessoas; ein outros casos, significa atenuar a deterloragäo do seu estado 
de saude. 
Questfio I 
Concorda que ao distribuir os recursos disponiveis para os cuidados de saude e 
importante ter ein conta, entre outros possiveis criterios, tambem o seu impacto 
sobre o estado de saude das pessoas? 
1 34 5 
Discordo Discordo 
Plenamente 
Nem concordo Concordo 
Nem discordo 
(neutro) 
Questio 2 
Concordo 
Plenamente 
A distribuiýdo de recursos envolve a sua distribuiýdo pelos diferentes cuidados 
mas tem igualmente uma componente geografica, envolvendo a distribuiýdo pelas 
diferentes regi6es do pais. 
Concorda que ao distribuir os recursos disponiveis para os cuidados de saude e 
'veis crit'rios, tamb' importante ter em conta, entre outros possi e em corno e que 
esses recursos sdo distribuldos pelas varias regi6es do pals? 
12345 
Discordo Discordo Nem concordo Concordo Concordo 
Plenamente Nem discordo Plenamente 
(neutro) 
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Nas duas questbes seguintes de-nos a sua opinido sobre a importancia 
relativa dos dois criterios referidos nas questbes Ie2. 
QuestAo 3 
Suponha que na sequencia de uma descoberta cientifica, surgiu uma vacina 
destinada as crianýas que as imuniza (protege) totalmente contra urna 
determinada doenýa. A doenýa nAo e contagiosa mas e fatal. 
Sem a vacina, a1gurnas crianps virdo a contrair a doenp ea i-norrer ein 
consequýncia; outras, mesmo sern a vacina poderAo ndo chegar a contrair a 
doenp. 
Ha, no entanto, urna quantidade limitada da vacina para cada pais e esta 
quantidade ndo e suficiente para vacinar todas as crianýas. Ha que tornar urna 
decis5o sobre quern vacinar. 
Suponha entäo que o pais esta dividido ein duas regioes, Regiäo 1e Regiäo 2, ein 
que metade das criangas habita na Regiäo 1ea outra metade habita na Regiäo 2. 
Tem de escolher entre distribuir todas as doses da vacina pelos centros de saude 
da Regiäo 1 (Cenario A) ou distribuir metade das doses pelos centros de saude da 
Regiäo 1e metade pelos centros de saude da Regiäo 2 (Cenario B). Os dois 
cenarios envolvem a mesma redugäo do numero total de casos de doenýa mas 
diferem quanto a distribuiýao geografica dos casos de doenga evitados. 
Por favor, indique qual dos cenarios, A ou B, escolheria, marcando com urna 
cruz Zo quadrado correspondente: 
Cenario A 
Nümero de cnangas que iräo evitar 
a doenýa 
Cenario B 
Nümero de criangas que iräo evitar 
a doenga 
ou 
Regiiýo I Reghio 2 Regl'ýio I Regitio 2 
ATENCAO: Se escolheu o Cenario A, por favor va para a quest5o 4 da pdgina 5 
Se escolheu o Cenario B, por favor continue na pagina seguinte (p. 4) 
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Admita agora que distribuir as vacinas pelas duas regi6es (Cenario B) e menos 
eficaz do que concentrar a sua distribuiýdo apenas na Regido I (CenArio A). 
Para cada uma das cinco hipoteses em baixo, assinale com uma cruz um dos 
quadrados, indicando se continua a preferir o Cenario B ou se agora passaria a 
optar pelo Cenario A: 
Cenario A Cenario B 
Mmero de crianps que irdo N6mero de crianýas que irAo 
evitar a doenýa evitar a doenp 
1. 
ou 
1: 1 
45 crianýas 45 crianýas 
100 crianýas ri 
0 criangas 
2. 
3. 
gido I Regitio 2 
1ý00 I Regijo 2 
100 crianps 
0 crianýas 
gi . ao Regiao 2 
ou 
n 
35 crianýas 35 crianýas 
giao I RegOo 2 
ou 
25 crianps 25 crianýas 
IIII 
gi, io I Rcgiiio 2 Rcgiao I Rcgiýio 2 
4. 
5. 
100 crianýas 
0 crianps 
[ýiiio I Regiao 2 
100 crianýas 
0 crianýas 
Regido I RegOo 2 
F-ý ý 
ou 
10 crianýas 10 crianýas 
I -I r---7771 
Regl*5o I Regiiio 2 
F-I 
ou 
crianýas 5 crianýas 
, gi ao 1 Regl'äo 2 
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Quest5o 4 
Com base em dados do ano de 2006 sabe-se que o tempo medio de espera para 
uma cirurgia, em Portugal, nas trýs regioes com maior numero de pessoas A 
espera (Norte, Centro e Lisboa e Vale do Tejo) e de 7 meses e que est5o inscritas 
nas listas de espera de cada uma destas reg16es cerca de 70000 pessoas. 
Suponha que o Ministerio da Saude decide, como medida extraordindria, reforpr 
o financiamento do combate as listas de espera para determinada cirurgia (por 
exemplo, cataratas ou protese da anca) no proximo ano. 0 objectivo e reduzir o 
numero de pessoas a espera para alem do tempo considerado clinicamente 
aceitavel. 
Assim, suponha que existern duas alternativas para distribuir este montante 
extraordinario de recursos: 
-Na Afternativa A, os recursos sdo concentraclos na Regiao de Lisboa e Vale do 
Tejo (LVT); 
-Na Afternativa B, o montante e dividido igualmente pelas Regi6es Norte, 
Centro e Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 
Pelo facto da Regiao de Lisboa e Vale do Tejo dispor de mais equipas 
especializadas, a primeira alternativa permite alcanpr urna maior reduýao do 
numero de pessoas a espera, no total das trýs regi6es. 
Por favor, indique qual das altemativas, A ou B, escolheria, marcando corn urna 
cruz Mo quadrado correspondente: 
Alternativa A 
Nüinero total de pessoas operadas 
LVT Centro Norte 
ou 
Alternativa B 
Nümero total de pessoas operadas 
3300 3300 3300 
pessoas pessoas vessoas 
LVT Centro Norte 
ATEN(7, kO: Se escolheu a Alternativa A, por favor va para a questdo 5 da pdgina 7. 
Se escolheu a Alternativa B, por favor continue na pagina seguinte (p. 6) 
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Adi-nita agora que na Altemativa B, em que o montante e dividido iguali-nente 
pelas trýs Regioes, o numero total de pessoas operadas e inferior ao 
anterion-nente anunciado. 
Para cada uma das cinco hipoteses em baixo, assinale com urna cruz un-i dos 
quadrados, indicando se continua a preferir a Alternativa B ou se agora passaria a 
optar pela Altemativa A: 
Alternativa A Alternativa B 
Mmero total de pessoas operadas Mmero total de pessoas operadas 
1. 
10000 pessoas ri 
00 
pessoas pessoas 
ou 
ou 
F71 
LVT Centro Norte 
10000 pessoas 171 
00 pessoas pessoas 
LVT Centro Norte 
10000 pessoas 
n 
00 
pessoas pessoas 
ou 
LVT Centro Norte LVT Centro Norte 
10000 p F-11 F1 I 
0 
pessoas pessoas 
ou 
3000 3000 3000 
pessoas pessoas pessoas 
LVT Centro Norte 
LII 
2500 2500 2500 
pessoas pessoas pessoas 
LVT Centro Norte 
LII 
1500 1500 1500 
pessoas pessoas pessoas 
800 800 800 
pessoas pessoas pcss()as 
r---l r-l I 
LVT Centro Norte LVT Centro Norte 
r% 
10000 
pessoas 
00 pessoas pessoas 
LVT Centro Norte 
F-I 
ou 
300 300 300 
pc"Soas pessoas pessoas 
Centro Norte 
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Nas duas quest6es seguintes refira-nos as suas preferencias pessoais. 
Questio 5 
Existern muitas doerips, como as doenps oncologicas, que ao serem detectadas 
precocemente tem uma maior probabilidade de cura. Para se diagnosticar uma 
doerip no seu inicio e fundamental que se fapm rastreios. 
No nosso pais ha poucos rastreios sistematicos das doengas oncolOgicas. Ainda 
assim, mesmo quando se oferece o teste gratuitamente no Serviýo Nacional de 
Saude, nem todos os utentes se dirigem aos servigos competentes para fazerem 
esses testes. 
Suponha que recebeu uma carta do seu Centro de Saude a convida-lo(a) para 
fazer um rastreio oncologico. Pense por exemplo no rastreio do cancro do cOlon. 
Nessa mesma carta referem que Ihe däo a escolher entre ser atendido(a) por um 
medico ou por uma medica. 
Para as seguintes quest6es, faýa urna cruz Z no quadrado correspondente: 
A possibilidade de escolher o genero (homem ou mulher) do profissional que ira 
realizar o teste tem impacto sobre a sua decisäo de dirigir-se ao Centro de Saude 
para fazer o rastreio? 
Sim 
....................... 
1: 1 
NAO ..................... 
1: 1 
Suponha agora que decide ir ao Centro de Saude para realizar o rastreio. 
Mediante a possibilidade de escolher um medico ou urna medica, exerce a sua 
escolha ou e-lhe indiferente? 
Escolho de acordo 
com a minha preferencia 
r] 
E-me indiferente .......... 
1-1 
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QuestAo 6 
A atitude das pessoas perante os mesmos problemas de saude nem sempre e 
igual. Existem, por exemplo, sintomas comuns como 'dores de cabega' ou 'dores 
de costas' que ein grande parte dos casos näo levam as pessoas a procurar 
cuidados medicos personalizados. 
Gostariamos de saber qual a sua atitude / preferencia perante as situaý6es 
hipoteticas descritas em baixo. Pense, por exemplo, no caso das 'dores de 
cabep' ou 'dores de costas'. 
Para cada uma das cinco hipOteses fap uma cruz Z no quadrado que no seu 
entender melhor corresponde ou corresponderia a sua fonna de agir preferida. 
Ndo fago Fago auto- Peýo Vou ao 
nada medicagdo conselho ao m6dico 
farmacýutico 
1. Sinto dores fortes uma vez por outra 
El 
2. Sinto clores fortes frequentemente mas faýo a 
minha vida normal El El El 
3. Sinto dores fortes frequentemente e embora 
faýa a minha vida nonnal durante o dia, durrno 
mal de noite por causa das dores 
El D El 
4. Sinto dores fortes frequentemente, durmo 
mal e por vezes tenho de inter-romper as minhas 
tarefas didrias por causa das dores 
El El El El 
5. Sinto dores fortes frequentemente, durmo 
mal e por vezes sou mesmo forgado(a) a faltar 
ao trabalho / escola por causa das dores 
El El 1: 1 El 
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Por flm, gostariamos que nos fornecesse a1guns dados pessoais (sexo, idade e 
nivel de escolaridade), apenas para fins estatisticos. 
Por favor, preencha ou fap uma cruz 0 no quadrado correspondente: 
1. Sexo: 
Masculino ............. 
F-I Feminino ............... 
1-1 
2. Idade: Anos 
3. Nivel de escolaridade: Qual o maior grau que frequentou com ýxito? (Se ainda 
se encontra a estudar, ein qualquer nivel de ensino, por favor, faýa uma cruz onde 
se le "A frequentar"): 
Nenhum 
................ 
ri 
l' Ciclo (4' classe) 
ri 
20 Cielo (6' ano)....... 
n 
3' Ciclo (9'ano) 
ri 
Ensino secundario....... 
Curso medio ............. 
Curso superior........... 
A frequentar .............. 
1-1 
Muito obrigada por ter preenchido este questionario. A sua 
contribuipo e valiosa para a nossa investigapo. 
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